Re: [RFC] IMA LSM based rule race condition issue on 4.19 LTS

Guozihua (Scott)
2022-12-16T02:37:04Z

On 2022/12/16 5:04, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 15, 2022 at 9:30 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 21:15 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>>> On 2022/12/15 18:49, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 2022-12-15 at 16:51 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>>>>> On 2022/12/14 20:19, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, 2022-12-14 at 09:33 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2022/12/13 23:30, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Fri, 2022-12-09 at 15:00 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Hi community.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Previously our team reported a race condition in IMA relates to LSM
>>>>>>>>> based rules which would case IMA to match files that should be filtered
>>>>>>>>> out under normal condition. The issue was originally analyzed and fixed
>>>>>>>>> on mainstream. The patch and the discussion could be found here:
>>>>>>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220921125804.59490-1-guozihua@huawei.com/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> After that, we did a regression test on 4.19 LTS and the same issue
>>>>>>>>> arises. Further analysis reveled that the issue is from a completely
>>>>>>>>> different cause.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The cause is that selinux_audit_rule_init() would set the rule (which is
>>>>>>>>> a second level pointer) to NULL immediately after called. The relevant
>>>>>>>>> codes are as shown:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> security/selinux/ss/services.c:
>>>>>>>>>> int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
>>>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>>>> struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
>>>>>>>>>> struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
>>>>>>>>>> struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
>>>>>>>>>> struct role_datum *roledatum;
>>>>>>>>>> struct type_datum *typedatum;
>>>>>>>>>> struct user_datum *userdatum;
>>>>>>>>>> struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
>>>>>>>>>> int rc = 0;
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *rule = NULL;
>>>>>>>>> *rule is set to NULL here, which means the rule on IMA side is also NULL.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> if (!state->initialized)
>>>>>>>>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>>> out:
>>>>>>>>>> read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> if (rc) {
>>>>>>>>>> selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
>>>>>>>>>> tmprule = NULL;
>>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *rule = tmprule;
>>>>>>>>> rule is updated at the end of the function.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> return rc;
>>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:
>>>>>>>>>> static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>>>>>>>>>> const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>>>>>>>>>> enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
>>>>>>>>>> {...
>>>>>>>>>> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
>>>>>>>>>> int rc = 0;
>>>>>>>>>> u32 osid;
>>>>>>>>>> int retried = 0;
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
>>>>>>>>>> continue;
>>>>>>>>> Setting rule to NULL would lead to LSM based rule matching being skipped.
>>>>>>>>>> retry:
>>>>>>>>>> switch (i) {
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> To solve this issue, there are multiple approaches we might take and I
>>>>>>>>> would like some input from the community.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The first proposed solution would be to change
>>>>>>>>> selinux_audit_rule_init(). Remove the set to NULL bit and update the
>>>>>>>>> rule pointer with cmpxchg.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>>>>>>>>>> index a9f2bc8443bd..aa74b04ccaf7 100644
>>>>>>>>>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>>>>>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
>>>>>>>>>> @@ -3297,10 +3297,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
>>>>>>>>>> struct type_datum *typedatum;
>>>>>>>>>> struct user_datum *userdatum;
>>>>>>>>>> struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
>>>>>>>>>> + struct selinux_audit_rule *orig = rule;
>>>>>>>>>> int rc = 0;
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> - *rule = NULL;
>>>>>>>>>> -
>>>>>>>>>> if (!state->initialized)
>>>>>>>>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> @@ -3382,7 +3381,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
>>>>>>>>>> tmprule = NULL;
>>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> - *rule = tmprule;
>>>>>>>>>> + if (cmpxchg(rule, orig, tmprule) != orig)
>>>>>>>>>> + selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> return rc;
>>>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This solution would be an easy fix, but might influence other modules
