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From: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
To: alex.aring@gmail.com, stefan@datenfreihafen.org,
	miquel.raynal@bootlin.com, linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org,
	pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
	phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 net] mac802154: fix uninit-value in ieee802154_header_create()
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:45:37 +0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261120084537.31991-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com>

During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
 ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
 wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
 dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
 ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
 x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
 ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
 ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
 wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
 dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
 ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
 x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:310
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Both ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create() declare
struct ieee802154_hdr hdr on the stack and clear only hdr.fc via
memset. This leaves hdr.sec uninitialized.

There are two ways uninitialized hdr.sec fields can be read:

1. ieee802154_header_create() had a pre-existing assignment:

       hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;

   This could set security_enabled = 1 from a stale cb->secen (e.g.,
   after WPAN_SECURITY_ON followed by WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT), even when
   mac802154_set_header_security() returns without initializing hdr.sec.
   ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() would then read uninitialized hdr.sec.

2. mac802154_set_header_security() never writes sec.frame_counter.
   ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() copies it from the stack into the skb
   before mac802154_llsec_encrypt() sets the real value. If encryption
   fails, or via AF_PACKET taps in dev_queue_xmit_nit(), the
   uninitialized bytes are exposed to userspace.

Fix both issues by replacing memset(&hdr.fc, ...) with
memset(&hdr, ...) in both functions, which zeros hdr.sec entirely
before mac802154_set_header_security() is called. The stale
hdr.fc.security_enabled assignment is also removed as it is now
superseded by the full zero-initialization.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Replace memset(&hdr.fc, ...) with memset(&hdr, ...) in both
  ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create() to also
  zero hdr.sec, closing the pre-existing uninitialized sec.frame_counter
  read on the normal TX path (noted by Sashiko AI review).
- Rename subject to reflect this is a bug fix, not a cleanup.

 net/mac802154/iface.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
index f437b8daa00d..36bdd7558810 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
@@ -366,9 +366,8 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (!daddr)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
+	memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
 	hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
-	hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
 	hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
 	hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
 
@@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ static int mac802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (!daddr)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
+	memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
 	hdr.fc.type = IEEE802154_FC_TYPE_DATA;
 	hdr.fc.ack_request = wpan_dev->ackreq;
 	hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
-- 
2.55.0

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  8:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-16  6:52 [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment Petr Vaganov
2026-11-17 11:06 ` Miquel Raynal
2026-11-18  2:04 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-20  8:45 ` Petr Vaganov [this message]

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