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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1)
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 11:44:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ahVrgomLQ14ncWTE@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ahVeT9TTxlJiW2Qu@redhat.com>

Perhaps proc_pid_make_inode() can record task->self_exec_id in
proc_inode ? At least this can help to fix the
"if (ptrace_may_access(task)) mm = get_task_mm(task)" pattern...

On 05/26, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>
> On 05/18, Jann Horn wrote:
> >
> > Fix the easy cases where procfs currently calls ptrace_may_access() without
> > exec_update_lock protection, where the fix is to simply add the extra lock
> > or use mm_access():
>
> I thought about this too, but I do not know if it is fine performance wise...
>
> And what about proc_coredump_filter_write() which doesn't use ptrace_may_access() ?
>
> AFAICS, we can't rely on the open-time checks. /proc/$pid/coredump_filter can
> be opened for writing, the task can do suid exec after that, the file remains
> writable.
>
> Not a big deal, but still.
>
> Oleg.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-26  9:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-18 16:35 [PATCH 0/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock Jann Horn
2026-05-18 16:35 ` [PATCH 1/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1) Jann Horn
2026-05-26  8:48   ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-05-26  9:44     ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2026-05-26 14:19       ` Jann Horn
2026-05-26 14:16     ` Jann Horn
2026-05-26 18:22       ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-05-26 18:30         ` Jann Horn
2026-05-18 16:35 ` [PATCH 2/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links) Jann Horn
2026-05-22 11:47 ` [PATCH 0/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock Christian Brauner
2026-05-25 19:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2026-05-26 11:10   ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-05-26 18:22   ` Jann Horn

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