From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Gautam Dawar <gdawar@xilinx.com>
Cc: Martin Petrus Hubertus Habets <martinh@xilinx.com>,
Harpreet Singh Anand <hanand@xilinx.com>,
"virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org"
<virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: Security hole in vhost-vdpa?
Date: Sun, 6 Jun 2021 17:38:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210606173637-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BY5PR02MB6980228A5EA2D021A3F9F47BB1399@BY5PR02MB6980.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
On Sun, Jun 06, 2021 at 02:39:48PM +0000, Gautam Dawar wrote:
> Hi All,
>
>
>
> This is in continuation to my findings noted in Bug 213179 and discussions we
> have had in the last couple of weeks over emails.
>
>
>
> Today, I published the first patch for this issue which adds timeout based wait
> for completion event and also logs a warning message to alert the user/
> administrator of the problem.
Can't close just finish without waiting for userspace?
Then notify userspace about any buffers that did not complete ...
> As a next step, the idea is to implement a mechanism to allow vhost-vdpa module
> notify userspace app (QEMU) to close the fd corresponding to the vhost-vdpa
> character device when it is waiting for the completion event in
> vhost_vdpa_remove(). Jason confirmed this by saying that we need a new eventfd/
> ioctl to receive hot remove request from kernel.
>
>
>
> Although, we can proceed to implement changes for the part described above but
> I feel that that the problem is much deeper than that. This mechanism will just
> request the userspace to close the fd and let vhost-vdpa proceed with the
> clean-up. However, IMHO things should be under more control of kernel space
> than the user space.
>
>
>
> The problem I am trying to highlight is that a malicious user-space application
> can render any module registering a vDPA device to hang in their
> de-initialization sequence. This will typically surface when
> vdpa_device_unregister() is called from the function responsible for module
> unload leading rmmod commands to not return, forever.
>
>
>
> To prove my point, I created a simple C program (test_vdpa.c) that opens the
> vhost-vdpa character device and never exits. The logs (test_logs.txt) show that
> after registering the vDPA device from sfc driver, vhost-vdpa module creates
> the char device /dev/vhost-vdpa-0 for it. As this is available to all apps in
> the userspace, the malicious app (./block_vdpa_unload) opens this device and
> goes to infinite sleep. At this time, when module unload (rmmod sfc) is called,
> it hangs and the following print informs the user/admin of this state with
> following message:
>
> [ 8180.053647] vhost-vdpa-0: vhost_vdpa_remove waiting for /dev/vhost-vdpa-0
> to be closed
>
>
>
> Finally, when block_vdpa_unload is killed, vhost_vdpa_remove() unblocks and sfc
> module is unloaded.
>
>
>
> With such application running in userspace, a kernel module (that registered
> corresponding vDPA device) will hang during unload sequence. Such control of
> the userspace application on the system resources should certainly be
> prevented.
>
> To me, this seems to be a serious issue and requires modifications in the way
> it is currently handled in vhost-vdpa (and other modules (VFIO?) with similar
> implementation).
>
> Let me know what you think.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Gautam Dawar
>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <errno.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv)
> {
> unsigned int index;
> char dev_path[30];
> int fd;
>
> if (argc != 2) {
> printf("Usage: %s <vhost-vdpa device index>\n", argv[0]);
> return -1;
> }
>
> index = strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 10);
>
> snprintf(dev_path, sizeof(dev_path), "/dev/vhost-vdpa-%u", index);
> fd = open(dev_path, O_RDWR);
> if(fd < 0)
> {
> printf("Failed to open %s, errno: %d!\n", dev_path, errno);
> return 1;
> }
>
> printf("Blocking unload of driver that registered vDPA device"
> " corresponding to cdev %s created by vhost-vdpa\n", dev_path);
> while (1)
> sleep(1);
>
> close(fd);
> return 0;
> }
> [root@ndr730p ~]# ~/create_vdpa_device.sh
>
> [root@ndr730p ~]# ll /dev/vhost-vdpa-0
> crw------- 1 root root 240, 0 Jun 6 19:59 /dev/vhost-vdpa-0
>
> [root@ndr730p ~]# ./block_vdpa_unload 0 &
> [1] 10930
> Blocking unload of driver that registered vDPA device corresponding to cdev /dev/vhost-vdpa-0 created by vhost-vdpa
>
> [root@ndr730p ~]# rmmod sfc
> [ 8179.010520] sfc_ef100 0000:06:00.4: ef100_vdpa_delete: Calling vdpa unregister device
> [ 8180.053647] vhost-vdpa-0: vhost_vdpa_remove waiting for /dev/vhost-vdpa-0 to be closed
>
> [root@ndr730p ~]# kill -9 10930
> [ 8218.392897] sfc_ef100 0000:06:00.0: shutdown successful
>
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next parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-06 21:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <BY5PR02MB6980228A5EA2D021A3F9F47BB1399@BY5PR02MB6980.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
2021-06-06 21:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2021-06-07 2:10 ` Security hole in vhost-vdpa? Jason Wang
2021-06-10 4:30 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-06-10 5:13 ` Jason Wang
[not found] ` <MN2PR02MB6991BB8836C3688B9EDDD136B1359@MN2PR02MB6991.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>
2021-06-10 5:59 ` Jason Wang
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