From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
To: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable-commits@vger.kernel.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>, David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Patch "bpf: Prevent unsafe access to the sock fields in the BPF timestamping callback" has been added to the 6.1-stable tree
Date: Fri, 23 May 2025 16:17:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <69d1a996-5eaa-4af9-978d-c59c70a95438@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAL+tcoBEGozJ1Zs2c0L-kG=ZTVfPGXdshQxs7nCxwr-NhZoUPw@mail.gmail.com>
On 5/22/25 4:25 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
> On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 7:17 AM Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
>>
>> bpf: Prevent unsafe access to the sock fields in the BPF timestamping callback
>>
>> to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at:
>> http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
>>
>> The filename of the patch is:
>> bpf-prevent-unsafe-access-to-the-sock-fields-in-the-.patch
>> and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory.
>>
>> If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
>> please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>
> Hi,
>
> I'm notified that this patch has been added into many branches, which
> is against my expectations. The BPF timestaping feature was
> implemented in 6.14 and the patch you are handling is just one of them.
>
> The function of this patch prevents unexpected bpf programs using this
> feature from triggering
> fatal problems. So, IMHO, we don't need this patch in all the
> older/stable branches:)
>
> Thanks,
> Jason
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> commit 00b709040e0fdf5949dfbf02f38521e0b10943ac
>> Author: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
>> Date: Thu Feb 20 15:29:31 2025 +0800
>>
>> bpf: Prevent unsafe access to the sock fields in the BPF timestamping callback
>>
>> [ Upstream commit fd93eaffb3f977b23bc0a48d4c8616e654fcf133 ]
>>
>> The subsequent patch will implement BPF TX timestamping. It will
Agree. The patch is a preparation work for the new bpf tx timestamping feature.
It is not stable material.
Thanks,
Martin
>> call the sockops BPF program without holding the sock lock.
>>
>> This breaks the current assumption that all sock ops programs will
>> hold the sock lock. The sock's fields of the uapi's bpf_sock_ops
>> requires this assumption.
>>
>> To address this, a new "u8 is_locked_tcp_sock;" field is added. This
>> patch sets it in the current sock_ops callbacks. The "is_fullsock"
>> test is then replaced by the "is_locked_tcp_sock" test during
>> sock_ops_convert_ctx_access().
>>
>> The new TX timestamping callbacks added in the subsequent patch will
>> not have this set. This will prevent unsafe access from the new
>> timestamping callbacks.
>>
>> Potentially, we could allow read-only access. However, this would
>> require identifying which callback is read-safe-only and also requires
>> additional BPF instruction rewrites in the covert_ctx. Since the BPF
>> program can always read everything from a socket (e.g., by using
>> bpf_core_cast), this patch keeps it simple and disables all read
>> and write access to any socket fields through the bpf_sock_ops
>> UAPI from the new TX timestamping callback.
>>
>> Moreover, note that some of the fields in bpf_sock_ops are specific
>> to tcp_sock, and sock_ops currently only supports tcp_sock. In
>> the future, UDP timestamping will be added, which will also break
>> this assumption. The same idea used in this patch will be reused.
>> Considering that the current sock_ops only supports tcp_sock, the
>> variable is named is_locked_"tcp"_sock.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
>> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250220072940.99994-4-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
>> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-23 23:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20250522231656.3254864-1-sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 23:25 ` Patch "bpf: Prevent unsafe access to the sock fields in the BPF timestamping callback" has been added to the 6.1-stable tree Jason Xing
2025-05-23 23:17 ` Martin KaFai Lau [this message]
2025-05-27 14:53 ` Greg KH
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