From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.eperm.de ([89.247.134.16]:60074 "EHLO mail.eperm.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751273AbdFGLar (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Jun 2017 07:30:47 -0400 From: Stephan =?ISO-8859-1?Q?M=FCller?= To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Eric Biggers , Herbert Xu , Kirill Marinushkin , security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 13:30:44 +0200 Message-ID: <6959639.4HXaobxm8b@tauon.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: References: <20170606173900.29279-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> <4079216.Z1x2SUeU2i@tauon.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Am Mittwoch, 7. Juni 2017, 12:09:31 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld: Hi Jason, > On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 7:14 AM, Stephan M�ller wrote: > > including those who like FIPS and Co. The crypto/rng code > > I'm 99% certain it was this way because the developer who wrote it > originally didn't know what he was doing. Also, no other code anywhere > in the kernel instantiates that generator like hat. More generally, > though, I refuse to FIPS. The right way to instantiate the crypto API RNG is by crypto_get_default_rng and crypto_put_default_rng. I can understand that you refuse FIPS. It would even be great if *nobody* outside the crypto/testmgr.c needs to care about FIPS at all. That would imply that the get_random_bytes provdes access to a DRBG if somebody desires FIPS. Thus, if the get_random_bytes would provide random numbers from a pluggable DRNG allowing users to use a DRBG if desired (or ChaCha20 or another favorite DRNG), the entire RNG API in the kernel crypto API could be removed entirely in favor of a get_random_bytes call everywhere. Ciao Stephan