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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	util-linux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: bind mounting namespace inodes for unprivileged users
Date: Wed, 04 May 2016 14:00:53 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462384853.14310.87.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87futx3eid.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>

On Wed, 2016-05-04 at 12:43 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> writes:
> > On Wed, 2016-05-04 at 09:38 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > > James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> writes:
> > > > So, does anyone have any strong (or even weak) opinions about 
> > > > this before I start coding patches?
> > > 
> > > The mount namespace is complex and getting it right is a pain in 
> > > the rear.  So adding yet another path and piece in to the 
> > > existing complexity makes me cringe a little.
> > 
> > Yes, well which is worse: having no way to bind unprivileged
> > containers without spawning a long running process or having a way 
> > to bind them which may lead to unremovable files.  Since I just use 
> > sudo mount --bind anyway for my containers, I don't see the file 
> > removal argument as too daunting.
> 
> So far with setns support I haven't felt the need to bind mount
> containers.  So I am not certain it is an either or choice.
> 
> And of course the other side of the craziness is having a mount point 
> on a filesystem makes that filesystem unmountable (except for lazy
> unmounts).  So getting this wrong could affect clean shutdowns and
> reboots.

OK, I by this argument a little.  It could be circumvented by having
the shutdown script remove all container bindings, though.  This seems
to work

umount -t nsfs -a

>   Which suggests it may be wise to limit this kind of thing
> to a tmpfs like /run/user/<uid>/.
> 
> Mostly this is my way of say tread carefully because there be dragons
> here.

Understood.  Even though fixing the pinned filesystem issue can be
done, I do agree that it makes the problem knottier.

James


      reply	other threads:[~2016-05-04 18:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-05-03 18:20 bind mounting namespace inodes for unprivileged users James Bottomley
2016-05-03 21:22 ` Serge Hallyn
2016-05-04 11:15   ` James Bottomley
2016-05-04  8:44 ` Karel Zak
2016-05-04 13:16   ` James Bottomley
2016-05-04 14:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-05-04 17:28   ` James Bottomley
2016-05-04 17:43     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-05-04 18:00       ` James Bottomley [this message]

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