From: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
To: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Subject: [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 25/25] tpm: allow Sandbox to run TPMv2.x commands
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 14:56:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180503145604.4cdb72b5@xps13> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPnjgZ3edaUDDGSdcSN=U92d_s-HNYjTV_jTxJ7djiy9Pk6MXw@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Simon,
On Wed, 2 May 2018 20:32:55 -0600, Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> wrote:
> Hi Miquel,
>
> On 2 May 2018 at 02:59, Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> wrote:
> > Sandbx is run in userspace. What is done in baremetal applications like
> > U-Boot is using an address in memory which is supposedly free to load
> > and store data to it. The user interaction in U-Boot's shell works like
> > that and it is hard to find another way to transfer a 'buffer' from one
> > side to the other. It is always possible to fill an environment
> > variable, but not that easy to use.
> >
> > Of course our Linux distributions do not allow such salvage accesses and
> > Sandbox will simply be killed. To avoid such scenario, it is possible,
> > when compiling the Sandbox driver, to allocate some memory so the
> > pointer that is given does not point to an unauthorized area anymore.
> > This just give the possibility to run all the TPM commands without
> > killing Sandbox.
> >
>
> map_sysmem() and map_to_sysmem() are supposed to handle this, assuming
> I understand the problem correctly.
Thank you very much for this, I searched a better solution to handle
it, even asked on #u-boot but ended using these horrible hacks.
I will drop this patch and integrate the map_*sysmem() functions as and
when appropriate.
Thanks,
Miquèl
--
Miquel Raynal, Bootlin (formerly Free Electrons)
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-03 12:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-02 8:59 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 00/25] Introduce TPMv2.0 support Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 01/25] tpm: add Revision ID field in the chip structure Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 02/25] tpm: prepare introduction of TPMv2.x support in Kconfig Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 19:33 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 03/25] tpm: disociate TPMv1.x specific and generic code Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:31 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-14 18:01 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-14 19:43 ` Tom Rini
2018-05-15 8:56 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 04/25] tpm: prepare support for TPMv2.x commands Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:31 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-03 12:27 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 05/25] tpm: add macros to enhance TPM commands readability Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:31 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 06/25] tpm: add possible traces to analyze buffers returned by the TPM Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 07/25] tpm: report driver error code to upper layer Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:31 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 08/25] tpm: add TPM2_Startup command support Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:31 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 09/25] tpm: add TPM2_SelfTest " Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 10/25] tpm: add TPM2_Clear " Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 11/25] tpm: add TPM2_PCR_Extend " Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 12/25] tpm: add TPM2_PCR_Read " Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-15 7:52 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 13/25] tpm: add TPM2_GetCapability " Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-15 8:19 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 14/25] tpm: add dictionary attack mitigation commands support Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 15/25] tpm: add TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth command support Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 16/25] tpm: add PCR authentication commands support Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 17/25] tpm: add support for TPMv2.x SPI modules Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-15 8:48 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 18/25] tpm: add the possibility to reset the chip with a gpio Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 19/25] doc: device-tree-bindings: add ST33TPHF20 TPMv2.0 module info Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 20/25] test/py: add TPMv2.x test suite Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 21/25] tpm: add a Sandbox TPMv2.x driver Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 22/25] doc: device-tree-bindings: add Sandbox TPMv2.0 module info Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-03 12:45 ` Miquel Raynal
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 23/25] sandbox: dts: add Sandbox TPMv2.x node Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 24/25] configs: add TPMv2.x support in Sandbox Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-02 8:59 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 25/25] tpm: allow Sandbox to run TPMv2.x commands Miquel Raynal
2018-05-03 2:32 ` Simon Glass
2018-05-03 12:56 ` Miquel Raynal [this message]
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