From: Ana Bobillo <anabobillo3@gmail.com>
To: u-boot@lists.u-boot-project.org
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>,
Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>,
Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] efi_loader: reject a PE section whose end wraps around
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2026 06:13:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5b986292-b889-4e1e-9e0f-9012ea225366@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <633dddd6-ee22-4cd6-a8b6-cb7df0650fae@gmail.com>
From: Ana Bobillo <anabobillo3@gmail.com>
efi_load_pe() computes the end of each section as the sum of its
VirtualAddress and its size, both u32, so the sum wraps around before it
is widened to unsigned long. A section near 4 GiB then yields a small
virt_size, and the memset() and memcpy() of the section write far past
the allocated image.
Relative virtual addresses are 32 bit, so reject a section whose end
does not fit into 32 bits. barebox, whose EFI loader is based on this
file, fixed the same in b6598389d46d ("efi: loader: fix integer overflow
in PE virt_size calculation").
This runs before the image is rejected when Secure Boot fails to verify
it.
Fixes: cb149c66342c ("efi_loader: Add PE image loader")
Signed-off-by: Ana Bobillo <anabobillo3@gmail.com>
---
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index 35cf3cd268f..b15a662e5d6 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -1062,9 +1062,20 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
/* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */
for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec = §ions[i];
+ u32 end;
- virt_size = max_t(unsigned long, virt_size,
- sec->VirtualAddress + section_size(sec));
+ /*
+ * Relative virtual addresses are 32 bit. A section whose end
+ * wraps around would make virt_size too small for the memset()
+ * and memcpy() below.
+ */
+ if (__builtin_add_overflow(sec->VirtualAddress,
+ section_size(sec), &end)) {
+ log_err("Section %d virtual address overflow\n", i);
+ return EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ virt_size = max_t(unsigned long, virt_size, end);
}
/* Read 32/64bit specific header bits */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-30 6:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-30 6:13 [PATCH 00/10] efi_loader: check PE images before using them Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:13 ` [PATCH 01/10] efi_loader: check the NT header size in efi_check_pe() Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 7:23 ` Ilias Apalodimas
2026-10-30 11:15 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2026-10-30 11:40 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:13 ` [PATCH 02/10] efi_loader: check the PE image ranges in efi_image_parse() Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 12:14 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2026-10-30 12:49 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:13 ` Ana Bobillo [this message]
2026-10-30 7:41 ` [PATCH 03/10] efi_loader: reject a PE section whose end wraps around Ilias Apalodimas
2026-10-30 12:35 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2026-10-30 12:49 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 04/10] efi_loader: check PE section raw data against the image size Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 12:45 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2026-10-30 12:51 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 05/10] efi_loader: check that the PE headers fit into the loaded image Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 13:09 ` Heinrich Schuchardt
2026-10-30 14:05 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 06/10] efi_loader: check the relocation table against the image size Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 07/10] efi_loader: check certificate lengths in efi_image_authenticate() Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 08/10] efi_loader: do not load an image that cannot be measured Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 7:22 ` Ilias Apalodimas
2026-10-30 7:54 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 9:23 ` Ilias Apalodimas
2026-10-30 10:04 ` Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 09/10] test: lib: add tests for the PE image checks Ana Bobillo
2026-10-30 6:14 ` [PATCH 10/10] test: py: test invalid certificate lengths in signed images Ana Bobillo
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