From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: ashish.kalra@amd.com, Felicitas Hetzelt <file@sect.tu-berlin.de>,
"Radev, Martin" <martin.radev@aisec.fraunhofer.de>,
david.kaplan@amd.com,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Robert Buhren <robert@sect.tu-berlin.de>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, "Morbitzer,
Mathias" <mathias.morbitzer@aisec.fraunhofer.de>,
hch@lst.de
Subject: Re: swiotlb/virtio: unchecked device dma address and length
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 03:54:41 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201215074427-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c3629a27-3590-1d9f-211b-c0b7be152b32@redhat.com>
On Tue, Dec 15, 2020 at 11:20:48AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>
> On 2020/12/15 上午5:49, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 06:31:21PM +0100, Felicitas Hetzelt wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > Hi! Please see below my responses.
> >
> > > we have been analyzing the Hypervisor-OS interface of Linux
> > > and discovered bugs in the swiotlb/virtio implementation that can be
> > > triggered from a malicious Hypervisor / virtual device.
> > > With SEV, the SWIOTLB implementation is forcefully enabled and would
> > > always be used. Thus, all virtio devices and others would use it under
> > > the hood.
> > >
> > > The reason for analyzing this interface is that, technologies such as
> > > Intel's Trusted Domain Extensions [1] and AMD's Secure Nested Paging [2]
> > > change the threat model assumed by various Linux kernel subsystems.
> > > These technologies take the presence of a fully malicious hypervisor
> > > into account and aim to provide protection for virtual machines in such
> > > an environment. Therefore, all input received from the hypervisor or an
> > > external device should be carefully validated. Note that these issues
> > > are of little (or no) relevance in a "normal" virtualization setup,
> > > nevertheless we believe that it is required to fix them if TDX or SNP is
> > > used.
> > >
> > > We are happy to provide more information if needed!
> > >
> > > [1]
> > > https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
> > >
> > > [2]https://www.amd.com/en/processors/amd-secure-encrypted-virtualization
> > >
> > > Bug:
> > > OOB memory write.
> > > dma_unmap_single -> swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single is invoked with dma_addr
> > > and length parameters that are under control of the device.
> > > This happens e.g. in virtio_ring:
> > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.10-rc7/source/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c#L378
> > Heya!
> >
> > Thank you for pointing this out! I've a couple of questions and hope you can
> > help me out with them.
> >
> > Also CC-ing AMD / TDX folks.
> > > This raises two issues:
> > > 1) swiotlb_tlb_unmap_single fails to check whether the index generated
> > > from the dma_addr is in range of the io_tlb_orig_addr array.
> > That is fairly simple to implement I would think. That is it can check
> > that the dma_addr is from the PA in the io_tlb pool when SWIOTLB=force
> > is used.
>
>
> I'm not sure this can fix all the cases. It looks to me we should map
> descriptor coherent but readonly (which is not supported by current DMA
> API).
Neither is this supported but encrypted memory technologies.
> Otherwise, device can modify the desc[i].addr/desc[i].len at any time to
> pretend a valid mapping.
>
> Thanks
>
>
> >
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-16 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <d2ae0b1d-332b-42a1-87bf-7da2b749cac2@sect.tu-berlin.de>
2020-12-14 21:49 ` swiotlb/virtio: unchecked device dma address and length Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2020-12-15 3:20 ` Jason Wang
2020-12-15 14:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2020-12-16 5:53 ` Jason Wang
2020-12-16 6:41 ` Jason Wang
2020-12-16 13:04 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2020-12-17 4:19 ` Jason Wang
2020-12-16 8:54 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2020-12-16 13:07 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
[not found] ` <20201215084720.GA9981@ashkalra_ubuntu_server>
[not found] ` <c90f5ea4-b8b2-98d7-546a-dc71fb618230@sect.tu-berlin.de>
2020-12-15 14:37 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
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