Linux kernel -stable discussions
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 1/2] x86/fpu: Fix state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig()
Date: Mon, 31 May 2021 21:48:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87czt64rcu.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87fsy24tqt.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

On Mon, May 31 2021 at 20:56, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, May 31 2021 at 12:01, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> __fpu__restore_sig()
>
> 	if (!buf) {
>                 fpu__clear_user_states(fpu);
>                 return 0;
>         }
>
> and
>
> handle_signal()
>
>    if (!failed)
>       fpu__clear_user_states(fpu);
>
> which invoke that function unconditionally.

So we cannot warn there.

This is all wrong and everything should use copy_kernel_to_xstate()
after copying the buffer from user space. But of course allocating
memory there is daft.

There is also xstateregs_set() which invokes fpstate_init() on fail
which means it blows away _ALL_ state including supervisor state.

Even without supervisor state this function is bonkers. If the ptracer
provides a bogus data set then this just invalidates the target tasks
FPU state for no real good reason.

This should just use a kernel buffer.  If the copy from user fails, the
caller gets the EFAULT. If the header is bogus, then
copy_kernel_to_xstate() returns -EINVAL and that's handed back to the
caller. No reason to invalidate anything.

Thanks,

        tglx






      parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-31 19:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <cover.1622351443.git.luto@kernel.org>
2021-05-30  5:12 ` [RFC v2 1/2] x86/fpu: Fix state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-30 22:02   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-05-30 23:41     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-31  9:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-05-31 10:01   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-05-31 18:56     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-05-31 19:30       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-31 22:46         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-01  4:58           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-01 14:48             ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-01 18:06             ` [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Dave Hansen
2021-06-01 18:14               ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-01 18:35                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-01 22:44                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-01 18:25               ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-01 23:17           ` [RFC v2 1/2] x86/fpu: Fix state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-05-31 19:48       ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87czt64rcu.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de \
    --to=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox