[PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support

[PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support

[Masahisa Kojima]

This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support.
Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM
running as a OP-TEE TA.
Unit test will be added in the separate series.

Masahisa Kojima (2):
  efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is
    disabled
  efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement

 include/efi_loader.h              |   6 +
 include/efi_tcg2.h                |   9 ++
 include/tpm-v2.h                  |  18 +++
 lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |   6 +
 lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |   2 +-
 lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 132 +++++++++++++++----
 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    |  67 +---------
 lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c         | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |   3 +
 9 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Masahisa Kojima]

This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.
PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both
UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in
measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are
gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if
UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.

This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.

Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
---

Changes in v3:
- hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

Changes in v2:
- Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
- Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
- Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
- Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
- Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c


 lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |  6 +++
 lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |  2 +-
 lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    | 67 +---------------------------
 lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |  3 ++
 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
 	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_VERIFY
 	select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
 	default n
 	help
 	  Select this option if you want to enable capsule
@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
 	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_VERIFY
+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
 	default n
 	help
 	  Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
@@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
 	  it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
 	  at least, PK, KEK and db.
 
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
+	bool
+	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+
 config EFI_ESRT
 	bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"
 	depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
-obj-y += efi_signature.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
 
 EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
 $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+/**
+ * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
+ * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
+ * @start:	Start address of region (included)
+ * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
+ * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
+ *
+ * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
+ *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
+ *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
+ *
+ * Return:	status code
+ */
+efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+				  const void *start, const void *end,
+				  int nocheck)
+{
+	struct image_region *reg;
+	int i, j;
+
+	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
+		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
+		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+	}
+
+	if (end < start)
+		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
+		reg = &regs->reg[i];
+		if (nocheck)
+			continue;
+
+		/* new data after registered region */
+		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
+			continue;
+
+		/* new data preceding registered region */
+		if (end <= reg->data) {
+			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
+				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
+				       sizeof(*reg));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* new data overlapping registered region */
+		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
+		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	reg = &regs->reg[i];
+	reg->data = start;
+	reg->size = end - start;
+	regs->num++;
+
+	return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 /**
  * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
  * @arg1:	pointer to pointer to first section header
@@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
 
 	EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		return true;
+
 	if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
 		return true;
 
@@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err:
 	EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
-#else
-static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
-{
-	return true;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
-
 
 /**
  * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -15,18 +15,16 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
 #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
 
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
-		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
 static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
 	/* SEQUENCE */
 	0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
@@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:
 	return !revoked;
 }
 
-/**
- * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
- * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
- * @start:	Start address of region (included)
- * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
- * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
- *
- * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
- *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
- *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
- *
- * Return:	status code
- */
-efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
-				  const void *start, const void *end,
-				  int nocheck)
-{
-	struct image_region *reg;
-	int i, j;
-
-	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
-		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
-		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
-	}
-
-	if (end < start)
-		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
-		reg = &regs->reg[i];
-		if (nocheck)
-			continue;
-
-		/* new data after registered region */
-		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
-			continue;
-
-		/* new data preceding registered region */
-		if (end <= reg->data) {
-			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
-				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
-				       sizeof(*reg));
-			break;
-		}
-
-		/* new data overlapping registered region */
-		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
-		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-	}
-
-	reg = &regs->reg[i];
-	reg->data = start;
-	reg->size = end - start;
-	regs->num++;
-
-	return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 /**
  * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
  * @sigstore:	Pointer to signature store structure
@@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
 
 	return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
 	const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
 };
 
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
+		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+
 static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
 	{u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
 	{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH v3 2/2] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement

[Masahisa Kojima]

"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification"
requires to measure every attempt to load and execute
a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4].
This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR,
and appends measurement into Event Log.

Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
---

(no changes since v2)

Changes in v2:
- Remove duplicate <efi.h> include
- Remove unnecessary __packed attribute
- Add all EV_EFI_* event definition
- Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image
- Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and
  EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER
- Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path
- Add function comment


 include/efi_loader.h              |   6 +
 include/efi_tcg2.h                |   9 ++
 include/tpm-v2.h                  |  18 +++
 lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c |  59 +++++++--
 lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c         | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644
--- a/include/efi_loader.h
+++ b/include/efi_loader.h
@@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void);
 efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void);
 /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */
 efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void);
+/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+				   struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+				   struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info);
 /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */
 int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc,
 			       const char *if_typename, int diskid,
@@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
 
 bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void);
 
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi);
+
 bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
 		     WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
 
diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h
index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644
--- a/include/efi_tcg2.h
+++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
 #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
 
+#include <efi_api.h>
 #include <tpm-v2.h>
 
 #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \
@@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event {
 	u8 event[];
 } __packed;
 
+struct uefi_image_load_event {
+	efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory;
+	u64 image_length_in_memory;
+	u64 image_link_time_address;
+	u64 length_of_device_path;
+	struct efi_device_path device_path[];
+};
+
 struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability {
 	u8 size;
 	struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version;
diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h
index df67a196cf..6e812c017c 100644
--- a/include/tpm-v2.h
+++ b/include/tpm-v2.h
@@ -62,6 +62,24 @@ struct udevice;
 #define EV_CPU_MICROCODE	((u32)0x00000009)
 #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES	((u32)0x0000000B)
 
+/*
+ * event types, cf.
+ * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0"
+ * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019
+ */
+#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE			((u32)0x80000000)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG		((u32)0x80000001)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT			((u32)0x80000002)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION	((u32)0x80000003)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER		((u32)0x80000004)
+#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER		((u32)0x80000005)
+#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT			((u32)0x80000006)
+#define EV_EFI_ACTION				((u32)0x80000007)
+#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB		((u32)0x80000008)
+#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES			((u32)0x80000009)
+#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT			((u32)0x80000010)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY		((u32)0x800000E0)
+
 /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */
 struct tpms_tagged_property {
 	u32 property;
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index b8a790bcb9..cc548e1b88 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
 		return 1;
 }
 
+/**
+ * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image
+ * @efi:		pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size:		size of @efi binary
+ * @new_efi:		pointer to the newly allocated image
+ *
+ * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates
+ * the image buffer and updates @efi_size.
+ *
+ * Return:	valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails.
+ */
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi)
+{
+	size_t new_efi_size;
+	void *p;
+
+	/*
+	 * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
+	 * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) {
+		new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8);
+		p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
+		if (!p)
+			return NULL;
+		memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size);
+		*efi_size = new_efi_size;
+		*new_efi = p;
+		return p;
+	} else {
+		return efi;
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image
  * @efi:	Pointer to image
@@ -560,7 +594,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
 	struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
 	void *new_efi = NULL;
 	u8 *auth, *wincerts_end;
-	size_t new_efi_size, auth_size;
+	size_t auth_size;
 	bool ret = false;
 
 	EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
@@ -571,19 +605,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
 	if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
 		return true;
 
-	/*
-	 * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
-	 * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
-	 */
-	if (efi_size & 0x7) {
-		new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL;
-		new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
-		if (!new_efi)
-			return false;
-		memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size);
-		efi = new_efi;
-		efi_size = new_efi_size;
-	}
+	efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi);
+	if (!efi)
+		return false;
 
 	if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts,
 			     &wincerts_len)) {
@@ -886,6 +910,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
 		goto err;
 	}
 
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL)
+	/* Measure an PE/COFF image */
+	if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle,
+				  loaded_image_info))
+		log_err("PE image measurement failed\n");
+#endif
+
 	/* Copy PE headers */
 	memcpy(efi_reloc, efi,
 	       sizeof(*dos)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
index 94e8f22bbb..7ad9cb2b89 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@
 #include <efi_loader.h>
 #include <efi_tcg2.h>
 #include <log.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
 #include <version.h>
 #include <tpm-v2.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha1.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha512.h>
@@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out:
 	return EFI_EXIT(ret);
 }
 
