From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794920344; b=0sdPQcWl01NUTlQSoXBhncKc+ykT6eaLq4aXOJXN0GmAKAE7IaF9H20VboG5c/mR5jm/ l+hN8mTHG5ufsPRINaPrgOKKSSJ2fsjgOTEVckDQKkTvEhRb6hHsVeU3sgiz9KF4zZlig shxWxtkov9Y5FLfD0DWN36huO7ZlvTx54BUIxnBk2d+ZJ1l7FwqS/TEzzYz8Xs/SjjCA1 zyCthK6g/VrXE0gZWFZNNlnI7jhANqNYIcvUfJVC3ce8f3z3/jiB6HvWqdApf8N5enp7A 07iwuBk0CzGME0y61ocPuGjLZ3OlGSEr8gofD6lIOqeqx2FLU8cefHYS706GWkGyytQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794920344; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=P/iIhIHbJi0Ry1aV+mvg4mIMdsNQGqRfT0aLhVEY/6g=; b=JISwqcXRX1vHoLHMc53m12ZiPomq6U4x2yFNfChPgSDTXBXqo6hle4cCvmPS+l4zA844 YRO/fSFD5pBFJjVI79UJATjATt2p79Ix7C3YYvZDsydlQiJQdJOvLECEBxHUNn3c04cbW JIO0ql+0E2PKWCNBYtS4eKj4EdDXh7fjswsFP6LxMSwcIcSKhvk2vISD0IfAEtnlZT/VQ tIHZY24D5hGwGzIC3TJT1YkXwLIc9h4xX7+dIxLeuXFZx750FqqXCDns0V/kkmCJWubmv hJEm5Hn+bY2WpfHhNUWhBL6ZrIfuoLqDWaVTazPePYWqOQkDHwNcoOBcH0lyy6IV0tg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=OPAeyU1b; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 601D9606A89E; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:59:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=OPAeyU1b Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AE5D71F000C6; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 12:59:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794920344; bh=P/iIhIHbJi0Ry1aV+mvg4mIMdsNQGqRfT0aLhVEY/6g=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=OPAeyU1bcr8bRfKjvwodvxzewD4ztke+RkTghZNG3xec746dQSVKR7e0AMI3CSvEk 9MAxhAYnGHoa99PgtFgvEXOVzdccfvGUD7QS+NXoB79vjmvesVpd0UjcH3UYh/a316 a5hyqbDa3FjuJlJr3dWTM4tpzZvSGLBEidzJ35Qj9M5D1Vnm/XGLKNqqPP9vFFeX32 lNwMB8odTs7mnL/1cGCIpLi5K4j/5nKf6MVoKPCQspaCwvO4g6sCFt9s57Os3JUeAZ UM2Qnqmj3HyMgYutVzKEMXSVOtf0WDQhoI2ICzWRK1WepJcHnvDfYTj7WcuikOAmYT rSBM+RpWMoDCg== Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 07:59:02 -0500 From: Sasha Levin To: Jens Axboe Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , "stable@vger.kernel.org" , "io-uring@vger.kernel.org" , Yufan Chen , dev@rebasedinc.com Subject: Re: io_uring/eventfd: registered eventfd signals only once after the cd305ee3633a backport (6.18.y, 6.12.y, Ubuntu 26.04) Message-ID: References: <5d92861f-9a4d-4810-8700-b9e457ed9c86@kernel.dk> <2026111605-deskbound-clobber-a4a1@gregkh> <07947062-2974-4630-90db-1556e25b50bb@kernel.dk> <8e6c1d69-9910-4c89-832a-34ecd65a0ca7@kernel.dk> X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <8e6c1d69-9910-4c89-832a-34ecd65a0ca7@kernel.dk> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 05:45:53AM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote: >On 11/17/26 5:42 AM, Sasha Levin wrote: >> On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 07:21:38PM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote: >>> On 11/16/26 2:52 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: >>>> On Sat, Nov 14, 2026 at 11:12:40AM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote: >>>>> On 11/14/26 10:42 AM, Sasha Levin wrote: >>>>>> On 2026-11-13, dev@rebasedinc.com wrote: >>>>>>> If this is correct, a backport of 04fe9aeb4f3c to 6.18.y and 6.12.y looks like the right fix; it keeps the CVE-2026-80920 fix in place. >>>>>> >>>>>> Queued for 6.18 and 6.12, thanks. >>>>> >>>>> Yet another bs CVE - Greg, please invalidate this one too, it's NOT CVE material. >>>>> Getting a little tired of chasing these. >>>> >>>> Now rejected, sorry about that. >>> >>> Not sure how we improve on that, it's really annoying to catch these bogus >>> ones after the fact? >> >> Hi Jens, >> >> Since some of our reviews are LLM based, I was looking to see why this one was >> flagged as a security issue. >> >> From the explanation, and looking at the code, it seems that we can register an >> eventfd with io_uring, then have epoll watch that same eventfd. When something >> wakes the epoll, the kernel is holding epoll's wait-queue lock. That wakeup >> runs io_uring's poll handler, which signals the eventfd, but the eventfd is >> watched by the same epoll, so it tries to grab that same lock again on the same >> CPU. The CPU spins forever on a lock it already holds. One core is dead, >> followed by RCU stalls, machine wedges. Any unprivileged user with io_uring >> access can do it. > >I think you're looking at the parent of that, not the followup. Yes the >parent is a real fix, it's similar to the eventfd fix in mainline as well >for that exact issue. If by followup you mean 04fe9aeb4f3c ("io_uring/eventfd: reset deferred signal state") then yes, I don't think it's security relevant, and it never had a CVE assigned. cd305ee3633a ("io_uring: defer eventfd signaling when queued from a wakeup handler") is what had the CVE assigned to it, and what Greg rejected earlier. Should the rejection be reverted then? -- Thanks, Sasha