* [PATCH 3.18 46/49] ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Takashi Iwai,
Amit Pundir
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit af368027a49a751d6ff4ee9e3f9961f35bb4fede upstream.
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/timer.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct snd_timer_user {
struct timespec tstamp; /* trigger tstamp */
wait_queue_head_t qchange_sleep;
struct fasync_struct *fasync;
- struct mutex tread_sem;
+ struct mutex ioctl_lock;
};
/* list of timers */
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_open(struct in
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&tu->qlock);
init_waitqueue_head(&tu->qchange_sleep);
- mutex_init(&tu->tread_sem);
+ mutex_init(&tu->ioctl_lock);
tu->ticks = 1;
tu->queue_size = 128;
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
@@ -1362,8 +1362,10 @@ static int snd_timer_user_release(struct
if (file->private_data) {
tu = file->private_data;
file->private_data = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
if (tu->timeri)
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
kfree(tu->queue);
kfree(tu->tqueue);
kfree(tu);
@@ -1601,7 +1603,6 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
- mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
@@ -1645,7 +1646,6 @@ static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct
}
__err:
- mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return err;
}
@@ -1861,7 +1861,7 @@ enum {
SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE_OLD = _IO('T', 0x23),
};
-static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+static long __snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
@@ -1878,17 +1878,11 @@ static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct
{
int xarg;
- mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
- if (tu->timeri) { /* too late */
- mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
+ if (tu->timeri) /* too late */
return -EBUSY;
- }
- if (get_user(xarg, p)) {
- mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
+ if (get_user(xarg, p))
return -EFAULT;
- }
tu->tread = xarg ? 1 : 0;
- mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return 0;
}
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO:
@@ -1921,6 +1915,18 @@ static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct
return -ENOTTY;
}
+static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct snd_timer_user *tu = file->private_data;
+ long ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ ret = __snd_timer_user_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+ mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int snd_timer_user_fasync(int fd, struct file * file, int on)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 09/49] staging: comedi: jr3_pci: cope with jiffies wraparound
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ian Abbott
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
commit 8ec04a491825e08068e92bed0bba7821893b6433 upstream.
The timer expiry routine `jr3_pci_poll_dev()` checks for expiry by
checking whether the absolute value of `jiffies` (stored in local
variable `now`) is greater than the expected expiry time in jiffy units.
This will fail when `jiffies` wraps around. Also, it seems to make
sense to handle the expiry one jiffy earlier than the current test. Use
`time_after_eq()` to check for expiry.
Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static void jr3_pci_poll_dev(unsigned lo
s = &dev->subdevices[i];
spriv = s->private;
- if (now > spriv->next_time_min) {
+ if (time_after_eq(now, spriv->next_time_min)) {
struct jr3_pci_poll_delay sub_delay;
sub_delay = jr3_pci_poll_subdevice(s);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 45/49] ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Takashi Iwai,
Amit Pundir
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3 upstream.
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
@@ -142,8 +142,10 @@ static struct snd_seq_queue *queue_new(i
static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
/* stop and release the timer */
+ mutex_lock(&q->timer_mutex);
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_close(q);
+ mutex_unlock(&q->timer_mutex);
/* wait until access free */
snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
/* release resources... */
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 44/49] sched: panic on corrupted stack end
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jann Horn, Linus Torvalds,
Amit Pundir
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
commit 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df upstream.
Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g. via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).
Just panic directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[AmitP: Minor refactoring of upstream changes for linux-3.18.y]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/sched/core.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2709,7 +2709,8 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(stru
static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
- BUG_ON(unlikely(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev)));
+ if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
+ panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
#endif
/*
* Test if we are atomic. Since do_exit() needs to call into
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 08/49] staging: comedi: jr3_pci: fix possible null pointer dereference
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ian Abbott
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
commit 45292be0b3db0b7f8286683b376e2d9f949d11f9 upstream.
For some reason, the driver does not consider allocation of the
subdevice private data to be a fatal error when attaching the COMEDI
device. It tests the subdevice private data pointer for validity at
certain points, but omits some crucial tests. In particular,
`jr3_pci_auto_attach()` calls `jr3_pci_alloc_spriv()` to allocate and
initialize the subdevice private data, but the same function
subsequently dereferences the pointer to access the `next_time_min` and
`next_time_max` members without checking it first. The other missing
test is in the timer expiry routine `jr3_pci_poll_dev()`, but it will
crash before it gets that far.
Fix the bug by returning `-ENOMEM` from `jr3_pci_auto_attach()` as soon
as one of the calls to `jr3_pci_alloc_spriv()` returns `NULL`. The
COMEDI core will subsequently call `jr3_pci_detach()` to clean up.
Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/jr3_pci.c
@@ -729,11 +729,12 @@ static int jr3_pci_auto_attach(struct co
s->insn_read = jr3_pci_ai_insn_read;
spriv = jr3_pci_alloc_spriv(dev, s);
- if (spriv) {
- /* Channel specific range and maxdata */
- s->range_table_list = spriv->range_table_list;
- s->maxdata_list = spriv->maxdata_list;
- }
+ if (!spriv)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Channel specific range and maxdata */
+ s->range_table_list = spriv->range_table_list;
+ s->maxdata_list = spriv->maxdata_list;
}
/* Reset DSP card */
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 06/49] staging: vt6656: use off stack for out buffer USB transfers.
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Malcolm Priestley
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
commit 12ecd24ef93277e4e5feaf27b0b18f2d3828bc5e upstream.
Since 4.9 mandated USB buffers be heap allocated this causes the driver
to fail.
Since there is a wide range of buffer sizes use kmemdup to create
allocated buffer.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/vt6656/usbpipe.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/vt6656/usbpipe.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vt6656/usbpipe.c
@@ -50,15 +50,25 @@ int vnt_control_out(struct vnt_private *
u16 index, u16 length, u8 *buffer)
{
int status = 0;
+ u8 *usb_buffer;
if (test_bit(DEVICE_FLAGS_DISCONNECTED, &priv->flags))
return STATUS_FAILURE;
mutex_lock(&priv->usb_lock);
+ usb_buffer = kmemdup(buffer, length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!usb_buffer) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->usb_lock);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
status = usb_control_msg(priv->usb,
- usb_sndctrlpipe(priv->usb, 0), request, 0x40, value,
- index, buffer, length, USB_CTL_WAIT);
+ usb_sndctrlpipe(priv->usb, 0),
+ request, 0x40, value,
+ index, usb_buffer, length, USB_CTL_WAIT);
+
+ kfree(usb_buffer);
mutex_unlock(&priv->usb_lock);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 31/49] perf: Fix event->ctx locking
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Paul E. McKenney, Jiri Olsa, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Linus Torvalds, Ingo Molnar, Amit Pundir
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b upstream.
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 207 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -907,6 +907,77 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_co
}
/*
+ * Because of perf_event::ctx migration in sys_perf_event_open::move_group and
+ * perf_pmu_migrate_context() we need some magic.
+ *
+ * Those places that change perf_event::ctx will hold both
+ * perf_event_ctx::mutex of the 'old' and 'new' ctx value.
+ *
+ * Lock ordering is by mutex address. There is one other site where
+ * perf_event_context::mutex nests and that is put_event(). But remember that
+ * that is a parent<->child context relation, and migration does not affect
+ * children, therefore these two orderings should not interact.
+ *
+ * The change in perf_event::ctx does not affect children (as claimed above)
+ * because the sys_perf_event_open() case will install a new event and break
+ * the ctx parent<->child relation, and perf_pmu_migrate_context() is only
+ * concerned with cpuctx and that doesn't have children.
+ *
+ * The places that change perf_event::ctx will issue:
+ *
+ * perf_remove_from_context();
+ * synchronize_rcu();
+ * perf_install_in_context();
+ *
+ * to affect the change. The remove_from_context() + synchronize_rcu() should
+ * quiesce the event, after which we can install it in the new location. This
+ * means that only external vectors (perf_fops, prctl) can perturb the event
+ * while in transit. Therefore all such accessors should also acquire
+ * perf_event_context::mutex to serialize against this.
+ *
+ * However; because event->ctx can change while we're waiting to acquire
+ * ctx->mutex we must be careful and use the below perf_event_ctx_lock()
+ * function.
+ *
+ * Lock order:
+ * task_struct::perf_event_mutex
+ * perf_event_context::mutex
+ * perf_event_context::lock
+ * perf_event::child_mutex;
+ * perf_event::mmap_mutex
+ * mmap_sem
+ */
+static struct perf_event_context *perf_event_ctx_lock(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+again:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ctx = ACCESS_ONCE(event->ctx);
+ if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ctx->refcount)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto again;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+ if (event->ctx != ctx) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ put_ctx(ctx);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void perf_event_ctx_unlock(struct perf_event *event,
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx)
+{
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+ put_ctx(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
* This must be done under the ctx->lock, such as to serialize against
* context_equiv(), therefore we cannot call put_ctx() since that might end up
* calling scheduler related locks and ctx->lock nests inside those.
@@ -1654,7 +1725,7 @@ int __perf_event_disable(void *info)
* is the current context on this CPU and preemption is disabled,
* hence we can't get into perf_event_task_sched_out for this context.
*/
-void perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
@@ -1695,6 +1766,19 @@ retry:
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
+
+/*
+ * Strictly speaking kernel users cannot create groups and therefore this
+ * interface does not need the perf_event_ctx_lock() magic.
+ */
+void perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ _perf_event_disable(event);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_disable);
static void perf_set_shadow_time(struct perf_event *event,
@@ -2158,7 +2242,7 @@ unlock:
* perf_event_for_each_child or perf_event_for_each as described
* for perf_event_disable.
*/
-void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
@@ -2214,9 +2298,21 @@ retry:
out:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
+
+/*
+ * See perf_event_disable();
+ */
+void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ _perf_event_enable(event);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_enable);
-int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
+static int _perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
{
/*
* not supported on inherited events
@@ -2225,10 +2321,25 @@ int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event
return -EINVAL;
atomic_add(refresh, &event->event_limit);
- perf_event_enable(event);
+ _perf_event_enable(event);
return 0;
}
+
+/*
+ * See perf_event_disable()
+ */
+int perf_event_refresh(struct perf_event *event, int refresh)
+{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ ret = _perf_event_refresh(event, refresh);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_event_refresh);
static void ctx_sched_out(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
@@ -3421,7 +3532,16 @@ static void perf_remove_from_owner(struc
rcu_read_unlock();
if (owner) {
- mutex_lock(&owner->perf_event_mutex);
+ /*
+ * If we're here through perf_event_exit_task() we're already
+ * holding ctx->mutex which would be an inversion wrt. the
+ * normal lock order.
+ *
+ * However we can safely take this lock because its the child
+ * ctx->mutex.
+ */
+ mutex_lock_nested(&owner->perf_event_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
/*
* We have to re-check the event->owner field, if it is cleared
* we raced with perf_event_exit_task(), acquiring the mutex
@@ -3547,12 +3667,13 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct
u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
{
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *sub;
- int n = 0, size = 0, ret = -EFAULT;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx;
- u64 values[5];
+ int n = 0, size = 0, ret;
u64 count, enabled, running;
+ u64 values[5];
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
- mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
count = perf_event_read_value(leader, &enabled, &running);
values[n++] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
@@ -3567,7 +3688,7 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf, values, size))
- goto unlock;
+ return -EFAULT;
ret = size;
@@ -3581,14 +3702,11 @@ static int perf_event_read_group(struct
size = n * sizeof(u64);
if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, values, size)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto unlock;
+ return -EFAULT;
}
ret += size;
}
-unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -3660,8 +3778,14 @@ static ssize_t
perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+ int ret;
- return perf_read_hw(event, buf, count);
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ ret = perf_read_hw(event, buf, count);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+ return ret;
}
static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
@@ -3687,7 +3811,7 @@ static unsigned int perf_poll(struct fil
return events;
}
-static void perf_event_reset(struct perf_event *event)
+static void _perf_event_reset(struct perf_event *event)
{
(void)perf_event_read(event);
local64_set(&event->count, 0);
@@ -3706,6 +3830,7 @@ static void perf_event_for_each_child(st
struct perf_event *child;
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
+
mutex_lock(&event->child_mutex);
func(event);
list_for_each_entry(child, &event->child_list, child_list)
@@ -3719,14 +3844,13 @@ static void perf_event_for_each(struct p
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *sibling;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
- mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
+
event = event->group_leader;
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
- mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
}
struct period_event {
@@ -3831,25 +3955,24 @@ static int perf_event_set_output(struct
struct perf_event *output_event);
static int perf_event_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, void __user *arg);
-static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+static long _perf_ioctl(struct perf_event *event, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
void (*func)(struct perf_event *);
u32 flags = arg;
switch (cmd) {
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_ENABLE:
- func = perf_event_enable;
+ func = _perf_event_enable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_DISABLE:
- func = perf_event_disable;
+ func = _perf_event_disable;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_RESET:
- func = perf_event_reset;
+ func = _perf_event_reset;
break;
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH:
- return perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
+ return _perf_event_refresh(event, arg);
case PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD:
return perf_event_period(event, (u64 __user *)arg);
@@ -3896,6 +4019,19 @@ static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file
return 0;
}
+static long perf_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+ long ret;
+
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ ret = _perf_ioctl(event, cmd, arg);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static long perf_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
@@ -3918,11 +4054,15 @@ static long perf_compat_ioctl(struct fil
int perf_event_task_enable(void)
{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
- list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
- perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_enable);
+ list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_enable);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+ }
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
@@ -3930,11 +4070,15 @@ int perf_event_task_enable(void)
int perf_event_task_disable(void)
{
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
- list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry)
- perf_event_for_each_child(event, perf_event_disable);
+ list_for_each_entry(event, ¤t->perf_event_list, owner_entry) {
+ ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
+ perf_event_for_each_child(event, _perf_event_disable);
+ perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+ }
mutex_unlock(¤t->perf_event_mutex);
return 0;
@@ -7271,6 +7415,15 @@ out:
return ret;
}
+static void mutex_lock_double(struct mutex *a, struct mutex *b)
+{
+ if (b < a)
+ swap(a, b);
+
+ mutex_lock(a);
+ mutex_lock_nested(b, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+}
+
/**
* sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
*
@@ -7286,7 +7439,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL;
struct perf_event *event, *sibling;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
- struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+ struct perf_event_context *ctx, *uninitialized_var(gctx);
struct file *event_file = NULL;
struct fd group = {NULL, 0};
struct task_struct *task = NULL;
@@ -7484,9 +7637,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
if (move_group) {
- struct perf_event_context *gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+ gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
+ * of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
+ */
+ mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
- mutex_lock(&gctx->mutex);
perf_remove_from_context(group_leader, false);
/*
@@ -7501,15 +7659,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
perf_event__state_init(sibling);
put_ctx(gctx);
}
- mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
- put_ctx(gctx);
+ } else {
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
- mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
if (move_group) {
+ /*
+ * Wait for everybody to stop referencing the events through
+ * the old lists, before installing it on new lists.
+ */
synchronize_rcu();
+
perf_install_in_context(ctx, group_leader, group_leader->cpu);
get_ctx(ctx);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
@@ -7521,6 +7683,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, event->cpu);
perf_unpin_context(ctx);
+
+ if (move_group) {
+ mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+ put_ctx(gctx);
+ }
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
put_online_cpus();
@@ -7628,7 +7795,11 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu
src_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, src_cpu)->ctx;
dst_ctx = &per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, dst_cpu)->ctx;
- mutex_lock(&src_ctx->mutex);
+ /*
+ * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
+ * of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
+ */
+ mutex_lock_double(&src_ctx->mutex, &dst_ctx->mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &src_ctx->event_list,
event_entry) {
perf_remove_from_context(event, false);
@@ -7636,11 +7807,9 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu
put_ctx(src_ctx);
list_add(&event->migrate_entry, &events);
}
- mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
synchronize_rcu();
- mutex_lock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(event, tmp, &events, migrate_entry) {
list_del(&event->migrate_entry);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
@@ -7650,6 +7819,7 @@ void perf_pmu_migrate_context(struct pmu
get_ctx(dst_ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&dst_ctx->mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&src_ctx->mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_pmu_migrate_context);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 04/49] USB: Proper handling of Race Condition when two USB class drivers try to call init_usb_class simultaneously
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ajay Kaher, Alan Stern
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@samsung.com>
commit 2f86a96be0ccb1302b7eee7855dbee5ce4dc5dfb upstream.
There is race condition when two USB class drivers try to call
init_usb_class at the same time and leads to crash.
code path: probe->usb_register_dev->init_usb_class
To solve this, mutex locking has been added in init_usb_class() and
destroy_usb_class().
As pointed by Alan, removed "if (usb_class)" test from destroy_usb_class()
because usb_class can never be NULL there.
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/file.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/file.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/file.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#define MAX_USB_MINORS 256
static const struct file_operations *usb_minors[MAX_USB_MINORS];
static DECLARE_RWSEM(minor_rwsem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(init_usb_class_mutex);
static int usb_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
@@ -108,8 +109,9 @@ static void release_usb_class(struct kre
static void destroy_usb_class(void)
{
- if (usb_class)
- kref_put(&usb_class->kref, release_usb_class);
+ mutex_lock(&init_usb_class_mutex);
+ kref_put(&usb_class->kref, release_usb_class);
+ mutex_unlock(&init_usb_class_mutex);
}
int usb_major_init(void)
@@ -171,7 +173,10 @@ int usb_register_dev(struct usb_interfac
if (intf->minor >= 0)
return -EADDRINUSE;
+ mutex_lock(&init_usb_class_mutex);
retval = init_usb_class();
+ mutex_unlock(&init_usb_class_mutex);
+
if (retval)
return retval;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 32/49] arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland,
Peter Ziljstra (Intel), Suzuki K. Poulose, Amit Pundir
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
commit 8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071 upstream.
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c
@@ -316,22 +316,31 @@ out:
}
static int
-validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
- struct perf_event *event)
+validate_event(struct pmu *pmu, struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
+ struct perf_event *event)
{
- struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
+ struct arm_pmu *armpmu;
struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (is_software_event(event))
return 1;
+ /*
+ * Reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs (e.g. CPU + CCI). The
+ * core perf code won't check that the pmu->ctx == leader->ctx
+ * until after pmu->event_init(event).
+ */
+ if (event->pmu != pmu)
+ return 0;
+
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
+ armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
}
@@ -349,15 +358,15 @@ validate_group(struct perf_event *event)
memset(fake_used_mask, 0, sizeof(fake_used_mask));
fake_pmu.used_mask = fake_used_mask;
- if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, leader))
+ if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, leader))
return -EINVAL;
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
- if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, sibling))
+ if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, sibling))
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (!validate_event(&fake_pmu, event))
+ if (!validate_event(event->pmu, &fake_pmu, event))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 29/49] Bluetooth: Fix user channel for 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Szymon Janc, Marko Kiiskila,
Marcel Holtmann
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
commit ab89f0bdd63a3721f7cd3f064f39fc4ac7ca14d4 upstream.
Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila <marko@runtime.io>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -909,7 +909,8 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
+ if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_ERRQUEUE|
+ MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
return -EINVAL;
if (len < 4 || len > HCI_MAX_FRAME_SIZE)
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 27/49] serial: omap: fix runtime-pm handling on unbind
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Felipe Balbi, Santosh Shilimkar,
Johan Hovold, Tony Lindgren
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
commit 099bd73dc17ed77aa8c98323e043613b6e8f54fc upstream.
An unbalanced and misplaced synchronous put was used to suspend the
device on driver unbind, something which with a likewise misplaced
pm_runtime_disable leads to external aborts when an open port is being
removed.
Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1028) at 0xfa024010
...
[<c046e760>] (serial_omap_set_mctrl) from [<c046a064>] (uart_update_mctrl+0x50/0x60)
[<c046a064>] (uart_update_mctrl) from [<c046a400>] (uart_shutdown+0xbc/0x138)
[<c046a400>] (uart_shutdown) from [<c046bd2c>] (uart_hangup+0x94/0x190)
[<c046bd2c>] (uart_hangup) from [<c045b760>] (__tty_hangup+0x404/0x41c)
[<c045b760>] (__tty_hangup) from [<c045b794>] (tty_vhangup+0x1c/0x20)
[<c045b794>] (tty_vhangup) from [<c046ccc8>] (uart_remove_one_port+0xec/0x260)
[<c046ccc8>] (uart_remove_one_port) from [<c046ef4c>] (serial_omap_remove+0x40/0x60)
[<c046ef4c>] (serial_omap_remove) from [<c04845e8>] (platform_drv_remove+0x34/0x4c)
Fix this up by resuming the device before deregistering the port and by
suspending and disabling runtime pm only after the port has been
removed.
Also make sure to disable autosuspend before disabling runtime pm so
that the usage count is balanced and device actually suspended before
returning.
Note that due to a negative autosuspend delay being set in probe, the
unbalanced put would actually suspend the device on first driver unbind,
while rebinding and again unbinding would result in a negative
power.usage_count.
Fixes: 7e9c8e7dbf3b ("serial: omap: make sure to suspend device before remove")
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/omap-serial.c
@@ -1756,9 +1756,13 @@ static int serial_omap_remove(struct pla
{
struct uart_omap_port *up = platform_get_drvdata(dev);
+ pm_runtime_get_sync(up->dev);
+
+ uart_remove_one_port(&serial_omap_reg, &up->port);
+
+ pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(up->dev);
pm_runtime_put_sync(up->dev);
pm_runtime_disable(up->dev);
- uart_remove_one_port(&serial_omap_reg, &up->port);
pm_qos_remove_request(&up->pm_qos_request);
device_init_wakeup(&dev->dev, false);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 26/49] md/raid1: avoid reusing a resync bio after error handling.
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, NeilBrown, Shaohua Li
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
commit 0c9d5b127f695818c2c5a3868c1f28ca2969e905 upstream.
fix_sync_read_error() modifies a bio on a newly faulty
device by setting bi_end_io to end_sync_write.
This ensure that put_buf() will still call rdev_dec_pending()
as required, but makes sure that subsequent code in
fix_sync_read_error() doesn't try to read from the device.
Unfortunately this interacts badly with sync_request_write()
which assumes that any bio with bi_end_io set to non-NULL
other than end_sync_read is safe to write to.
As the device is now faulty it doesn't make sense to write.
As the bio was recently used for a read, it is "dirty"
and not suitable for immediate submission.
In particular, ->bi_next might be non-NULL, which will cause
generic_make_request() to complain.
Break this interaction by refusing to write to devices
which are marked as Faulty.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@profitbricks.com>
Fixes: 2e52d449bcec ("md/raid1: add failfast handling for reads.")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/raid1.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/md/raid1.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid1.c
@@ -2067,6 +2067,8 @@ static void sync_request_write(struct md
(i == r1_bio->read_disk ||
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery))))
continue;
+ if (test_bit(Faulty, &conf->mirrors[i].rdev->flags))
+ continue;
wbio->bi_rw = WRITE;
wbio->bi_end_io = end_sync_write;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 18/49] fs/xattr.c: zero out memory copied to userspace in getxattr
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Vlastimil Babka,
Michal Hocko, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
commit 81be3dee96346fbe08c31be5ef74f03f6b63cf68 upstream.
getxattr uses vmalloc to allocate memory if kzalloc fails. This is
filled by vfs_getxattr and then copied to the userspace. vmalloc,
however, doesn't zero out the memory so if the specific implementation
of the xattr handler is sloppy we can theoretically expose a kernel
memory. There is no real sign this is really the case but let's make
sure this will not happen and use vzalloc instead.
Fixes: 779302e67835 ("fs/xattr.c:getxattr(): improve handling of allocation failures")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/xattr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __
size = XATTR_SIZE_MAX;
kvalue = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!kvalue) {
- vvalue = vmalloc(size);
+ vvalue = vzalloc(size);
if (!vvalue)
return -ENOMEM;
kvalue = vvalue;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 22/49] SMB3: Work around mount failure when using SMB3 dialect to Macs
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Steve French
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
commit 7db0a6efdc3e990cdfd4b24820d010e9eb7890ad upstream.
Macs send the maximum buffer size in response on ioctl to validate
negotiate security information, which causes us to fail the mount
as the response buffer is larger than the expected response.
Changed ioctl response processing to allow for padding of validate
negotiate ioctl response and limit the maximum response size to
maximum buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -491,8 +491,12 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsign
}
if (rsplen != sizeof(struct validate_negotiate_info_rsp)) {
- cifs_dbg(VFS, "invalid size of protocol negotiate response\n");
- return -EIO;
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "invalid protocol negotiate response size: %d\n",
+ rsplen);
+
+ /* relax check since Mac returns max bufsize allowed on ioctl */
+ if (rsplen > CIFSMaxBufSize)
+ return -EIO;
}
/* check validate negotiate info response matches what we got earlier */
@@ -1308,8 +1312,12 @@ SMB2_ioctl(const unsigned int xid, struc
* than one credit. Windows typically sets this smaller, but for some
* ioctls it may be useful to allow server to send more. No point
* limiting what the server can send as long as fits in one credit
+ * Unfortunately - we can not handle more than CIFS_MAX_MSG_SIZE
+ * (by default, note that it can be overridden to make max larger)
+ * in responses (except for read responses which can be bigger.
+ * We may want to bump this limit up
*/
- req->MaxOutputResponse = cpu_to_le32(0xFF00); /* < 64K uses 1 credit */
+ req->MaxOutputResponse = cpu_to_le32(CIFSMaxBufSize);
if (is_fsctl)
req->Flags = cpu_to_le32(SMB2_0_IOCTL_IS_FSCTL);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 21/49] Set unicode flag on cifs echo request to avoid Mac error
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Steve French
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
commit 26c9cb668c7fbf9830516b75d8bee70b699ed449 upstream.
Mac requires the unicode flag to be set for cifs, even for the smb
echo request (which doesn't have strings).
Without this Mac rejects the periodic echo requests (when mounting
with cifs) that we use to check if server is down
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ CIFSSMBEcho(struct TCP_Server_Info *serv
if (rc)
return rc;
+ if (server->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE)
+ smb->hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
+
/* set up echo request */
smb->hdr.Tid = 0xffff;
smb->hdr.WordCount = 1;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 20/49] fs/block_dev: always invalidate cleancache in invalidate_bdev()
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrey Ryabinin, Jan Kara,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Alexander Viro, Ross Zwisler, Jens Axboe,
Johannes Weiner, Alexey Kuznetsov, Christoph Hellwig,
Nikolay Borisov, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
commit a5f6a6a9c72eac38a7fadd1a038532bc8516337c upstream.
invalidate_bdev() calls cleancache_invalidate_inode() iff ->nrpages != 0
which doen't make any sense.
Make sure that invalidate_bdev() always calls cleancache_invalidate_inode()
regardless of mapping->nrpages value.
Fixes: c515e1fd361c ("mm/fs: add hooks to support cleancache")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424164135.22350-3-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/block_dev.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -86,12 +86,11 @@ void invalidate_bdev(struct block_device
{
struct address_space *mapping = bdev->bd_inode->i_mapping;
- if (mapping->nrpages == 0)
- return;
-
- invalidate_bh_lrus();
- lru_add_drain_all(); /* make sure all lru add caches are flushed */
- invalidate_mapping_pages(mapping, 0, -1);
+ if (mapping->nrpages) {
+ invalidate_bh_lrus();
+ lru_add_drain_all(); /* make sure all lru add caches are flushed */
+ invalidate_mapping_pages(mapping, 0, -1);
+ }
/* 99% of the time, we don't need to flush the cleancache on the bdev.
* But, for the strange corners, lets be cautious
*/
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 02/49] usb: host: xhci: print correct command ring address
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Chen, Mathias Nyman
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
commit 6fc091fb0459ade939a795bfdcaf645385b951d4 upstream.
Print correct command ring address using 'val_64'.
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-mem.c
@@ -2428,7 +2428,7 @@ int xhci_mem_init(struct xhci_hcd *xhci,
(xhci->cmd_ring->first_seg->dma & (u64) ~CMD_RING_RSVD_BITS) |
xhci->cmd_ring->cycle_state;
xhci_dbg_trace(xhci, trace_xhci_dbg_init,
- "// Setting command ring address to 0x%x", val);
+ "// Setting command ring address to 0x%016llx", val_64);
xhci_write_64(xhci, val_64, &xhci->op_regs->cmd_ring);
xhci_dbg_cmd_ptrs(xhci);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 19/49] ceph: fix memory leak in __ceph_setxattr()
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Luis Henriques, Yan, Zheng,
Ilya Dryomov
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
commit eeca958dce0a9231d1969f86196653eb50fcc9b3 upstream.
The ceph_inode_xattr needs to be released when removing an xattr. Easily
reproducible running the 'generic/020' test from xfstests or simply by
doing:
attr -s attr0 -V 0 /mnt/test && attr -r attr0 /mnt/test
While there, also fix the error path.
Here's the kmemleak splat:
unreferenced object 0xffff88001f86fbc0 (size 64):
comm "attr", pid 244, jiffies 4294904246 (age 98.464s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
40 fa 86 1f 00 88 ff ff 80 32 38 1f 00 88 ff ff @........28.....
00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81560199>] kmemleak_alloc+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff810f3e5b>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9b/0xf0
[<ffffffff812b157e>] __ceph_setxattr+0x17e/0x820
[<ffffffff812b1c57>] ceph_set_xattr_handler+0x37/0x40
[<ffffffff8111fb4b>] __vfs_removexattr+0x4b/0x60
[<ffffffff8111fd37>] vfs_removexattr+0x77/0xd0
[<ffffffff8111fdd1>] removexattr+0x41/0x60
[<ffffffff8111fe65>] path_removexattr+0x75/0xa0
[<ffffffff81120aeb>] SyS_lremovexattr+0xb/0x10
[<ffffffff81564b20>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ static int __set_xattr(struct ceph_inode
if (update_xattr) {
int err = 0;
+
if (xattr && (flags & XATTR_CREATE))
err = -EEXIST;
else if (!xattr && (flags & XATTR_REPLACE))
@@ -376,12 +377,14 @@ static int __set_xattr(struct ceph_inode
if (err) {
kfree(name);
kfree(val);
+ kfree(*newxattr);
return err;
}
if (update_xattr < 0) {
if (xattr)
__remove_xattr(ci, xattr);
kfree(name);
+ kfree(*newxattr);
return 0;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 13/49] x86/boot: Fix BSS corruption/overwrite bug in early x86 kernel startup
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ashish Kalra, Andy Lutomirski,
Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Denys Vlasenko, H. Peter Anvin,
Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish@bluestacks.com>
commit d594aa0277e541bb997aef0bc0a55172d8138340 upstream.
