From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
To: zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
coreteam@netfilter.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
jianjun@tsinghua.edu.cn
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] netfilter: nf_reject: validate TCP header length before sending resets
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 23:28:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aukOnoeRxeMJrOM7@chamomile> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102155622.2658789-1-zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 11:56:22PM +0800, zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn wrote:
> From: Minghao Zhang <zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
>
> The TCP header validation in both nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_get() and
> nf_reject_ip6_tcphdr_get() checks that the TCP segment is at least
> sizeof(struct tcphdr) long, but does not verify that the header
> length claimed via the data offset is actually present in the packet.
> A peer can send a TCP packet claiming a 60-byte header although only
> the fixed 20-byte header is present.
>
> The reset generation then computes the ACK number using the claimed
> header length, and the subtraction of the data offset from the TCP
> segment length underflows, producing a wrapped ACK value in the
> generated RST. For a 20-byte segment with doff = 15, ACK bit clear,
> sequence number 0, SYN and FIN clear, the RST carries ack_seq
> 0xffffffd8 instead of a meaningful value.
So a malformed TCP packet brings another malformed TCP packet...
> Reject TCP headers whose data offset is smaller than the fixed header
> or exceeds the available TCP segment length. This prevents generating
> resets with an ACK number derived from an invalid TCP header length.
Maybe, yes. I think TCP conntrack is marking this as invalid?
In that case, only stateless ruleset behind in this way.
> Found during a systematic audit of TCP header validation in the
> netfilter reject paths. Tested in network namespaces with nftables
> "reject with tcp reset" rules: on both IPv4 and IPv6, a probe with
> doff = 15 produced an RST with a wrapped ack_seq; with the fix no
> RST is generated for such packets, while probes with well-formed
> headers still get a correct RST.
Why did your LLM pick the net.git for this?
Then, another option is nf.git, but I don't think this is nf.git
material, maybe nf-next.git is a better target tree for this?
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Fixes: 764d8a9f2407 ("[NETFILTER]: Add IPv6 REJECT target")
> Reported-by: Minghao Zhang <zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Reported-by: Jianjun Chen <jianjun@tsinghua.edu.cn>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Minghao Zhang <zhangmh25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
> ---
> net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 5 +++++
> net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
> index 59ec465a9..0e8823a7d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
> @@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_get(struct sk_buff *oldskb,
> if (oth == NULL)
> return NULL;
>
> + /* Reject invalid or truncated TCP headers. */
> + if (oth->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4 ||
> + oldskb->len - ip_hdrlen(oldskb) < (oth->doff << 2))
> + return NULL;
> +
> /* No RST for RST. */
> if (oth->rst)
> return NULL;
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
> index 07cdaa10d..9dc112e50 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
> @@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ nf_reject_ip6_tcphdr_get(struct sk_buff *oldskb,
> if (otcph == NULL)
> return NULL;
>
> + /* Reject invalid or truncated TCP headers. */
> + if (otcph->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4 ||
> + *otcplen < (otcph->doff << 2))
> + return NULL;
> +
> /* No RST for RST. */
> if (otcph->rst) {
> pr_debug("RST is set\n");
> --
> 2.34.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-02 22:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 15:56 [PATCH net] netfilter: nf_reject: validate TCP header length before sending resets zhangmh25
2026-11-02 22:28 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso [this message]
2026-11-03 15:57 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
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