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From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
To: David Long <dave.long@linaro.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>,
	Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.9 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 09:13:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <94ba11bc-ca20-4e6d-7791-026cc8be8449@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181031135713.2873-12-dave.long@linaro.org>

David,

On 31/10/18 13:57, David Long wrote:
> From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> 
> Commit 3f7e8e2e1ebda787f156ce46e3f0a9ce2833fa4f upstream.
> 
> In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor,
> let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit. This is made complicated
> by the fact that we cannot take a branch before invalidating the
> BTB.
> 
> We only apply this to A12 and A17, which are the only two ARM
> cores on which this useful.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  2 -
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 17 ++++++++-
>  arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
> index 96beb53934c9..de242d9598c6 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
> @@ -71,6 +71,66 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector:
>  	W(b)	hyp_irq
>  	W(b)	hyp_fiq
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +	.align 5
> +__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
> +	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
> +	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
> +	 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
> +	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
> +	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
> +
> +	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
> +	isb
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
> +	/*
> +	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
> +	 * Thumb2 is really a pain, as SP cannot be used with most
> +	 * of the bitwise instructions. The vect_br macro ensures
> +	 * things gets cleaned-up.
> +	 */
> +	mcr	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
> +	mov	r0, sp
> +	and	r0, r0, #7
> +	sub	sp, sp, r0
> +	push	{r1, r2}
> +	mov	r1, r0
> +	mrc	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
> +	mrc	p15, 0, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* MIDR  */
> +	mcr	p15, 4, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
> +#endif
> +
> +.macro vect_br val, targ
> +ARM(	eor	sp, sp, #\val	)
> +ARM(	tst	sp, #7		)
> +ARM(	eorne	sp, sp, #\val	)
> +
> +THUMB(	cmp	r1, #\val	)
> +THUMB(	popeq	{r1, r2}	)
> +
> +	beq	\targ
> +.endm
> +
> +	vect_br	0, hyp_fiq
> +	vect_br	1, hyp_irq
> +	vect_br	2, hyp_hvc
> +	vect_br	3, hyp_dabt
> +	vect_br	4, hyp_pabt
> +	vect_br	5, hyp_svc
> +	vect_br	6, hyp_undef
> +	vect_br	7, hyp_reset
> +#endif
> +
>  .macro invalid_vector label, cause
>  	.align
>  \label:	mov	r0, #\cause
> @@ -132,6 +192,14 @@ hyp_hvc:
>  	beq	1f
>  
>  	push	{lr}
> +	/*
> +	 * Pushing r2 here is just a way of keeping the stack aligned to
> +	 * 8 bytes on any path that can trigger a HYP exception. Here,
> +	 * we may well be about to jump into the guest, and the guest
> +	 * exit would otherwise be badly decoded by our fancy
> +	 * "decode-exception-without-a-branch" code...
> +	 */
> +	push	{r2, lr}
>  
>  	mov	lr, r0
>  	mov	r0, r1
> @@ -142,6 +210,7 @@ THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
>  	blx	lr			@ Call the HYP function
>  
>  	pop	{lr}
> +	pop	{r2, lr}


I don't see how this can work. This clearly isn't the right resolution
for merging 3f7e8e2e1ebda787f156ce46e3f0a9ce2833fa4f, as it contradicts
the very comment you are merging here.

I wouldn't be surprised if the crash you're observing would be due to
this problem (unaligned stack, bad decoding of the vector, branch to the
wrong handler, HYP on fire).

	M.
-- 
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-05 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-31 13:56 [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space David Long
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening David Long
2018-11-06 10:40   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-06 10:55     ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:19       ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:30         ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-11-06 16:53           ` Mark Brown
2018-11-06 16:20     ` David Long
2018-11-06 16:23       ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-10-31 13:56 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 David Long
2018-11-05  9:13   ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2018-11-07  2:22     ` David Long
2018-11-07  2:23     ` David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user() David Long
2018-10-31 13:57 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses David Long
2018-10-31 21:23 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches Florian Fainelli
2018-11-02  1:18 ` David Long
2018-11-02  8:54   ` Marc Zyngier
2018-11-02 17:22     ` David Long
2018-11-02 11:28   ` Russell King - ARM Linux

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