From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 19:35:03 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zw1IN_Gm8LZjWEO4@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024101410-jiffy-handsaw-43e3@gregkh>
On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 05:55:22PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2024 at 06:21:03PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> >
> > Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().
> > This is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking
> > 4k PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map
> > is set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's
> > break-before-make semantics do not easily allow breaking apart
> > large/gigantic pages).
> >
> > More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
> > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
> > (0) instead of an error. This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
> > "work" (e.g. syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
> > but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from
> > the direct map.
> >
> > Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
> > where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
> > CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
> > CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
> > failure. Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
> > arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
> > affected.
> >
> > >>From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
> > series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
> > intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
> > set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
> > SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped
> > between v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA
> > allocations.
> >
> > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
> > [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
> > [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
> >
> > Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
> > Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
> > Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > mm/secretmem.c | 4 ++--
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> What is the git id of this change in Linus's tree?
532b53cebe58f34ce1c0f34d866f5c0e335c53c6
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-14 16:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-14 11:57 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2024-10-14 15:21 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map Mike Rapoport
2024-10-14 15:55 ` Greg KH
2024-10-14 16:35 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2024-10-18 8:47 ` Greg KH
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