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Thu, 23 Jan 2025 05:40:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([2a04:cec0:1900:d4b5:e910:e51a:5b57:1fb4]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-438b318aae1sm64968295e9.1.2025.01.23.05.40.20 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 23 Jan 2025 05:40:21 -0800 (PST) From: Julien Masson To: Mattijs Korpershoek , Simon Glass , Tom Rini , Guillaume La Roque Cc: , Mattijs Korpershoek Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] bootstd: android: Allow boot with AVB failures when unlocked In-Reply-To: <20250108-avb-disable-verif-v2-2-ba7d3b0d5b6a@baylibre.com> References: <20250108-avb-disable-verif-v2-0-ba7d3b0d5b6a@baylibre.com> Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 14:40:20 +0100 Message-ID: <871pwtd4xn.fsf@baylibre.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.8 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean On Thu 23 Jan 2025 at 14:40, Mattijs Korpershoek wrote: > When the bootloader is UNLOCKED, it should be possible to boot Android > even if AVB reports verification errors [1]. > > This allows developers to flash modified partitions on > userdebug/engineering builds. > > Developers can do so on unlocked devices with: > $ fastboot flash --disable-verity --disable-verification vbmeta vbmeta.img > > In such case, bootmeth_android refuses to boot. > > Allow the boot to continue when the device is UNLOCKED and AVB reports > verification errors. > > [1] https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/boot-flow#unlocked-devices > Fixes: 125d9f3306ea ("bootstd: Add a bootmeth for Android") > Signed-off-by: Mattijs Korpershoek > --- > boot/bootmeth_android.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- > 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/boot/bootmeth_android.c b/boot/bootmeth_android.c > index 2cd167f80280801618a317a65e93a10e70a0d9ee..dc9aad1633bb7a6d577013bfa0f939343f2e066b 100644 > --- a/boot/bootmeth_android.c > +++ b/boot/bootmeth_android.c > @@ -407,17 +407,26 @@ static int run_avb_verification(struct bootflow *bflow) > AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_RESTART_AND_INVALIDATE, > &out_data); > > - if (result != AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK) { > - printf("Verification failed, reason: %s\n", > - str_avb_slot_error(result)); > - avb_slot_verify_data_free(out_data); > - return log_msg_ret("avb verify", -EIO); > - } > - > - if (unlocked) > - boot_state = AVB_ORANGE; > - else > + if (!unlocked) { > + /* When device is locked, we only accept AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK */ > + if (result != AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK) { > + printf("Verification failed, reason: %s\n", > + str_avb_slot_error(result)); > + avb_slot_verify_data_free(out_data); > + return log_msg_ret("avb verify", -EIO); > + } > boot_state = AVB_GREEN; > + } else { > + /* When device is unlocked, we also accept verification errors */ > + if (result != AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK && > + result != AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_VERIFICATION) { > + printf("Unlocked verification failed, reason: %s\n", > + str_avb_slot_error(result)); > + avb_slot_verify_data_free(out_data); > + return log_msg_ret("avb verify unlocked", -EIO); > + } > + boot_state = AVB_ORANGE; > + } > > extra_args = avb_set_state(avb_ops, boot_state); > if (extra_args) { > @@ -427,9 +436,11 @@ static int run_avb_verification(struct bootflow *bflow) > goto free_out_data; > } > > - ret = avb_append_commandline(bflow, out_data->cmdline); > - if (ret < 0) > - goto free_out_data; > + if (result == AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK) { > + ret = avb_append_commandline(bflow, out_data->cmdline); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto free_out_data; > + } > > return 0; > > > -- > 2.47.1 > Reviewed-by: Julien Masson