* [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key
2024-07-17 11:28 [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment David Gstir
@ 2024-07-17 11:28 ` David Gstir
2024-07-17 13:33 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: David Gstir @ 2024-07-17 11:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sigma star Kernel Team, James Bottomley, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Richard Weinberger, David Oberhollenzer
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
David Gstir, stable
Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.
With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.
This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.
Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
index b0947f072a98..4edc5bbbcda3 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
@@ -186,20 +186,21 @@ static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
return ret;
}
-static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
+static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *encrypted_key, u8 *plain_key)
{
- return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false);
+ return do_dcp_crypto(encrypted_key, plain_key, false);
}
-static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
+static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *plain_key, u8 *encrypted_key)
{
- return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true);
+ return do_dcp_crypto(plain_key, encrypted_key, true);
}
static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
+ u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
@@ -207,30 +208,36 @@ static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
- get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
+ get_random_bytes(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
- ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key,
+ ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, plain_blob_key,
b->nonce, true);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
- ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
+ ret = encrypt_blob_key(plain_blob_key, b->blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
put_unaligned_le32(p->key_len, &b->payload_len);
p->blob_len = blen;
- return 0;
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key));
+
+ return ret;
}
static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
+ u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
@@ -248,14 +255,14 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
}
- ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
+ ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key, plain_blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
- b->blob_key, b->nonce, false);
+ plain_blob_key, b->nonce, false);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
@@ -263,6 +270,8 @@ static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
ret = 0;
out:
+ memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key));
+
return ret;
}
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment
2024-07-17 11:28 [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment David Gstir
2024-07-17 11:28 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key David Gstir
@ 2024-07-17 13:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2024-07-17 13:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Gstir, sigma star Kernel Team, James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Richard Weinberger, David Oberhollenzer
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
stable, kernel test robot
On Wed Jul 17, 2024 at 2:28 PM EEST, David Gstir wrote:
> The DCP trusted key type uses the wrong helper function to store
> the blob's payload length which can lead to the wrong byte order
> being used in case this would ever run on big endian architectures.
>
> Fix by using correct helper function.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
> Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
> Suggested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405240610.fj53EK0q-lkp@intel.com/
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
I applied the patches, will send the PR later on (probably either
-rc2 or -rc3), so thus they are mirrored already to also linux-next.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread