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From: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly at intel.com>
To: tpm2@lists.01.org
Subject: Re: [tpm2] using TPM2 NVRAM for storing LUKS password
Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2017 20:51:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1510257074.22094.40.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 1510232036.22094.29.camel@intel.com

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2078 bytes --]

On Thu, 2017-11-09 at 13:53 +0100, Patrick Ohly wrote:
> The commands that run as part of installation are:
>     tpm2_takeownership -o ownerpass -e endorsepass -l lockpass
>     tpm2_nvdefine -x 0x1500001 -s 40 -a 0x40000001 -t 0x80020002 -P
> ownerpass
>     tpm2_nvwrite -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -f
> /dev/shm/keydir.sVrmLQ/keyfile -P ownerpass
>     52 45 46 4b 49 54 5f 30 70 e6 2b b9 ca 0c 1c 00 1d 6d eb 58 a1 7a
> cf 0d 1d 71 46 bc fd 7a 80 a0 8f 8b 0a 30 fc 89 9b db 
> 
>     tpm2_nvlist
>     1 NV indexes defined.
> 
>       0. NV Index: 0x1500001
>       {
>     	    Hash algorithm(nameAlg):11
>          	    The Index attributes(attributes):0xa0020002
>          	    The size of the data area(dataSize):40
>        }
> 
>     tpm2_nvreadlock -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -P ownerpass
> 
> 
> Then the initramfs does:
>     tpm2_nvlist
>     0 NV indexes defined.
> 
>     tpm2_nvread -x 0x1500001 -a 0x40000001 -s 40 -o 0 -P ownerpass
>     ERROR: Failed to read NVRAM area at index 0x1500001 (22020097).
> Error:0x28b
> 
> I tried also without tpm2_nvreadlock and without tpm2_takeownership,
> but neither of that made a difference.

I forgot to ask one conceptual question: in the proposed usage
scenario, does it make sense to take ownership of the TPM? All
passwords would have to be well-known, because there is no user or
other form of input available which could provide them. So taking
ownership doesn't really change much from a security perspective.

https://github.com/intel/tpm2-tools/wiki/How-to-use-tpm2-tools shows
that all NVRAM operations also work without taking ownership, but
doesn't go into the pros and cons of that.

-- 
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.



             reply	other threads:[~2017-11-09 19:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-09 19:51 Patrick Ohly [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-11-27 11:50 [tpm2] using TPM2 NVRAM for storing LUKS password Stefan Berger
2017-11-27 10:03 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-10 15:27 Stefan Berger
2017-11-10 12:53 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-10 12:44 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-10 12:04 Stefan Berger
2017-11-10 11:53 Stefan Berger
2017-11-10  9:07 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-09 20:43 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-09 20:40 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-09 15:25 flihp
2017-11-09 15:17 Stefan Berger
2017-11-09 15:10 Patrick Ohly
2017-11-09 14:12 Javier Martinez Canillas
2017-11-09 12:53 Patrick Ohly

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