Re: [RFC] IMA LSM based rule race condition issue on 4.19 LTS

Guozihua (Scott)
2022-12-21T10:51:37Z

On 2022/12/20 9:11, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
> On 2022/12/19 21:11, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>> On Mon, 2022-12-19 at 15:10 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>>> On 2022/12/16 11:04, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Dec 15, 2022 at 9:36 PM Guozihua (Scott) <guozihua@huawei.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 2022/12/16 5:04, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>>>> How bad is the backport really? Perhaps it is worth doing it to see
>>>>>> what it looks like?
>>>>>>
>>>>> It might not be that bad, I'll try to post a version next Monday.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for giving it a shot.
>>>>
>>> When I am trying a partial backport of b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm
>>> policy update notifier"), I took a closer look into it and if we rip off
>>> the RCU and the notifier part, there would be a potential UAF issue when
>>> multiple processes are calling ima_lsm_update_rule() and
>>> ima_match_rules() at the same time. ima_lsm_update_rule() would free the
>>> old rule if the new rule is successfully copied and initialized, leading
>>> to ima_match_rules() accessing a freed rule.
>>>
>>> To reserve the mainline solution, we would have to either introduce RCU
>>> for rule access, which would work better with notifier mechanism or the
>>> same rule would be updated multiple times, or we would have to introduce
>>> a lock for LSM based rule update.
>>
>> Even with the RCU changes, the rules will be updated multiple times.
>> With your "ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()"
>> patch, upstream makes a single local copy of the rule to avoid updating
>> it multiple times. Without the notifier, it's updating all the rules.
> That's true. However, in the mainline solution, we are only making a
> local copy of the rule. In 4.19, because of the lazy update mechanism,
> we are replacing the rule on the rule list multiple times and is trying
> to free the original rule.
>>
>> Perhaps an atomic variable to detect if the rules are already being
>> updated would suffice. If the atomic variable is set, make a single
>> local copy of the rule.
> That should do it. I'll send a patch set soon.
>
Including Huaxin Lu in the loop. Sorry for forgotten about it for quite
some time.

I tried the backported solution, it seems that it's causing RCU stall.
It seems on 4.19.y IMA is already accessing rules through RCU. Still
debugging it.

The backported patches are as below

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 0819b7600649..20349ef6383b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> }
> }
>
> +static bool rule_updating = false;
> +
> /**
> * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
> * @rule: a pointer to a rule
> @@ -369,6 +371,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
> {
> int i;
> + bool result = false;
> + struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule;
> + bool rule_reinitialized = false;
>
> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
> (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
> @@ -408,7 +413,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> u32 osid;
> int retried = 0;
>
> - if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> + if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule)
> continue;
> retry:
> switch (i) {
> @@ -417,31 +422,49 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
> - rule->lsm[i].type,
> + lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
> NULL);
> break;
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
> - rule->lsm[i].type,
> + lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> - rule->lsm[i].rule,
> + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
> NULL);
> default:
> break;
> }> if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
> retried = 1;
> - ima_lsm_update_rules();
> - goto retry;
> + if (READ_ONCE(rule_updating)) {
> + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
> + if (lsm_rule) {
> + rule_reinitialized = true;
> + goto retry;
> + }
> + } else {
> + WRITE_ONCE(rule_updating, true);
> + ima_lsm_update_rules();
> + WRITE_ONCE(rule_updating, false);
> + goto retry;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!rc) {
> + result = false;
> + goto out;
> }
> - if (!rc)
> - return false;
> }
> - return true;
> + result = true;
> +
> +out:
> + if (rule_reinitialized) {
> + ima_lsm_free_rule(lsm_rule);
> + }
> + return result;
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index b2dadff3626b..0819b7600649 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -256,27 +256,99 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> kfree(entry);
> }
>
> +static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> + kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> + }
> + kfree(entry);
> +}
> +
> +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
> + int i, result;
> +
> + nentry = kmalloc(sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!nentry)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
> + * lsm rules can change
> + */
> + memcpy(nentry, entry, sizeof(*nentry));
> + memset(nentry->lsm, 0, FIELD_SIZEOF(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> + if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
> + continue;
> +
> + nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
> + nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
> + goto out_err;
> +
> + result = security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
> + Audit_equal,
> + nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> + &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> + if (result == -EINVAL)
> + pr_warn("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n",
> + entry->lsm[i].type);
> + }
> + return nentry;
> +
> +out_err:
> + ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> +{
> + struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;> +
> + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
> + if (!nentry)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
> + synchronize_rcu();
> + ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
> * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
> - * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
> - * they don't.
> + * the reloaded LSM policy.
> */
> static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> {
> - struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> - int result;
> - int i;
> + struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
> + int i, result, needs_update;
>
> - list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
> + needs_update = 0;
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> - if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
> - continue;> - result =
security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
> - Audit_equal,
> - entry->lsm[i].args_p,
> - &entry->lsm[i].rule);
> - BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
> + if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
> + needs_update = 1;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!needs_update)
> + continue;
> +
> + result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
> + if (result) {
> + pr_err("ima: lsm rule update error %d\n",
> + result);
> + return;
> }
> }
> }

--
Best
GUO Zihua