From: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
To: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Subject: [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 16/17] sandbox: Allow to execute from RAM
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 14:42:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180615124229.35310-17-agraf@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180615124229.35310-1-agraf@suse.de>
With efi_loader, we may want to execute payload from RAM. By default,
permissions on the RAM region don't allow us to execute from there though.
So whenever we get into the efi_loader case, let's mark RAM as executable.
That way we still protect normal cases, but allow for efi binaries to
directly get executed from within RAM.
For this, we hook into the already existing allow_unaligned() call which
also transitions the system over into semantics required by the UEFI
specification.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
---
arch/sandbox/cpu/cpu.c | 10 ++++++++++
arch/sandbox/cpu/os.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/os.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/sandbox/cpu/cpu.c b/arch/sandbox/cpu/cpu.c
index b20894b806..944f104899 100644
--- a/arch/sandbox/cpu/cpu.c
+++ b/arch/sandbox/cpu/cpu.c
@@ -162,3 +162,13 @@ void longjmp(jmp_buf jmp, int ret)
while (1)
;
}
+
+void allow_unaligned(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ r = os_mprotect(gd->arch.ram_buf, gd->ram_size,
+ OS_PROT_READ | OS_PROT_WRITE | OS_PROT_EXEC);
+
+ assert(!r);
+}
diff --git a/arch/sandbox/cpu/os.c b/arch/sandbox/cpu/os.c
index 5839932b00..81206ba0d2 100644
--- a/arch/sandbox/cpu/os.c
+++ b/arch/sandbox/cpu/os.c
@@ -183,6 +183,29 @@ void *os_realloc(void *ptr, size_t length)
return buf;
}
+int os_mprotect(void *ptr, size_t length, int prot)
+{
+ struct os_mem_hdr *hdr = ptr;
+ int p = 0;
+
+ if ((uintptr_t)ptr & sizeof(*hdr)) {
+ /*
+ * We got an unaligned pointer, probably a return value
+ * from os_malloc()
+ */
+ ptr = &hdr[-1];
+ }
+
+ if (prot & OS_PROT_READ)
+ p |= PROT_READ;
+ if (prot & OS_PROT_WRITE)
+ p |= PROT_WRITE;
+ if (prot & OS_PROT_EXEC)
+ p |= PROT_EXEC;
+
+ return mprotect(ptr, length, p);
+}
+
void os_usleep(unsigned long usec)
{
usleep(usec);
diff --git a/include/os.h b/include/os.h
index c8e0f52d30..d451e12064 100644
--- a/include/os.h
+++ b/include/os.h
@@ -157,6 +157,25 @@ void os_free(void *ptr);
void *os_realloc(void *ptr, size_t length);
/**
+ * Modify protection of a memory region
+ *
+ * This function changes the memory protection scheme of a given memory
+ * region. Using it you can for example allow execution of memory that
+ * would otherwise prohibit it.
+ *
+ * \param ptr Pointer to memory region to modify
+ * \param length New length for memory block
+ * \param prot New protection scheme (ORed OS_PROT_ values)
+ * \return 0 on success, -1 otherwise.
+ */
+int os_mprotect(void *ptr, size_t length, int prot);
+
+/* Defines for "prot" in os_mprotect() */
+#define OS_PROT_READ 0x1
+#define OS_PROT_WRITE 0x2
+#define OS_PROT_EXEC 0x4
+
+/**
* Access to the usleep function of the os
*
* \param usec Time to sleep in micro seconds
--
2.12.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-15 12:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-15 12:42 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 00/17] sandbox: efi_loader support Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 01/17] efi: sandbox: Add distroboot support Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 02/17] efi: sandbox: Add relocation constants Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 03/17] efi_loader: Use compiler constants for image loader Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 04/17] efi_loader: Use map_sysmem() in bootefi command Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 05/17] efi.h: Do not use config options Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 06/17] efi_loader: Allow SMBIOS tables in highmem Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 07/17] sandbox: Map host memory for efi_loader Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 08/17] efi_loader: efi_allocate_pages is too restrictive Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 09/17] efi_loader: Disable miniapps on sandbox Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 10/17] fs: Convert fs_read/write to take buffer instead of address Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 14:24 ` Simon Glass
2018-06-15 14:30 ` Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 11/17] efi_loader: Introduce ms abi vararg helpers Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 12/17] efi: sandbox: Enable EFI loader for sandbox Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 13/17] sandbox: Enable 1:1 map Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 14/17] distro: Move to compiler based target architecture determination Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 15/17] efi_loader: " Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 12:42 ` Alexander Graf [this message]
2018-06-15 12:42 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 17/17] sandbox: Fix setjmp/longjmp Alexander Graf
2018-06-15 15:18 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 00/17] sandbox: efi_loader support Simon Glass
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