+/**
+ * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash
+ *
+ * @efi:		pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size:		size of @efi binary
+ * @digest_list:	list of digest algorithms to extend
+ *
+ * Return:	status code
+ */
+static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+				       struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list)
+{
+	WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL;
+	size_t wincerts_len;
+	struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL;
+	void *new_efi = NULL;
+	u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	efi_status_t ret;
+	u32 active;
+	int i;
+
+	efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi);
+	if (!efi)
+		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+	if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts,
+			     &wincerts_len)) {
+		log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n");
+		ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active);
+	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+		ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	digest_list->count = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) {
+		u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg;
+
+		if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg)))
+			continue;
+		switch (hash_alg) {
+		case TPM2_ALG_SHA1:
+			hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+			break;
+		case TPM2_ALG_SHA256:
+			hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+			break;
+		case TPM2_ALG_SHA384:
+			hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+			break;
+		case TPM2_ALG_SHA512:
+			hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+			break;
+		default:
+			EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg);
+			return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		}
+		digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg;
+		memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg));
+		digest_list->count++;
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(new_efi);
+	free(regs);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image
+ *
+ * @efi:		pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size:		size of @efi binary
+ * @handle:		loaded image handle
+ * @loaded_image:	loaded image protocol
+ *
+ * Return:	status code
+ */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+				   struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+				   struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image)
+{
+	struct tpml_digest_values digest_list;
+	efi_status_t ret;
+	struct udevice *dev;
+	u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size;
+	struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event;
+	struct efi_device_path *device_path;
+	u32 device_path_length;
+	IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos;
+	IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
+	struct efi_handler *handler;
+
+	ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev);
+	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return ret;
+
+	switch (handle->image_type) {
+	case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
+		pcr_index = 4;
+		event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION;
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER:
+		pcr_index = 2;
+		event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+		break;
+	case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER:
+		pcr_index = 2;
+		event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list);
+	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
+	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header,
+					   &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path,
+					   &handler));
+	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+		return ret;
+
+	device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface);
+	device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path);
+	if (device_path_length > 0) {
+		/* add end node size */
+		device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path);
+	}
+	event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length;
+	image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size);
+	if (!image_load_event)
+		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+	image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi;
+	image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size;
+	image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length;
+
+	dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi;
+	nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew);
+	if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
+		IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt;
+
+		image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+				nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+	} else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+		image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+				nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+	} else {
+		ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (device_path_length > 0) {
+		memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path,
+		       device_path_length);
+	}
+
+	ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list,
+				    event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event);
+
+out:
+	free(image_load_event);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events
  *
@@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags,
 	/*
 	 * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not
 	 * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with
-	 * the  procedure  specified  in  "Calculating  the  PE  Image  Hash"
-	 * section  of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
+	 * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash"
+	 * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
 	 * Format"
-	 * Not supported for now
 	 */
 	if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) {
-		ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
-		goto out;
-	}
+		IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
 
-	pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
-	event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+		ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+				   (void **)&nt);
+		if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+			log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
 
-	ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
-				 &digest_list);
+		ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+					 &digest_list);
+	} else {
+		ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+					 &digest_list);
+	}
 	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto out;
 
+	pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
+	event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+
 	ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
 	if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto out;
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Heinrich Schuchardt]

