From: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
To: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Robert Gill <rtgill82@gmail.com>,
Jari Ruusu <jariruusu@protonmail.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
"Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)"
<regressions@leemhuis.info>,
antonio.gomez.iglesias@linux.intel.com,
daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] x86/entry_32: Use stack segment selector for VERW operand
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2024 10:44:18 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4827a532-a54a-483a-9222-692aea33a611@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFULd4bhpTKZ5k=hSpitoFQk=U0njuacFhKrvpvcNqbA5ryV9A@mail.gmail.com>
On 11. 07. 24, 10:30, Uros Bizjak wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:16 AM Pawan Gupta
> <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 11:50:50PM +0200, Uros Bizjak wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10. 07. 24 21:06, Pawan Gupta wrote:
>>>> Robert Gill reported below #GP when dosemu software was executing vm86()
>>>> system call:
>>>>
>>>> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
>>>> CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1
>>>> Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010
>>>> EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
>>>> EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
>>>> ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc
>>>> DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046
>>>> CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0
>>>> Call Trace:
>>>> show_regs+0x70/0x78
>>>> die_addr+0x29/0x70
>>>> exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348
>>>> exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
>>>> handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d
>>>> exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
>>>> restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
>>>> exc_bounds+0x98/0x98
>>>> restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
>>>>
>>>> This only happens when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS are enabled.
>>>> This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value can result
>>>> in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the following
>>>> behavior for VERW instruction:
>>>>
>>>> #GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES,
>>>> FS, or GS segment limit.
>>>>
>>>> CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user
>>>> space. Replace CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS with a safer version that uses %ss to
>>>> refer VERW operand mds_verw_sel. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an
>>>> arbitrary user %ds. Also, in NMI return path, move VERW to after
>>>> RESTORE_ALL_NMI that touches GPRs.
>>>>
>>>> For clarity, below are the locations where the new CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SAFE
>>>> version is being used:
>>>>
>>>> * entry_INT80_32(), entry_SYSENTER_32() and interrupts (via
>>>> handle_exception_return) do:
>>>>
>>>> restore_all_switch_stack:
>>>> [...]
>>>> mov %esi,%esi
>>>> verw %ss:0xc0fc92c0 <-------------
>>>> iret
>>>>
>>>> * Opportunistic SYSEXIT:
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>> verw %ss:0xc0fc92c0 <-------------
>>>> btrl $0x9,(%esp)
>>>> popf
>>>> pop %eax
>>>> sti
>>>> sysexit
>>>>
>>>> * nmi_return and nmi_from_espfix:
>>>> mov %esi,%esi
>>>> verw %ss:0xc0fc92c0 <-------------
>>>> jmp .Lirq_return
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: a0e2dab44d22 ("x86/entry_32: Add VERW just before userspace transition")
>>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
>>>> Reported-by: Robert Gill <rtgill82@gmail.com>
>>>> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218707
>>>> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8c77ccfd-d561-45a1-8ed5-6b75212c7a58@leemhuis.info/
>>>> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>>>> Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> # Use %ss
>>>> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> v4:
>>>> - Further simplify the patch by using %ss for all VERW calls in 32-bit mode (Brian).
>>>> - In NMI exit path move VERW after RESTORE_ALL_NMI that touches GPRs (Dave).
>>>>
>>>> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240701-fix-dosemu-vm86-v3-1-b1969532c75a@linux.intel.com
>>>> - Simplify CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SAFE by using %ss instead of %ds (Brian).
>>>> - Do verw before popf in SYSEXIT path (Jari).
>>>>
>>>> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240627-fix-dosemu-vm86-v2-1-d5579f698e77@linux.intel.com
>>>> - Safe guard against any other system calls like vm86() that might change %ds (Dave).
>>>>
>>>> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426-fix-dosemu-vm86-v1-1-88c826a3f378@linux.intel.com
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 18 +++++++++++++++---
>>>> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>>>> index d3a814efbff6..d54f6002e5a0 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>>>> @@ -253,6 +253,16 @@
>>>> .Lend_\@:
>>>> .endm
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * Safer version of CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS that uses %ss to reference VERW operand
>>>> + * mds_verw_sel. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds.
>>>> + */
>>>> +.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SAFE
>>>> + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_verw\@", "", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
>>>> + verw %ss:_ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)
>>>> +.Lskip_verw\@:
>>>> +.endm
>>>
>>> Why not simply:
>>>
>>> .macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_SAFE
>>> ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw %ss:_ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)),
>>> X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
>>> .endm
>>
>> We can do it this way as well. But, there are stable kernels that don't
>> support relocations in ALTERNATIVEs. The way it is done in current patch
>> can be backported without worrying about which kernels support relocations.
>
> Then you could use absolute reference in backports to kernels that
> don't support relocations in ALTERNATIVEs, "verw %ss:mds_verw_sel"
> works as well, but the relocation is one byte larger.
No, the kernels support (and use) relocations. It's only ALTERNATIVEs in
older kernels don't.
--
js
suse labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-11 8:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-10 19:06 [PATCH v4] x86/entry_32: Use stack segment selector for VERW operand Pawan Gupta
2024-07-10 21:50 ` Uros Bizjak
2024-07-10 23:16 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-07-11 5:49 ` Jiri Slaby
2024-07-11 18:34 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-07-11 8:30 ` Uros Bizjak
2024-07-11 8:44 ` Jiri Slaby [this message]
2024-07-11 6:52 ` Jari Ruusu
2024-07-11 9:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-07-11 18:36 ` Pawan Gupta
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