From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795035956; b=le/a9RqXq5D+xbIn+Ndg/vjmOJZpF+c6YDeMymgsr0UMkt07EkPlhrgLZOz8aDJfZgnm hHXtsePIP/jdTE7brLwiGPiaa4D/7kyOEgVW4FEhHD1tpUOBqx8JaldDQMm9qvv/OVqbl IKqB0gp1776eDZCFMtVyR42XhjUMlEdoJRwu8A7hNWS9daj/0spfcIwf+7F9h9pl1LZ1F yIJML8EubpqFE4MJx8LGcA+8zPvUvBck56Q9CNoIXtlKbzEqHlsyuvDS0nao9uGLK3V7F AT+zAOSMZ25s86+jf75tflLbcBH02BqMu4AfIkSxFLO+Eal9RXTRt3qnAwF2E/ybRRg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795035956; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=/S2zyU27fvT+ZKxA5LhfsVtGV9lAWdfRmN1xl4RnskE=; b=kJvWFCdJ1Q+UxGTEExCuEAAE50V9PfS0shX2bIBvXrRkzVssjdHdXZ5xpINAjg5rKslP I34nnC8uyDr4uNOgup6cIIqaHDvVO+Ix17F9Z0aXhQ6eUuxCUdMvWcqBtyNDrA5v0d2uJ WL3ssII3/AlcxY8bmThYBB8cX0i71hqWIphRyTYiFvH7P0USmTiwfIB8hZJc9SXpy4GOY iSTwKXCD9vJxd6QyhuczPpT7uYGu2t2RDnRfE0vegpbq/Chq2aZCNzgvY3pkjHodkDvWp 6Ir7IgKrmqftpYEqgJ3R4mNmQkse3SEbW9JuYnMLqQQCH4pSxZSHsmwzXQZW3lu+M0A== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=Zl6yMWaj; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8A08F606A32A; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:05:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=Zl6yMWaj Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D7D2F1F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:05:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795035956; bh=/S2zyU27fvT+ZKxA5LhfsVtGV9lAWdfRmN1xl4RnskE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Zl6yMWajIfgt0PfrGaqruOUMnmvBz9FWYxGHed6ACOq5uX4RW9EjRD8Rzx5eENWW9 5G0NMQRMhIzWVQ9HcQwrmsJoFKPvYZ1k0mk/3sXEX0vjN668THd9ni5dYn61b0LE7s fH+TZJ6G/ZpM712nZIly9vQe9x+f4cBJ/DHu3DUw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Junrui Luo , Martin Wilck , Yu Kuai , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0888/3318] md/raid5: validate payload size before calculating payload_len Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:25:10 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150346.051870148@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Martin Wilck [ Upstream commit 38c795105992bbaa3418dd39cbff7348ad17537c ] Commit b0cc3ae97e89 ("md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata") introduced a bounds check to verify that a given payload fits into the current metadata block. In order to calculate the payload size, it has to access the members payload->header.type and payload->size, the offset of which may already be past the end of the metadata block, because the loop condition only checks that the first byte of the payload is inside, and the payload entries have variable sizes. Later on, payload->checksum[0] and payload->checksum[1] are accessed without verifying that payload->size is large enough. Add another check to make sure that payload->size can be safely accessed, and make sure that the checksum fields are accessible. This issue has been found by AI (gemma4, Gemini) during a backport review. Cc: Junrui Luo Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b0cc3ae97e89 ("md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata") Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260907155103.2325511-1-mwilck@suse.com Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/raid5-cache.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c b/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c index eac0244857910..86ddb0499b9d6 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid5-cache.c @@ -2009,27 +2009,36 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb(struct r5l_log *log, if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) { + while (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_header) <= le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) { + u32 payload_size; sector_t payload_len; payload = (void *)mb + mb_offset; payload_flush = (void *)mb + mb_offset; if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_DATA) { + if (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) + > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + goto mismatch; + payload_size = le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9); payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) + - (sector_t)sizeof(__le32) * - (le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9)); - if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + (sector_t)sizeof(__le32) * payload_size; + if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size) || + payload_size < 1) goto mismatch; if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum( log, ctx, page, log_offset, payload->checksum[0]) < 0) goto mismatch; } else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_PARITY) { + if (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) + > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + goto mismatch; + payload_size = le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9); payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) + - (sector_t)sizeof(__le32) * - (le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9)); - if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + (sector_t)sizeof(__le32) * payload_size; + if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size) || + payload_size < conf->max_degraded) goto mismatch; if (r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum( log, ctx, page, log_offset, @@ -2043,6 +2052,9 @@ r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb(struct r5l_log *log, payload->checksum[1]) < 0) goto mismatch; } else if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) { + if (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) + > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + goto mismatch; payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) + (sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size); if (mb_offset + payload_len > le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) @@ -2104,7 +2116,7 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log, mb_offset = sizeof(struct r5l_meta_block); log_offset = r5l_ring_add(log, ctx->pos, BLOCK_SECTORS); - while (mb_offset < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) { + while (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_header) < le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) { sector_t payload_len; int dd; @@ -2114,6 +2126,9 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log, if (le16_to_cpu(payload->header.type) == R5LOG_PAYLOAD_FLUSH) { int i, count; + if (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) > + le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + return -EINVAL; payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_flush) + (sector_t)le32_to_cpu(payload_flush->size); if (mb_offset + payload_len > @@ -2138,6 +2153,9 @@ r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block(struct r5l_log *log, } /* DATA or PARITY payload */ + if (mb_offset + sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) > + le32_to_cpu(mb->meta_size)) + return -EINVAL; payload_len = sizeof(struct r5l_payload_data_parity) + (sector_t)sizeof(__le32) * (le32_to_cpu(payload->size) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 9)); -- 2.53.0