The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".
The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().
Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish@bluestacks.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/boot.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/boot.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#ifndef BOOT_BOOT_H
#define BOOT_BOOT_H
-#define STACK_SIZE 512 /* Minimum number of bytes for stack */
+#define STACK_SIZE 1024 /* Minimum number of bytes for stack */
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 15/49] dm era: save spacemap metadata root after the pre-commit
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Somasundaram Krishnasamy,
Mike Snitzer
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Somasundaram Krishnasamy <somasundaram.krishnasamy@oracle.com>
commit 117aceb030307dcd431fdcff87ce988d3016c34a upstream.
When committing era metadata to disk, it doesn't always save the latest
spacemap metadata root in superblock. Due to this, metadata is getting
corrupted sometimes when reopening the device. The correct order of update
should be, pre-commit (shadows spacemap root), save the spacemap root
(newly shadowed block) to in-core superblock and then the final commit.
Signed-off-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy <somasundaram.krishnasamy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-era-target.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-era-target.c
@@ -957,15 +957,15 @@ static int metadata_commit(struct era_me
}
}
- r = save_sm_root(md);
+ r = dm_tm_pre_commit(md->tm);
if (r) {
- DMERR("%s: save_sm_root failed", __func__);
+ DMERR("%s: pre commit failed", __func__);
return r;
}
- r = dm_tm_pre_commit(md->tm);
+ r = save_sm_root(md);
if (r) {
- DMERR("%s: pre commit failed", __func__);
+ DMERR("%s: save_sm_root failed", __func__);
return r;
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 14/49] um: Fix PTRACE_POKEUSER on x86_64
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, jie cao, Richard Weinberger
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
commit 9abc74a22d85ab29cef9896a2582a530da7e79bf upstream.
This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.
Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.
Reported-by: jie cao <cj3054@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/um/ptrace_64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/um/ptrace_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/ptrace_64.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int poke_user(struct task_struct *child,
else if ((addr >= offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[0])) &&
(addr <= offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[7]))) {
addr -= offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[0]);
- addr = addr >> 2;
+ addr = addr >> 3;
if ((addr == 4) || (addr == 5))
return -EIO;
child->thread.arch.debugregs[addr] = data;
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 11/49] usb: hub: Do not attempt to autosuspend disconnected devices
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alan Stern, Guenter Roeck
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
commit f5cccf49428447dfbc9edb7a04bb8fc316269781 upstream.
While running a bind/unbind stress test with the dwc3 usb driver on rk3399,
the following crash was observed.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000218
pgd = ffffffc00165f000
[00000218] *pgd=000000000174f003, *pud=000000000174f003,
*pmd=0000000001750003, *pte=00e8000001751713
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: uinput uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc cmac
ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat rfcomm
xt_mark fuse bridge stp llc zram btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth
ip6table_filter mwifiex_pcie mwifiex cfg80211 cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii joydev
snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device ppp_async
ppp_generic slhc tun
CPU: 1 PID: 29814 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 4.4.52 #507
Hardware name: Google Kevin (DT)
Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work
task: ffffffc0ac540000 ti: ffffffc0af4d4000 task.ti: ffffffc0af4d4000
PC is at autosuspend_check+0x74/0x174
LR is at autosuspend_check+0x70/0x174
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc00080dcc0>] autosuspend_check+0x74/0x174
[<ffffffc000810500>] usb_runtime_idle+0x20/0x40
[<ffffffc000785ae0>] __rpm_callback+0x48/0x7c
[<ffffffc000786af0>] rpm_idle+0x1e8/0x498
[<ffffffc000787cdc>] pm_runtime_work+0x88/0xcc
[<ffffffc000249bb8>] process_one_work+0x390/0x6b8
[<ffffffc00024abcc>] worker_thread+0x480/0x610
[<ffffffc000251a80>] kthread+0x164/0x178
[<ffffffc0002045d0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Source:
(gdb) l *0xffffffc00080dcc0
0xffffffc00080dcc0 is in autosuspend_check
(drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1778).
1773 /* We don't need to check interfaces that are
1774 * disabled for runtime PM. Either they are unbound
1775 * or else their drivers don't support autosuspend
1776 * and so they are permanently active.
1777 */
1778 if (intf->dev.power.disable_depth)
1779 continue;
1780 if (atomic_read(&intf->dev.power.usage_count) > 0)
1781 return -EBUSY;
1782 w |= intf->needs_remote_wakeup;
Code analysis shows that intf is set to NULL in usb_disable_device() prior
to setting actconfig to NULL. At the same time, usb_runtime_idle() does not
lock the usb device, and neither does any of the functions in the
traceback. This means that there is no protection against a race condition
where usb_disable_device() is removing dev->actconfig->interface[] pointers
while those are being accessed from autosuspend_check().
To solve the problem, synchronize and validate device state between
autosuspend_check() and usb_disconnect().
