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From: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
To: Sergei Nizovtsev <snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
	Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:07:40 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avrj_GrUbKNjDXz6@lima-development> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261111203614.1221188-1-snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>

On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 09:35:52PM +0100, Sergei Nizovtsev wrote:
> The backing_file_alloc and backing_file_free LSM hooks get the backing
> file as "struct file *backing_file", but its f_path is not populated
> while they run:
> 
>  - security_backing_file_alloc() is called from init_backing_file() in
>    alloc_empty_backing_file(), before vfs_open() sets f_path, so
>    backing_file->f_path.dentry is NULL;
>  - security_backing_file_free() can run for a backing file whose open
>    failed and whose f_path was already cleared.
> 
> Neither hook is listed in untrusted_lsm_hooks, so bpf_lsm_is_trusted()
> lets BPF LSM programs use the argument as a trusted pointer.  A program
> attached to lsm/backing_file_alloc can pass &backing_file->f_path to the
> trusted-args kfunc bpf_path_d_path(), and d_path() dereferences the NULL
> dentry on the first open of a file on overlayfs:
> 
>   extern int bpf_path_d_path(const struct path *path, char *buf,
>                              size_t sz) __ksym;
>   char buf[256];
> 
>   SEC("lsm/backing_file_alloc")
>   int BPF_PROG(poc, struct file *backing_file,
>                const struct file *user_file)
>   {
>           bpf_path_d_path(&backing_file->f_path, buf, sizeof(buf));
>           return 0;
>   }
> 
>   # bpftool prog load poc.bpf.o /sys/fs/bpf/poc autoattach
>   # cat <any file on an overlayfs mount>
> 
>   Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
>   KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
>   RIP: 0010:d_path+0xb4/0x810
>   Call Trace:
>    bpf_path_d_path+0x26/0x70
>    bpf_prog_f8f2e241d4ff7217_poc+0x33/0x37
>    bpf_trampoline_6442521065+0x61/0xf9
>    security_backing_file_alloc+0x78/0xe0
>    alloc_empty_backing_file+0xf0/0x170
>    backing_file_open+0xfd/0x290
>    ovl_open_realfile+0x1ed/0x270
>    ovl_open+0x1a9/0x2f0
>    do_dentry_open+0x404/0x1280
>    vfs_open_consume+0xba/0x4b0
>    path_openat+0xc4f/0x1f60
> 
> Add both hooks to untrusted_lsm_hooks, next to file_alloc_security and
> file_free_security, which are listed there for the same reason.  The
> program above is then rejected at load time with "R1 must be referenced
> or trusted".

I literally had a patch queued up and was just about to send it out for
review. Thank you for this.

> Fixes: 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5-2
> Signed-off-by: Sergei Nizovtsev <snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>
> ---
> Tested on bpf.git master (475a0cfd02f1) under virtme-ng with KASAN: the
> reproducer oopses without the patch and fails to load with it. Only the
> backing_file_alloc case was reproduced; backing_file_free is from code
> reading.
> 
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index f58dce888ff4a..f39a3766f2245 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_alloc)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_free)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security)
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 11:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-11 20:35 [PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted Sergei Nizovtsev
2026-11-14  6:10 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2026-11-16 11:07 ` Matt Bobrowski [this message]

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