From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>, kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Fix write-protection of PTs mapped by the TDP MMU
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 00:28:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yd9ySjsQFeHKnIDv@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALzav=djDTBxvXEz3O4QQu-2VkOcMESkpxmWYJYKikiGQLwyUA@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jan 12, 2022, David Matlack wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 12, 2022 at 3:14 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 12, 2022, David Matlack wrote:
> > > When the TDP MMU is write-protection GFNs for page table protection (as
> > > opposed to for dirty logging, or due to the HVA not being writable), it
> > > checks if the SPTE is already write-protected and if so skips modifying
> > > the SPTE and the TLB flush.
> > >
> > > This behavior is incorrect because the SPTE may be write-protected for
> > > dirty logging. This implies that the SPTE could be locklessly be made
> > > writable on the next write access, and that vCPUs could still be running
> > > with writable SPTEs cached in their TLB.
> > >
> > > Fix this by unconditionally setting the SPTE and only skipping the TLB
> > > flush if the SPTE was already marked !MMU-writable or !Host-writable,
> > > which guarantees the SPTE cannot be locklessly be made writable and no
> > > vCPUs are running the writable SPTEs cached in their TLBs.
> > >
> > > Technically it would be safe to skip setting the SPTE as well since:
> > >
> > > (a) If MMU-writable is set then Host-writable must be cleared
> > > and the only way to set Host-writable is to fault the SPTE
> > > back in entirely (at which point any unsynced shadow pages
> > > reachable by the new SPTE will be synced and MMU-writable can
> > > be safetly be set again).
> > >
> > > and
> > >
> > > (b) MMU-writable is never consulted on its own.
> > >
> > > And in fact this is what the shadow MMU does when write-protecting guest
> > > page tables. However setting the SPTE unconditionally is much easier to
> > > reason about and does not require a huge comment explaining why it is safe.
> >
> > I disagree. I looked at the code+comment before reading the full changelog and
> > typed up a response saying the code should be:
> >
> > if (!is_writable_pte(iter.old_spte) &&
> > !spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable(spte))
> > break;
> >
> > Then I went read the changelog and here we are :-)
> >
> > I find that much more easier to grok, e.g. in plain English: "if the SPTE isn't
> > writable and can't be made writable, there's nothing to do".
>
> Oh interesting. I actually find that confusing because it can easily
> lead to the MMU-writable bit staying set. Here we are protecting GFNs
> and we're opting to leave the MMU-writable bit set. It takes a lot of
> digging to figure out that this is safe because if MMU-writable is set
> and the SPTE cannot be locklessly be made writable then it implies
> Host-writable is clear, and Host-writable can't be reset without
> syncing the all shadow pages reachable by the MMU. Oh and the
> MMU-writable bit is never consulted on its own (e.g. We never iterate
> through all SPTEs to find the ones that are !MMU-writable).
Ah, you've missed the other wrinkle: MMU-writable can bet set iff Host-writable
is set. In other words, the MMU-writable bit is never left set because it can't
be set if spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable() returns false.
To reduce confusion, we can and probably should do:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index a4af2a42695c..bc691ff72cab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -316,8 +316,7 @@ static __always_inline bool is_rsvd_spte(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check,
static inline bool spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable(u64 spte)
{
- return (spte & shadow_host_writable_mask) &&
- (spte & shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
+ return (spte & shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
}
static inline u64 get_mmio_spte_generation(u64 spte)
Though it'd be nice to have a WARN somewhere to enforce that MMU-Writable isn't
set without Host-writable.
We could also rename the helper to is_mmu_writable_spte(), though I'm not sure
that's actually better.
Yet another option would be to invert the flag and make it shadow_mmu_pt_protected_mask
or something, i.e. make it more explicitly a flag that says "this thing is write-protected
for shadowing a page table".
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-13 0:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20220112215801.3502286-1-dmatlack@google.com>
2022-01-12 21:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Fix write-protection of PTs mapped by the TDP MMU David Matlack
2022-01-12 23:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-01-12 23:57 ` David Matlack
2022-01-13 0:28 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-01-13 17:04 ` David Matlack
2022-01-13 18:28 ` David Matlack
2022-01-13 19:29 ` Sean Christopherson
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