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[120.74.102.152]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a11sm5143776pgj.75.2021.08.26.21.49.43 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 26 Aug 2021 21:49:44 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 13:49:41 +0900 From: AKASHI Takahiro To: Heinrich Schuchardt Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt , u-boot@lists.denx.de, Alexander Graf , Ilias Apalodimas Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] efi_loader: don't load signature database from file Message-ID: <20210827044941.GG52912@laputa> Mail-Followup-To: AKASHI Takahiro , Heinrich Schuchardt , Heinrich Schuchardt , u-boot@lists.denx.de, Alexander Graf , Ilias Apalodimas References: <20210826134805.148975-1-heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com> <20210826134805.148975-4-heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com> <20210827041203.GE52912@laputa> <10048776-51ac-a13a-807c-8c50cf7a2d7e@gmx.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <10048776-51ac-a13a-807c-8c50cf7a2d7e@gmx.de> X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.2 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 06:42:39AM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > On 8/27/21 6:12 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 03:48:02PM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > > > The UEFI specification requires that the signature database may only be > > > stored in tamper-resistant storage. So these variable may not be read > > > from an unsigned file. > > > > I don't have a strong opinion here, but it seems to be too restrictive. > > Nobody expects that file-based variable implementation is *safe*. > > Leave it as it is so that people can easily experiment secure boot. > > If the prior boot stage checks the integrity of the U-Boot binary, the > file based implementation becomes 'safe' with this patch. How safe (or secure) is it? That is a question. What is your thread model? -Takahiro Akashi > Users can still experiment with secure boot by setting the secure boot > variables via the efidebug command. > > I cannot see a use case for having the secure boot data base on an > insecure medium. > > Best regards > > Heinrich > > > > > -Takahiro Akashi > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt > > > --- > > > v2: > > > no change > > > --- > > > include/efi_variable.h | 5 +++- > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 2 -- > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 2 +- > > > 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_variable.h b/include/efi_variable.h > > > index 4623a64142..2d97655e1f 100644 > > > --- a/include/efi_variable.h > > > +++ b/include/efi_variable.h > > > @@ -161,10 +161,13 @@ efi_status_t __maybe_unused efi_var_collect(struct efi_var_file **bufp, loff_t * > > > /** > > > * efi_var_restore() - restore EFI variables from buffer > > > * > > > + * Only if @safe is set secure boot related variables will be restored. > > > + * > > > * @buf: buffer > > > + * @safe: restoring from tamper-resistant storage > > > * Return: status code > > > */ > > > -efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf); > > > +efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf, bool safe); > > > > > > /** > > > * efi_var_from_file() - read variables from file > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > > > index cf7afecd60..b0c5b672c5 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > > > @@ -32,10 +32,8 @@ static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { > > > {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK}, > > > {u"db", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DB}, > > > {u"dbx", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBX}, > > > - /* not used yet > > > {u"dbt", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBT}, > > > {u"dbr", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBR}, > > > - */ > > > }; > > > > > > static bool efi_secure_boot; > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c > > > index de076b8cbc..c7c6805ed0 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_file.c > > > @@ -148,9 +148,10 @@ error: > > > #endif > > > } > > > > > > -efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf) > > > +efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf, bool safe) > > > { > > > struct efi_var_entry *var, *last_var; > > > + u16 *data; > > > efi_status_t ret; > > > > > > if (buf->reserved || buf->magic != EFI_VAR_FILE_MAGIC || > > > @@ -160,21 +161,29 @@ efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf) > > > return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > > } > > > > > > - var = buf->var; > > > last_var = (struct efi_var_entry *)((u8 *)buf + buf->length); > > > - while (var < last_var) { > > > - u16 *data = var->name + u16_strlen(var->name) + 1; > > > - > > > - if (var->attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE && var->length) { > > > - ret = efi_var_mem_ins(var->name, &var->guid, var->attr, > > > - var->length, data, 0, NULL, > > > - var->time); > > > - if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > - log_err("Failed to set EFI variable %ls\n", > > > - var->name); > > > - } > > > - var = (struct efi_var_entry *) > > > - ALIGN((uintptr_t)data + var->length, 8); > > > + for (var = buf->var; var < last_var; > > > + var = (struct efi_var_entry *) > > > + ALIGN((uintptr_t)data + var->length, 8)) { > > > + > > > + data = var->name + u16_strlen(var->name) + 1; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Secure boot related and non-volatile variables shall only be > > > + * restored from U-Boot's preseed. > > > + */ > > > + if (!safe && > > > + (efi_auth_var_get_type(var->name, &var->guid) != > > > + EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE || > > > + !(var->attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE))) > > > + continue; > > > + if (!var->length) > > > + continue; > > > + ret = efi_var_mem_ins(var->name, &var->guid, var->attr, > > > + var->length, data, 0, NULL, > > > + var->time); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + log_err("Failed to set EFI variable %ls\n", var->name); > > > } > > > return EFI_SUCCESS; > > > } > > > @@ -213,7 +222,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_var_from_file(void) > > > log_err("Failed to load EFI variables\n"); > > > goto error; > > > } > > > - if (buf->length != len || efi_var_restore(buf) != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + if (buf->length != len || efi_var_restore(buf, false) != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > log_err("Invalid EFI variables file\n"); > > > error: > > > free(buf); > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c > > > index ba0874e9e7..a7d305ffbc 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c > > > @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void) > > > > > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) { > > > ret = efi_var_restore((struct efi_var_file *) > > > - __efi_var_file_begin); > > > + __efi_var_file_begin, true); > > > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > log_err("Invalid EFI variable seed\n"); > > > } > > > -- > > > 2.30.2 > > > >