From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:11494 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726950AbeKSKRz (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Nov 2018 05:17:55 -0500 From: Andi Kleen To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina , Thomas Gleixner , Peter Zijlstra , Josh Poimboeuf , Andrea Arcangeli , David Woodhouse , Tim Chen , Casey Schaufler , Linux List Kernel Mailing , "the arch\/x86 maintainers" , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert? References: Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 15:56:10 -0800 In-Reply-To: (Linus Torvalds's message of "Sun, 18 Nov 2018 14:36:09 -0800") Message-ID: <871s7i0wkl.fsf@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Linus Torvalds writes: > On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 2:17 PM Jiri Kosina wrote: >> Which gets us back to Tim's fixup patch. Do you still prefer the revert, >> given the existence of that? > > I don't think the code needs to be reverted, but the *behavior* of > just unconditionally enabling STIBP needs to be reverted. Actually I think it should be reverted. Yes of course opt-in is needed. But also when you opt-in it doesn't make sense to set STIBP when the sibling is running the same security context, which is actually a common case. So to even use it properly you would need some scheduler support to detect these cases and only enable it then with opt-in. These patches didn't even try to tackle this problem. -Andi