>>>>>>>>> calling selinux_audit_rule_init() directly or indirectly (on 4.19 LTS,
>>>>>>>>> only auditfilter and IMA it seems). And it might be worth returning an
>>>>>>>>> error code such as -EAGAIN.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Or, we can access rules via RCU, similar to what we do on 5.10. This
>>>>>>>>> could means more code change and testing.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the 4.19 kernel, IMA is doing a lazy LSM based policy rule update as
>>>>>>>> needed. IMA waits for selinux_audit_rule_init() to complete and
>>>>>>>> shouldn't see NULL, unless there is an SELinux failure. Before
>>>>>>>> "fixing" the problem, what exactly is the problem?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IMA runs on multiple cores. On 4.19 kernel, IMA do a lazy update on ALL
>>>>>>> LSM based rules in one go without using RCU, which would still allow
>>>>>>> other cores to access the rule being updated. And that's the issue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An example scenario would be:
>>>>>>> CPU1 | CPU2
>>>>>>> opened a file and starts |
>>>>>>> updating LSM based rules. |
>>>>>>> | opened a file and starts
>>>>>>> | matching rules.
>>>>>>> |
>>>>>>> set a LSM based rule to NULL. | access the same LSM based rule and
>>>>>>> | see that it's NULL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this situation, CPU 2 would recognize this rule as not LSM based and
>>>>>>> ignore the LSM part of the rule while matching.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Would picking up just ima_lsm_update_rule(), without changing to the
>>>>>> lsm policy update notifier, from upstream and calling it from
>>>>>> ima_lsm_update_rules() resolve the RCU locking issue? Or are there
>>>>>> other issues?
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Mimi,
>>>>>
>>>>> That should resolve the issue just fine. However, that'd mean having a
>>>>> customized ima_lsm_update_rules as well as a customized
>>>>> ima_lsm_update_rule functions on 4.19.y, potentially decrease the
>>>>> maintainability. The customization of the two functions mentioned above
>>>>> would be to ripoff the RCU part so that we can leave the other rule-list
>>>>> access untouched.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Scott,
>>>>
>>>> Neither do we want to backport new functionality. Perhaps it is only a
>>>> subset of commit b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update
>>>> notifier").
>>> Yes we are able to backport part of this commit to get a mainline-like
>>> behavior which would solve the issue at hand as well. However from a
>>> maintenance standpoint it might be better to form a different commit and
>>> not re-use the commit message from mainline commit.
>>
>> I assume that is fine, but cherry-pick the original commit with the -x
>> option, so there is a correlation to the upstream commit. The patch
>> description would mention that the patch is a partial backport.
>
> FWIW, if the changes in the backport are significant I tend to use the
> following approach as it captures both the original commit as well as
> the details on what changes were made and why.
>
>>>>
> ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
>
> Really good explanation of what changes were necessary from the
> original patch, including why they were necessary in the first place.
>
> commit b169424551930a9325f700f502802f4d515194e5
> Author: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
> Date: Fri Jun 14 15:20:15 2019 +0300
>
> ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
>
> Don't do lazy policy updates while running the rule matching,
> run the updates as they happen.
>
> Depends on commit f242064c5df3 ("LSM: switch to blocking policy update
> notifiers")
>
> Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>>>>
Thanks for the suggestion Mimi and Paul.
>
>>>> Although your suggested solution of using "cmpxchg" isn't needed in
>>>> recent kernels, it wouldn't hurt either, right? Assuming that Paul
>>>> would be willing to accept it, that could be another option.
>>> The cmpxchg part is merely to avoid multiple updates on the same rule
>>> item. However I am not so sure why SELinux would set the rule to NULL.
>>> My guess is that SELinux is trying to stop others from using an
>>> invalidated rule?
>>>
>>> Would Paul be able to provide some insight? as well as some Comment on
>>> the proposed solution?
>
> I'm not comfortable with what might happen with a cmpxchg assignment
> when multiple threads are in a related RCU critical section; I'm
> assuming they would see the new value immediately (it is atomic,
> right?), which I imagine could cause some consistency problems.
> However, if someone who understands the intersection of cmpxchg/RCU
> better than I do can assure me this isn't a problem we can consider
> it.
>
> How bad is the backport really? Perhaps it is worth doing it to see
> what it looks like?
>
It might not be that bad, I'll try to post a version next Monday.

--
Best
GUO Zihua