From: Stanislav Brabec <sbrabec@suse.cz>
To: up201407890@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt
Cc: util-linux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Fixing su + runuser vulnerability CVE-2016-2779
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 17:21:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56D8648F.60504@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160303013722.22156xdxrqmywgw0@webmail.alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt>
On Mar 3, 2016 at 01:37 up201407890@alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt wrote:
> On another note, grsecurity recently released a new feature named
> GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY that disallows the use of TIOCSTI to unprivileged
> users unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This will fix all util-linux issues, but not chroot. There root inside
the chroot escapes from chroot and calls commands outside.
I can imagine yet another kernel level solution:
Implement a way to disallow TIOCSTI, eventually revoke terminal R/W access.
This would need application level fixes:
- Before calling the restricted process, disallow TIOCSTI.
- After returning from the restricted process, revoke terminal R/W.
> Brad Spengler (spender) said
> that looking into it, he didn't find legitimate uses of such ioctl, and
> no wide usage of writevt.
Some old systems had tiocsti(1) utility, probably used like a
predecessor of readline.
Just for curiosity, I just ran grep for TIOCSTI ioctl() over all
openSUSE sources. I got about 60 matches.
I analyzed use of some cases:
util-linux: used in agetty in wait_for_term_input()
kbd: contrib utility sti equal to tiocsti utility.
irda: Used by handle_scancode() to emulate input.
tcsh: Used in ed mode and in pushback().
emacs: Used in stuff_char() (putting char to be read from terminal)
...
It seems that TIOCSTI is used for:
- Read character, and if it does not match, put it back.
- Wait for character, than put it back for processing.
- Implementing a simple line editing.
--
Best Regards / S pozdravem,
Stanislav Brabec
software developer
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-03 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-02 19:35 Fixing su + runuser vulnerability CVE-2016-2779 Stanislav Brabec
2016-03-02 23:39 ` Ángel González
2016-03-03 0:37 ` up201407890
2016-03-03 16:21 ` Stanislav Brabec [this message]
2016-03-04 16:13 ` Stanislav Brabec
2016-03-04 18:03 ` up201407890
2016-03-04 23:50 ` Ángel González
2016-03-08 16:33 ` Stanislav Brabec
2016-03-07 13:13 ` Karel Zak
2016-03-08 16:02 ` Stanislav Brabec
2016-09-29 14:40 ` Karel Zak
2016-10-02 13:16 ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-03 10:28 ` Karel Zak
2016-10-03 13:29 ` Karel Zak
2016-10-09 11:09 ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-03 15:04 ` Karel Zak
2016-10-03 15:48 ` Pádraig Brady
2016-10-03 16:25 ` Karel Zak
2016-10-11 14:19 ` Karel Zak
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