On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.
> PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both
> UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in
> measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are
> gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if
> UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.
>
> This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
> to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3:
> - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
> - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
> - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
> - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c
>
>
>  lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |  6 +++
>  lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |  2 +-
>  lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    | 67 +---------------------------
>  lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |  3 ++
>  5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
>  	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
>  	select PKCS7_VERIFY
>  	select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
> +	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
>  	default n
>  	help
>  	  Select this option if you want to enable capsule
> @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
>  	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
>  	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
>  	select PKCS7_VERIFY
> +	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
>  	default n
>  	help
>  	  Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
> @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
>  	  it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
>  	  at least, PK, KEK and db.
>
> +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
> +	bool
> +	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
> +
>  config EFI_ESRT
>  	bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"
>  	depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
> -obj-y += efi_signature.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
>
>  EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
>  $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
> @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
>  	}
>  }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> +/**
> + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
> + * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
> + * @start:	Start address of region (included)
> + * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
> + * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
> + *
> + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
> + *
> + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
> + *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
> + *
> + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
> + *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
> + *
> + * Return:	status code
> + */
> +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
> +				  const void *start, const void *end,
> +				  int nocheck)
> +{
> +	struct image_region *reg;
> +	int i, j;
> +
> +	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
> +		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
> +		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (end < start)
> +		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
> +		reg = &regs->reg[i];
> +		if (nocheck)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		/* new data after registered region */
> +		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		/* new data preceding registered region */
> +		if (end <= reg->data) {
> +			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
> +				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
> +				       sizeof(*reg));
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		/* new data overlapping registered region */
> +		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
> +		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> +	}
> +
> +	reg = &regs->reg[i];
> +	reg->data = start;
> +	reg->size = end - start;
> +	regs->num++;
> +
> +	return EFI_SUCCESS;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
>   * @arg1:	pointer to pointer to first section header
> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
>
>  	EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
>
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> +		return true;
> +

Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
this case?

Best regards

Heinrich

>  	if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
>  		return true;
>
> @@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err:
>  	EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> -#else
> -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> -{
> -	return true;
> -}
> -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> -
>
>  /**
>   * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
> @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@
>  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>  #include <linux/compat.h>
>  #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
>  #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
>  #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
>
> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
> -		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
>  const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
>  const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
>  const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
>  const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
>  const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
>
> -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>  static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
>  	/* SEQUENCE */
>  	0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
> @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:
>  	return !revoked;
>  }
>
> -/**
> - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
> - * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
> - * @start:	Start address of region (included)
> - * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
> - * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
> - *
> - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
> - *
> - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
> - *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
> - *
> - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
> - *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
> - *
> - * Return:	status code
> - */
> -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
> -				  const void *start, const void *end,
> -				  int nocheck)
> -{
> -	struct image_region *reg;
> -	int i, j;
> -
> -	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
> -		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
> -		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
> -	}
> -
> -	if (end < start)
> -		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> -
> -	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
> -		reg = &regs->reg[i];
> -		if (nocheck)
> -			continue;
> -
> -		/* new data after registered region */
> -		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
> -			continue;
> -
> -		/* new data preceding registered region */
> -		if (end <= reg->data) {
> -			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
> -				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
> -				       sizeof(*reg));
> -			break;
> -		}
> -
> -		/* new data overlapping registered region */
> -		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
> -		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> -	}
> -
> -	reg = &regs->reg[i];
> -	reg->data = start;
> -	reg->size = end - start;
> -	regs->num++;
> -
> -	return EFI_SUCCESS;
> -}
> -
>  /**
>   * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
>   * @sigstore:	Pointer to signature store structure
> @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
>
>  	return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
>  }
> -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644
> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
>  	const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
>  };
>
> +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
> +		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
> +
>  static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
>  	{u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
>  	{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
>

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Heinrich Schuchardt]

On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip />
>>   /**
>>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
>>    * @arg1:	pointer to pointer to first section header
>> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
>>
>>   	EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
>>
>> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
>> +		return true;
>> +
>
> Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
> this case?

Hello Masahisa,

I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?

Best regards

Heinrich

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Masahisa Kojima]

Hi Heinrich,

Sorry for the late reply.

On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
>
> On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> <snip />
> >>   /**
> >>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
> >>    * @arg1:  pointer to pointer to first section header
> >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> >>
> >>      EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
> >>
> >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> >> +            return true;
> >> +
> >
> > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
> > this case?

The original code is as follows.

#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {

  < snip >

 }
#else
static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
{
       return true;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */

The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch,
so I keep the original implementation, always return true
if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.

Thanks,
Masahisa

>
> Hello Masahisa,
>
> I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
>
> Best regards
>
> Heinrich

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Takahiro Akashi]

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> Hi Heinrich,
> 
> Sorry for the late reply.
> 
> On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
> >
> > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > <snip />
> > >>   /**
> > >>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
> > >>    * @arg1:  pointer to pointer to first section header
> > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> > >>
> > >>      EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
> > >>
> > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > >> +            return true;
> > >> +
> > >
> > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
> > > this case?
> 
> The original code is as follows.

Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that

> > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > >> +            return true;

and the succeeding check,

        if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
                        return true;

are somehow redundant.
But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out
the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().

-Takahiro Akashi


> #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
> 
>   < snip >
> 
>  }
> #else
> static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> {
>        return true;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> 
> The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch,
> so I keep the original implementation, always return true
> if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
> 
> Thanks,
> Masahisa
> 
> >
> > Hello Masahisa,
> >
> > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
> >
> > Best regards
> >
> > Heinrich

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Masahisa Kojima]

On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > Hi Heinrich,
> >
> > Sorry for the late reply.
> >
> > On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> > > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > > <snip />
> > > >>   /**
> > > >>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
> > > >>    * @arg1:  pointer to pointer to first section header
> > > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> > > >>
> > > >>      EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
> > > >>
> > > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > > >> +            return true;
> > > >> +
> > > >
> > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
> > > > this case?
> >
> > The original code is as follows.
>
> Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that
>
> > > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > > >> +            return true;
>
> and the succeeding check,
>
>         if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
>                         return true;
>
> are somehow redundant.
> But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out
> the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().

Hi Heinrich, Takahiro,

Sorry for the late reply.
I now understand Takahiro's concern.
If I remove following check,

> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> +            return true;

compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs.

lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate':
/home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601:
undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb'
/home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607:
undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb'
/home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613:
undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest'

I would like to propose two resolution.

1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition
2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and
    always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.

Please advise.

Thanks,
Masahisa


>
> -Takahiro Akashi
>
>
> > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
> >
> >   < snip >
> >
> >  }
> > #else
> > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> > {
> >        return true;
> > }
> > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> >
> > The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch,
> > so I keep the original implementation, always return true
> > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Masahisa
> >
> > >
> > > Hello Masahisa,
> > >
> > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
> > >
> > > Best regards
> > >
> > > Heinrich

[PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

[Masahisa Kojima]

Hi Heinrich,

I'm about to send v4 patch series.

> 1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition

I chose this option, but I reverted #ifdef statement instead of using
"if (IS_ENABLED)" because I think it is better not to rely on compiler
optimization.

> 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and
>     always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.

In this option, CONFIG_PKCS7_VERIFY is required for EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL
just for successful build.
To minimize dependency, I did not proceed with 2).

Please kindly review v4.

Thanks,
Masahisa

On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 07:06, Masahisa Kojima
<masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi
> <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > > Hi Heinrich,
> > >
> > > Sorry for the late reply.
> > >
> > > On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> > > > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > > > <snip />
> > > > >>   /**
> > > > >>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
> > > > >>    * @arg1:  pointer to pointer to first section header
> > > > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> > > > >>
> > > > >>      EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
> > > > >>
> > > > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > > > >> +            return true;
> > > > >> +
> > > > >
> > > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in
> > > > > this case?
> > >
> > > The original code is as follows.
> >
> > Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that
> >
> > > > >> +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > > > >> +            return true;
> >
> > and the succeeding check,
> >
> >         if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
> >                         return true;
> >
> > are somehow redundant.
> > But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out
> > the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().
>
> Hi Heinrich, Takahiro,
>
> Sorry for the late reply.
> I now understand Takahiro's concern.
> If I remove following check,
>
> > +    if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
> > +            return true;
>
> compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs.
>
> lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate':
> /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601:
> undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb'
> /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607:
> undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb'
> /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613:
> undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest'
>
> I would like to propose two resolution.
>
> 1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition
> 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and
>     always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.
>
> Please advise.
>
> Thanks,
> Masahisa
>
>
> >
> > -Takahiro Akashi
> >
> >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
> > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
> > >
> > >   < snip >
> > >
> > >  }
> > > #else
> > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
> > > {
> > >        return true;
> > > }
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
> > >
> > > The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch,
> > > so I keep the original implementation, always return true
> > > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Masahisa
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Hello Masahisa,
> > > >
> > > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
> > > >
> > > > Best regards
> > > >
> > > > Heinrich