From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2013 11:57:16 +0200
Message-ID: <20130410095716.GF24443@gmail.com>
References: <20130408224328.GA17641@www.outflux.net>
	<51634935.9010905@zytor.com> <877gkc596d.fsf@xmission.com>
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To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>, x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>, Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
List-Id: virtualization@lists.linuxfoundation.org


* Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:

> "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> writes:
> 
> > On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
> >> the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
> >> an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
> >> kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
> >> 
> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >> Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
> >
> > Also, tglx: does this interfere with your per-cpu IDT efforts?
> 
> Given that we don't change any IDT entries why would anyone want a
> per-cpu IDT?  The cache lines should easily be shared accross all
> processors.

That's true iif they are cached.

If not then it's a remote DRAM access cache miss for all CPUs except the node that 
holds that memory.

> Or are there some giant NUMA machines that trigger cache misses when accessing 
> the IDT and the penalty for pulling the cache line across the NUMA fabric is 
> prohibitive?

IDT accesses for pure userspace execution are pretty rare. So we are not just 
talking about huge NUMA machines here but about ordinary NUMA machines taking a 
remote cache miss hit for the first IRQ or other IDT-accessing operation they do 
after some cache-intense user-space processing.

It's a small effect, but it exists and improving it would be legitimate.

Thanks,

	Ingo