From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 149C3C433F5 for ; Sun, 12 Dec 2021 13:20:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230521AbhLLNUb (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Dec 2021 08:20:31 -0500 Received: from sin.source.kernel.org ([145.40.73.55]:49436 "EHLO sin.source.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229907AbhLLNUb (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Dec 2021 08:20:31 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sin.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 66FCCCE0B16 for ; Sun, 12 Dec 2021 13:20:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DB906C341C5; Sun, 12 Dec 2021 13:20:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1639315227; bh=fLKOWxFUOcNIL62kYCpWTg7U4RURJqQ9zh9VEyWk/HA=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=XPXipdkjeRFOdbq4IWdtCHCeOzPcil0yugeZXOwnOmSbmkmINgpFWK/CJBrbiqcVm AFwgkiVNTNdmrfUXgh6QZD0FSgqUxBLNZ2vf3kffQVbGnzU+MS2PSBG+T3ufQ2rBYI 6JQtD7i05Z6t00LcCZ4wbXDd+uGMyVzBNsu3hue8= Date: Sun, 12 Dec 2021 14:20:24 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Tom Lendacky Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted Message-ID: References: <2e06a99ba4c4b1bc6663605414f7518e4c43d188.1639243140.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <2e06a99ba4c4b1bc6663605414f7518e4c43d188.1639243140.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Dec 11, 2021 at 11:19:00AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote: > commit 1ff2fc02862d52e18fd3daabcfe840ec27e920a8 upstream > to be applied to 4.14, 4.19 and 5.4. > > Reserving memory using efi_mem_reserve() calls into the x86 > efi_arch_mem_reserve() function. This function will insert a new EFI > memory descriptor into the EFI memory map representing the area of > memory to be reserved and marking it as EFI runtime memory. As part > of adding this new entry, a new EFI memory map is allocated and mapped. > The mapping is where a problem can occur. This new memory map is mapped > using early_memremap() and generally mapped encrypted, unless the new > memory for the mapping happens to come from an area of memory that is > marked as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory. In this case, the new memory will > be mapped unencrypted. However, during replacement of the old memory map, > efi_mem_type() is disabled, so the new memory map will now be long-term > mapped encrypted (in efi.memmap), resulting in the map containing invalid > data and causing the kernel boot to crash. > > Since it is known that the area will be mapped encrypted going forward, > explicitly map the new memory map as encrypted using early_memremap_prot(). > > Cc: # 4.14.x > Fixes: 8f716c9b5feb ("x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear") > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ebf1eb2940405438a09d51d121ec0d02c8755558.1634752931.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/ > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > [ardb: incorporate Kconfig fix by Arnd] > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 3 ++- > 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Now queued up, thanks. greg k-h