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/driver.c | 3 +++
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/driver.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/driver.c
@@ -1757,6 +1757,9 @@ static int autosuspend_check(struct usb_
int w, i;
struct usb_interface *intf;
+ if (udev->state == USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
/* Fail if autosuspend is disabled, or any interfaces are in use, or
* any interface drivers require remote wakeup but it isn't available.
*/
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -2100,6 +2100,12 @@ void usb_disconnect(struct usb_device **
dev_info(&udev->dev, "USB disconnect, device number %d\n",
udev->devnum);
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the pm runtime code knows that the USB device
+ * is in the process of being disconnected.
+ */
+ pm_runtime_barrier(&udev->dev);
+
usb_lock_device(udev);
hub_disconnect_children(udev);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 12/49] usb: misc: legousbtower: Fix buffers on stack
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maksim Salau
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maksim Salau <maksim.salau@gmail.com>
commit 942a48730faf149ccbf3e12ac718aee120bb3529 upstream.
Allocate buffers on HEAP instead of STACK for local structures
that are to be received using usb_control_msg().
Signed-off-by: Maksim Salau <maksim.salau@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alfredo Rafael Vicente Boix <alviboi@gmail.com>;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c
@@ -317,9 +317,16 @@ static int tower_open (struct inode *ino
int subminor;
int retval = 0;
struct usb_interface *interface;
- struct tower_reset_reply reset_reply;
+ struct tower_reset_reply *reset_reply;
int result;
+ reset_reply = kmalloc(sizeof(*reset_reply), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!reset_reply) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
nonseekable_open(inode, file);
subminor = iminor(inode);
@@ -364,8 +371,8 @@ static int tower_open (struct inode *ino
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_DEVICE,
0,
0,
- &reset_reply,
- sizeof(reset_reply),
+ reset_reply,
+ sizeof(*reset_reply),
1000);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(&dev->udev->dev,
@@ -406,6 +413,7 @@ unlock_exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
exit:
+ kfree(reset_reply);
return retval;
}
@@ -808,7 +816,7 @@ static int tower_probe (struct usb_inter
struct lego_usb_tower *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor* endpoint;
- struct tower_get_version_reply get_version_reply;
+ struct tower_get_version_reply *get_version_reply = NULL;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
int result;
@@ -916,6 +924,13 @@ static int tower_probe (struct usb_inter
"%d minor %d\n", (dev->minor - LEGO_USB_TOWER_MINOR_BASE),
USB_MAJOR, dev->minor);
+ get_version_reply = kmalloc(sizeof(*get_version_reply), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!get_version_reply) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
/* get the firmware version and log it */
result = usb_control_msg (udev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(udev, 0),
@@ -923,24 +938,26 @@ static int tower_probe (struct usb_inter
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_DEVICE,
0,
0,
- &get_version_reply,
- sizeof(get_version_reply),
+ get_version_reply,
+ sizeof(*get_version_reply),
1000);
if (result < 0) {
dev_err(idev, "LEGO USB Tower get version control request failed\n");
retval = result;
goto error;
}
- dev_info(&interface->dev, "LEGO USB Tower firmware version is %d.%d "
- "build %d\n", get_version_reply.major,
- get_version_reply.minor,
- le16_to_cpu(get_version_reply.build_no));
+ dev_info(&interface->dev,
+ "LEGO USB Tower firmware version is %d.%d build %d\n",
+ get_version_reply->major,
+ get_version_reply->minor,
+ le16_to_cpu(get_version_reply->build_no));
exit:
return retval;
error:
+ kfree(get_version_reply);
tower_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 01/49] target/fileio: Fix zero-length READ and WRITE handling
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Bart Van Assche, Hannes Reinecke,
Christoph Hellwig, Andy Grover, David Disseldorp,
Nicholas Bellinger
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
commit 59ac9c078141b8fd0186c0b18660a1b2c24e724e upstream.
This patch fixes zero-length READ and WRITE handling in target/FILEIO,
which was broken a long time back by:
Since:
commit d81cb44726f050d7cf1be4afd9cb45d153b52066
Author: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Sep 17 16:36:11 2012 -0700
target: go through normal processing for all zero-length commands
which moved zero-length READ and WRITE completion out of target-core,
to doing submission into backend driver code.
To address this, go ahead and invoke target_complete_cmd() for any
non negative return value in fd_do_rw().
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Andy Grover <agrover@redhat.com>
Cc: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/target_core_file.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c
@@ -760,8 +760,7 @@ fd_execute_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct
return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
}
- if (ret)
- target_complete_cmd(cmd, SAM_STAT_GOOD);
+ target_complete_cmd(cmd, SAM_STAT_GOOD);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 3.18 10/49] usb: misc: add missing continue in switch
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-18 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Gustavo A. R. Silva, Alan Stern
In-Reply-To: <20170518131643.028057293@linuxfoundation.org>
3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
commit 2c930e3d0aed1505e86e0928d323df5027817740 upstream.
Add missing continue in switch.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1248733
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ get_endpoints(struct usbtest_dev *dev, s
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (dev->info->intr)
goto try_intr;
+ continue;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC:
if (dev->info->iso)
goto try_iso;
^ permalink raw reply
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