From: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
To: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Julian Sun <sunjunchao2870@gmail.com>,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
syzbot+ebea2790904673d7c618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] f2fs: Do not check the FI_DIRTY_INODE flag when umounting a ro fs.
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2024 23:06:38 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <db0f8aef-a5af-4da9-b6ae-4fb60d0bfc4f@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Ztd9iJI4ubmpc0_T@google.com>
On 2024/9/4 5:20, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> On 09/03, Chao Yu wrote:
>> On 2024/9/2 21:01, Julian Sun wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-09-02 at 16:13 +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
>>>>> On 2024/8/29 0:54, Julian Sun wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi, all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Recently syzbot reported a bug as following:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:896!
>>>>>>> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5217 Comm: syz-executor605 Not tainted
>>>>>>> 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00033-g872cf28b8df9 #0
>>>>>>> RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1598/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:896
>>>>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>>>> <TASK>
>>>>>>> evict+0x532/0x950 fs/inode.c:704
>>>>>>> dispose_list fs/inode.c:747 [inline]
>>>>>>> evict_inodes+0x5f9/0x690 fs/inode.c:797
>>>>>>> generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2d0 fs/super.c:627
>>>>>>> kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1696
>>>>>>> kill_f2fs_super+0x344/0x690 fs/f2fs/super.c:4898
>>>>>>> deactivate_locked_super+0xc4/0x130 fs/super.c:473
>>>>>>> cleanup_mnt+0x41f/0x4b0 fs/namespace.c:1373
>>>>>>> task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228
>>>>>>> ptrace_notify+0x2d2/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2402
>>>>>>> ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:415 [inline]
>>>>>>> ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:477
>>>>>>> [inline]
>>>>>>> syscall_exit_work+0xc6/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:173
>>>>>>> syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:200
>>>>>>> [inline]
>>>>>>> __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:205
>>>>>>> [inline]
>>>>>>> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x279/0x370
>>>>>>> kernel/entry/common.c:218
>>>>>>> do_syscall_64+0x100/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
>>>>>>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The syzbot constructed the following scenario: concurrently
>>>>>>> creating directories and setting the file system to read-only.
>>>>>>> In this case, while f2fs was making dir, the filesystem
>>>>>>> switched to
>>>>>>> readonly, and when it tried to clear the dirty flag, it
>>>>>>> triggered
>>
>> Go back to the root cause, I have no idea why it can leave dirty inode
>> while mkdir races w/ readonly remount, due to the two operations should
>> be exclusive, IIUC.
>
> Wait, we can think of writable disk mounted as fs-readonly. In that case,
> IIRC, we allow to recover files/data by roll-forward and so on, which can
We will remove SB_RDONLY flag from sb->s_flags intentionally before
recovery, so that following write_checkpoint() or sync_filesystem()
won't skip flushing due to sb is readonly.
static bool f2fs_recover_quota_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
...
if (readonly) {
sbi->sb->s_flags &= ~SB_RDONLY;
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_WRITABLE);
}
...
}
> make some dirty inodes. Can we check if there's any missing path which does
> not flush dirty inode?
I guess the root cause of this issue is like this:
- f2fs_lookup
- __recover_dot_dentries()
- clear_inode_flag(dir, FI_INLINE_DOTS)
- __mark_inode_dirty_flag()
- remount rdonly
- sb->s_flags |= SB_RDONLY
- umount
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- generic_shutdown_super
- sync_filesystem skips due to sb_rdonly is true
- evict_inodes
- dispose_list
- f2fs_evict_inode panic
So how about this?
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chao/linux.git/commit/?h=wip&id=e080fc8bec4d674cb8eb26ef0a0432f88bd65dd0
Thanks,
>
>>
>> - mkdir
>> - do_mkdirat
>> - filename_create
>> - mnt_want_write
>> - mnt_get_write_access
>> - mount
>> - do_remount
>> - reconfigure_super
>> - sb_prepare_remount_readonly
>> - mnt_hold_writers
>> - vfs_mkdir
>> - f2fs_mkdir
>>
>> But when I try to reproduce this bug w/ reproducer provided by syzbot,
>> I have found a clue in the log:
>>
>> "skip recovering inline_dots inode..."
>>
>> So I doubt the root cause is __recover_dot_dentries() in f2fs_lookup()
>> generates dirty data/meta, in this path, we will not grab related lock
>> to exclude readonly remount.
>>
>> Let me try to verify below patch:
>>
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chao/linux.git/commit/?h=wip&id=69dc8fbbbb39f85f9f436ca562c98afbcc2a48d2
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> code path: f2fs_mkdir()-> f2fs_sync_fs()-
>>>>>>>> f2fs_write_checkpoint()
>>>>>>> ->f2fs_readonly(). This resulted FI_DIRTY_INODE flag not being
>>>>>>> cleared,
>>>>>>> which eventually led to a bug being triggered during the
>>>>>>> FI_DIRTY_INODE
>>>>>>> check in f2fs_evict_inode().
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In this case, we cannot do anything further, so if filesystem
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> readonly,
>>>>>>> do not trigger the BUG. Instead, clean up resources to the best
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>> ability to prevent triggering subsequent resource leak checks.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If there is anything important I'm missing, please let me know,
>>>>>>> thanks.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Reported-by:
>>>>>>> syzbot+ebea2790904673d7c618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>>>>>> Closes:
>>>>>>> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ebea2790904673d7c618
>>>>>>> Fixes: ca7d802a7d8e ("f2fs: detect dirty inode in evict_inode")
>>>>>>> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Julian Sun <sunjunchao2870@gmail.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 ++-
>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
>>>>>>> index aef57172014f..ebf825dba0a5 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
>>>>>>> @@ -892,7 +892,8 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
>>>>>>> atomic_read(&fi->i_compr_blocks));
>>>>>>> if (likely(!f2fs_cp_error(sbi) &&
>>>>>>> - !is_sbi_flag_set(sbi,
>>>>>>> SBI_CP_DISABLED)))
>>>>>>> + !is_sbi_flag_set(sbi,
>>>>>>> SBI_CP_DISABLED)) &&
>>>>>>> + !f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb))
>>>>>
>>>>> Is it fine to drop this dirty inode? Since once it remounts f2fs as
>>>>> rw one,
>>>>> previous updates on such inode may be lost? Or am I missing
>>>>> something?
>>>
>>> The purpose of calling this here is mainly to avoid triggering the
>>> f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); statement in the subsequent f2fs_put_super() due
>>> to a reference count check failure.
>>> I would say it's possible, but there doesn't seem to be much more we
>>> can do in this scenario: the inode is about to be freed, and the file
>>> system is read-only. Or do we need a mechanism to save the inode that
>>> is about to be freed and then write it back to disk at the appropriate
>>> time after the file system becomes rw again? But such a mechanism
>>> sounds somewhat complex and a little bit of weird... Do you have any
>>> suggestions?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>>>> f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode,
>>>>>>> FI_DIRTY_INODE));
>>>>>>> else
>>>>>>> f2fs_inode_synced(inode);
>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-04 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-28 16:54 [PATCH v2] f2fs: Do not check the FI_DIRTY_INODE flag when umounting a ro fs Julian Sun
2024-09-02 8:13 ` Chao Yu
2024-09-02 13:01 ` Julian Sun
2024-09-03 14:20 ` Chao Yu
2024-09-03 21:20 ` Jaegeuk Kim
2024-09-04 15:06 ` Chao Yu [this message]
2024-09-03 13:19 ` Julian Sun
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