From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Sam Edwards <cfsworks@gmail.com>
Cc: wens@csie.org, Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
u-boot@lists.denx.de, Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sunxi: psci: remove redundant initialization from psci_arch_init
Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 11:22:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86cyzaf6ie.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <69909b61-f57e-fc91-43a5-0f4bd23609c9@gmail.com>
On Fri, 25 Aug 2023 19:05:32 +0100,
Sam Edwards <cfsworks@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/25/23 00:20, Chen-Yu Tsai wrote:
>
> Hi Chen-Yu,
>
> > IIRC the GIC manual says that the secure bit is set or cleared to select
> > which bank of registers is accessed.
>
> Which secure bit are we talking about here? Do we mean the
> *configured* secure bit (SCR.NS, what the code is attempting to clear)
> or the *effective* secure bit (AWPROT[1], et al)? The distinction is
> important in monitor mode (where this function runs) since there (and
> only there) the CPU core ignores the configured setting and runs in
> the secure world unconditionally.
>
> I'm guessing it's most likely the latter since the former isn't
> exposed outside of the CPU core, unless the GIC has some special
> signal going to it...
The GIC definitely has the NS bit routed to it. Otherwise, the secure
configuration would just be an utter joke. Just try it.
>
> > And I suppose it is here to be more robust.
>
> ...but if it is the former (i.e. SCR.NS is significant in this
> function) the code should be retained, but moved *before* the GIC
> register accesses, and the old value of SCR.NS should be restored
> *after*.
>
> Either way: I don't think this line should be kept in its current
> form, because it's written in a way that strongly suggests that we
> want to run in secure mode after exiting monitor mode, which is flatly
> not the case.
Well, history is unfortunately against you on that front. Running on
the secure side definitely was a requirement when this code was
initially written, as the AW BSP *required* to run on the secure side.
If that requirement is no more, great. But I don't think you can
decide that unilaterally.
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-26 10:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230531201520.15479-1-CFSworks@gmail.com>
2023-08-14 20:39 ` [PATCH] sunxi: psci: remove redundant initialization from psci_arch_init Andre Przywara
2023-08-15 11:13 ` Marc Zyngier
2023-08-25 7:20 ` Chen-Yu Tsai
2023-08-25 18:05 ` Sam Edwards
2023-08-26 10:22 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2023-08-28 21:49 ` Sam Edwards
2023-08-29 14:30 ` Chen-Yu Tsai
2023-08-29 14:34 ` Chen-Yu Tsai
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