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From: "Ted Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: Petr Uzel <petr.uzel@suse.cz>
Cc: util-linux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/20] uuidd: make drop_privs true by default in main()
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 14:29:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120329212911.GB13970@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1333039528-24784-11-git-send-email-petr.uzel@suse.cz>

On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 06:45:18PM +0200, Petr Uzel wrote:
> The drop_privs variable in main() was used to determine whether the
> daemon will attempt to drop privileges (provided it has been installed
> suid). As of now, it makes sense to drop the privileges each time it is
> started. Therefore, this patch inverts the default value of drop_privs
> to true, so that it does not need to be set in the getopt loop at
> multiple places.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Petr Uzel <petr.uzel@suse.cz>

This breaks the configuration where libuuid starts uuidd if it's not
available, since there the user process probably doesn't have access
to write to /var/lib/libuuid/clock.txt, and so dropping the setgid
privileges of uuid will cause it not to work.

Also, if you're going to have a -K option to keep the privileges,
there isn't much of a security benefit, since if there's a bug in
uuidd, the attacker can always call uuidd with -K and and then attempt
to exploint any problem that might be there.

So it's not clear adding the ability to drop privileges is really all
that functional; if uuidd is setuid/setgid, it's probably because it
**needs** those privileges.

						- Ted

  reply	other threads:[~2012-03-29 21:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-03-29 16:45 [PATCH 00/20] *** uuidd: refactoring & systemd support + build-sys fixes *** Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 01/20] uuidd: use UUIDD_OP_GETPID instead of magic number Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 02/20] uuidd: remove useless initialization of cleanup_socket Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 03/20] uuidd: factor out pidfile creation into separate function Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 04/20] uuidd: implement --no-pid option Petr Uzel
2012-04-03 12:51   ` Karel Zak
2012-04-05  7:36     ` Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 05/20] uuidd: implement --no-fork option Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 06/20] uuidd: factor out socket creation into separate function Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 07/20] uuidd: implement --socket-activation option Petr Uzel
2012-04-03 13:03   ` Karel Zak
2012-04-05  7:46     ` Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 08/20] uuidd: print all debugging information to stderr Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 09/20] uuidd: factor out dropping of privileges into separate function Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 10/20] uuidd: make drop_privs true by default in main() Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 21:29   ` Ted Ts'o [this message]
2012-03-31 16:38     ` Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 11/20] uuidd: introduce --keep-privs option Petr Uzel
2012-04-03 13:32   ` Karel Zak
2012-04-05  7:48     ` Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 12/20] uuidd: --socket-activation implies --keep-privs Petr Uzel
2012-04-03 13:38   ` Karel Zak
2012-04-05  7:49     ` Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 13/20] uuidd: add systemd unit files Petr Uzel
2012-04-03 14:01   ` Karel Zak
2012-04-03 14:47     ` Tom Gundersen
2012-04-05  7:52       ` Petr Uzel
2012-04-05  8:23         ` Karel Zak
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 14/20] libuuid: use EXIT_FAILURE Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 15/20] libuuid: implement --disable-libuuid-exec-uuidd configure option Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 16/20] libuuid: fix typo in uuid_compare manpage Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 17/20] build-sys: run distcheck with verbose make rules Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 18/20] build-sys: add ttyutils.h to dist Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 19/20] build-sys: add fsprobe.h " Petr Uzel
2012-03-29 16:45 ` [PATCH 20/20] build-sys: fix installation of uuidd units with make distcheck Petr Uzel

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