From: "Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Collingbourne <peter@pcc.me.uk>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/24] arm64: Fix lazy TCO clear when enabling user MTE
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:57:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avQqdBEGwje1iVlz@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <avNjcKtuQkZW0_Sr@arm.com>
Hi Catalin,
On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 06:33:20PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 07, 2026 at 04:36:07PM +0100, Pierre-Clément Tosi wrote:
> > On kernel entry from EL0 with HW KASAN inactive and user MTE disabled or
> > in async mode, mte_disable_tco_entry() leaves PSTATE.TCO set to avoid an
> > expensive write, as it assumes that EL1 tag checks are not needed.
> >
> > However, if the thread is in the process of enabling sync or asymm MTE,
> > set_mte_ctrl() updates SCTLR_EL1.TCF0 without clearing PSTATE.TCO! As a
> > result, kernel uaccesses miss tag faults until the next context switch.
>
> Nit: next context switch or another syscall. I think this makes it
> clearer that the only potential missed tag accesses after the prctl() is
> a signal frame write as we don't have other uaccesses.
>
> > Clear TCO in set_mte_ctrl() immediately after setting the task's SCTLR.
> >
> > Cc: Peter Collingbourne <peter@pcc.me.uk>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Fixes: 38ddf7dafaea ("arm64: mte: avoid clearing PSTATE.TCO on entry unless necessary")
> > Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
>
> The patch is correct but I wonder whether we need a cc stable.
>
> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Thanks for your review.
I'm happy to drop the cc in the next version. The rationale was that this fixed
an unexpected userspace-visible kernel behavior and closed a window during which
tag checks were not performed, which _could_ be a concern when userspace enables
MTE for security. I can see how this doesn't make a strong case for backporting.
--
Pierre
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-11 8:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-07 15:36 [PATCH 00/24] arm64: Decouple MTE code from KASAN support Pierre-Clément Tosi
2026-11-07 15:36 ` [PATCH 01/24] arm64: Fix lazy TCO clear when enabling user MTE Pierre-Clément Tosi
2026-11-10 18:33 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-11-11 8:57 ` Pierre-Clément Tosi [this message]
2026-11-11 9:38 ` Peter Collingbourne
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=avQqdBEGwje1iVlz@google.com \
--to=ptosi@google.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=peter@pcc.me.uk \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox