From: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: mte: Allow PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS access to the zero page
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:56:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aa94d2b9-d2f1-04fd-7cfe-8a1ab078e5c3@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210210180316.23654-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com>
On 2/10/21 6:03 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> The ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS) implementation checks whether the user
> page has valid tags (mapped with PROT_MTE) by testing the PG_mte_tagged
> page flag. If this bit is cleared, ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS) returns
> -EIO.
>
> A newly created (PROT_MTE) mapping points to the zero page which had its
> tags zeroed during cpu_enable_mte(). If there were no prior writes to
> this mapping, ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS) fails with -EIO since the zero
> page does not have the PG_mte_tagged flag set.
>
> Set PG_mte_tagged on the zero page when its tags are cleared during
> boot. In addition, to avoid ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS) succeeding on
> !PROT_MTE mappings pointing to the zero page, change the
> __access_remote_tags() check to (vm_flags & VM_MTE) instead of
> PG_mte_tagged.
>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Fixes: 34bfeea4a9e9 ("arm64: mte: Clear the tags when a page is mapped in user-space with PROT_MTE")
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Reported-by: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
> ---
>
> The fix is actually checking VM_MTE instead of PG_mte_tagged in
> __access_remote_tags() but I added the WARN_ON(!PG_mte_tagged) and
> setting the flag on the zero page in case we break this assumption in
> the future.
>
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 6 +-----
> arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 3 ++-
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> index e99eddec0a46..3e6331b64932 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> @@ -1701,16 +1701,12 @@ static void bti_enable(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
> static void cpu_enable_mte(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap)
> {
> - static bool cleared_zero_page = false;
> -
> /*
> * Clear the tags in the zero page. This needs to be done via the
> * linear map which has the Tagged attribute.
> */
> - if (!cleared_zero_page) {
> - cleared_zero_page = true;
> + if (!test_and_set_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &ZERO_PAGE(0)->flags))
> mte_clear_page_tags(lm_alias(empty_zero_page));
> - }
>
> kasan_init_hw_tags_cpu();
> }
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> index dc9ada64feed..80b62fe49dcf 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
> @@ -329,11 +329,12 @@ static int __access_remote_tags(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
> * would cause the existing tags to be cleared if the page
> * was never mapped with PROT_MTE.
> */
> - if (!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags)) {
> + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE)) {
> ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> put_page(page);
> break;
> }
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!test_bit(PG_mte_tagged, &page->flags));
>
Nit: I would live a white line before WARN_ON_ONCE() to improve readability and
maybe transform it in WARN_ONCE() with a message (alternatively a comment on
top) based on what you are explaining in the commit message.
Otherwise:
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> /* limit access to the end of the page */
> offset = offset_in_page(addr);
>
--
Regards,
Vincenzo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-11 10:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-10 18:03 [PATCH] arm64: mte: Allow PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS access to the zero page Catalin Marinas
2021-02-10 18:52 ` Luis Machado
2021-02-11 10:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-11 10:56 ` Vincenzo Frascino [this message]
2021-02-12 16:45 ` Catalin Marinas
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-02-16 18:56 vivek
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