Linux kernel -stable discussions
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 10:09:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YbhfWHTL8Kobq9vv@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2e06a99ba4c4b1bc6663605414f7518e4c43d188.1639243140.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On Sat, Dec 11, 2021 at 11:19:00AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> commit 1ff2fc02862d52e18fd3daabcfe840ec27e920a8 upstream
> to be applied to 4.14, 4.19 and 5.4.
> 
> Reserving memory using efi_mem_reserve() calls into the x86
> efi_arch_mem_reserve() function. This function will insert a new EFI
> memory descriptor into the EFI memory map representing the area of
> memory to be reserved and marking it as EFI runtime memory. As part
> of adding this new entry, a new EFI memory map is allocated and mapped.
> The mapping is where a problem can occur. This new memory map is mapped
> using early_memremap() and generally mapped encrypted, unless the new
> memory for the mapping happens to come from an area of memory that is
> marked as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory. In this case, the new memory will
> be mapped unencrypted. However, during replacement of the old memory map,
> efi_mem_type() is disabled, so the new memory map will now be long-term
> mapped encrypted (in efi.memmap), resulting in the map containing invalid
> data and causing the kernel boot to crash.
> 
> Since it is known that the area will be mapped encrypted going forward,
> explicitly map the new memory map as encrypted using early_memremap_prot().
> 
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.x
> Fixes: 8f716c9b5feb ("x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear")
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ebf1eb2940405438a09d51d121ec0d02c8755558.1634752931.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> [ardb: incorporate Kconfig fix by Arnd]
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig               | 1 +
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 3 ++-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index c2a3ec3dd850..c6c71592f6e4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1990,6 +1990,7 @@ config EFI
>  	depends on ACPI
>  	select UCS2_STRING
>  	select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
> +	select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
>  	---help---
>  	  This enables the kernel to use EFI runtime services that are
>  	  available (such as the EFI variable services).
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> index aefe845dff59..6ca88fbc009c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> @@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size)
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> -	new = early_memremap(new_phys, new_size);
> +	new = early_memremap_prot(new_phys, new_size,
> +				  pgprot_val(pgprot_encrypted(FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL)));
>  	if (!new) {
>  		pr_err("Failed to map new boot services memmap\n");
>  		return;
> -- 
> 2.33.1
> 

This seems to cause config warnings as reported here:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/CA+G9fYsEQCjOi_58WcMb4i-2t1Gv=KjPuWa6L792YAZF=zzinw@mail.gmail.com
and:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/CA+G9fYuCFSbLMarXOnapUXN_NRgQMkjfr_rSTPjzBJQ-FT-Q3g@mail.gmail.com

so I will be dropping this commit from the 4.14, 4.19, and 5.4 trees.
Can you please fix this up and resend?

thanks,

greg k-h

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-12-14  9:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-11 17:19 [PATCH] x86/sme: Explicitly map new EFI memmap table as encrypted Tom Lendacky
2021-12-12 13:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-14  9:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-12-14 11:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-12-14 13:40     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-10-20 18:02 Tom Lendacky
2021-10-21 13:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-10-22 14:48   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2021-10-22 16:21     ` Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YbhfWHTL8Kobq9vv@kroah.com \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=naresh.kamboju@linaro.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox