From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: AKASHI Takahiro Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 14:27:34 +0900 Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] efi_capsule: Add a function to get the public key needed for capsule authentication In-Reply-To: <20210412150526.29822-4-sughosh.ganu@linaro.org> References: <20210412150526.29822-1-sughosh.ganu@linaro.org> <20210412150526.29822-4-sughosh.ganu@linaro.org> Message-ID: <20210428052734.GC25322@laputa> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: u-boot@lists.denx.de Simon, On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 08:35:25PM +0530, Sughosh Ganu wrote: > Define a function which would be used in the scenario where the > public key is stored on the platform's dtb. This dtb is concatenated > with the u-boot binary during the build process. Platforms which have > a different mechanism for getting the public key would define their > own platform specific function under a different Kconfig symbol. > > Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu > --- > > Changes since V1: > * Remove the weak function, and add the functionality to retrieve the > public key under the config symbol CONFIG_EFI_PKEY_DTB_EMBED. > > lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c > index 2cc8f2dee0..d95e9377fe 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c > @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ > #include > #include > > +#include > #include > #include > #include > > +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; > + > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_report = EFI_CAPSULE_REPORT_GUID; > static const efi_guid_t efi_guid_firmware_management_capsule_id = > EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID; > @@ -208,15 +211,45 @@ skip: > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_root_cert_guid = > EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID; > > -__weak int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len) > +#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_PKEY_DTB_EMBED) > +int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len) > { > - /* The platform is supposed to provide > - * a method for getting the public key > - * stored in the form of efi signature > - * list > + /* > + * This is a function for retrieving the public key from the > + * platform's device tree. The platform's device tree has been > + * concatenated with the u-boot binary. > + * If a platform has a different mechanism to get the public > + * key, it can define it's own kconfig symbol and define a > + * function to retrieve the public key > */ > + const void *fdt_blob = gd->fdt_blob; > + const void *blob; > + const char *cnode_name = "capsule-key"; > + const char *snode_name = "signature"; # Again, "key" is not the best word to describe the value. The syntax assumed here in a device tree (control FDT) is; / { signature { capsule-key = "..."; }; ... }; "signature" node is already used as a directory to hold public keys for FIT image verification (vboot). (doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt) While it is unlikely that both EFI capsule authentication and FIT image authentication are enabled at the same time, I'm a bit concerned if the mixture of different contents might cause some confusion. For instance, "required-mode" which has nothing to do with UEFI capsule may exist directly under "signagture." Do you have any thoughts? -Takahiro Akashi > + int sig_node; > + int len; > + > + sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(fdt_blob, 0, snode_name); > + if (sig_node < 0) { > + EFI_PRINT("Unable to get signature node offset\n"); > + return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND; > + } > + > + blob = fdt_getprop(fdt_blob, sig_node, cnode_name, &len); > + > + if (!blob || len < 0) { > + EFI_PRINT("Unable to get capsule-key value\n"); > + *pkey = NULL; > + *pkey_len = 0; > + return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND; > + } > + > + *pkey = (void *)blob; > + *pkey_len = len; > + > return 0; > } > +#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_PKEY_DTB_EMBED */ > > efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, efi_uintn_t capsule_size, > void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size) > -- > 2.17.1 >