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[80.230.25.21]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-488fc1c0354sm129158345e9.11.2026.04.18.10.18.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 18 Apr 2026 10:18:09 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 13:18:07 -0400 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Michael Bommarito Cc: Olivia Mackall , Herbert Xu , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Jason Wang , virtualization@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() Message-ID: <20260418131110-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20260418000020.1847122-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> <20260418150613.3522589-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: virtualization@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20260418150613.3522589-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-MFC-PROC-ID: 4JV0BgtbKz6Z-xdUgQ9fUvbRS5qmSBYuKhncVl2L74s_1776532692 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline On Sat, Apr 18, 2026 at 11:06:13AM -0400, Michael Bommarito wrote: > random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into > vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using > vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a > memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted > buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 > or 64). > > A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond > sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline > array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes > those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe > them directly via /dev/hwrng. > > Concrete impact is inside the guest: > > - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that > over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data > into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread > that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace > interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. > > - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a > malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised > guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for > guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest > root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest > kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In > practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually > disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the > fix is still worth carrying because the underlying > memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. > > KASAN confirms the OOB on a guest booted under a QEMU 9.0 whose > virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: > > BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 > Read of size 64 at addr ffff8880089c2220 by task hwrng/52 > Call Trace: > __asan_memcpy > virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 > hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 > kthread > Allocated by task 1: > probe_common+0xa5/0x660 > virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880089c2000 > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 > The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of > allocated 544-byte region [ffff8880089c2000, ffff8880089c2220) > > Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer > overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened > usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in > the USB 9p transport. > > With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, > the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the > bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are > discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. > > Changes in v2 (per Michael S. Tsirkin review): > - move the bound check from random_recv_done() into copy_data(), > so the clamp sits immediately next to the memcpy it protects > - clamp to sizeof(vi->data) rather than substituting len = 0, so a > previously-working but buggy device that occasionally over-reports > used.len does not start returning zero-length reads > - add array_index_nospec() on vi->data_idx to defeat a speculative > out-of-bounds read given the malicious-backend threat model > - expand the commit message to describe the /dev/hwrng observation > path and the hypervisor + guest-root cooperation scenario > > Fixes: f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin > Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito > Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 > --- > drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c > index 0ce02d7e5048..5e83ffa105e4 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -69,8 +70,26 @@ static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) > static unsigned int copy_data(struct virtrng_info *vi, void *buf, > unsigned int size) > { > - size = min_t(unsigned int, size, vi->data_avail); > - memcpy(buf, vi->data + vi->data_idx, size); > + unsigned int idx, avail; > + > + /* > + * vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and > + * vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A > + * malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past > + * sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index > + * with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be > + * steered into adjacent slab memory, including under > + * speculation. > + */ > + avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); > + if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { > + vi->data_avail = 0; > + request_entropy(vi); > + return 0; > + } > + size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); > + idx = array_index_nospec(vi->data_idx, sizeof(vi->data)); > + memcpy(buf, vi->data + idx, size); > vi->data_idx += size; > vi->data_avail -= size; > if (vi->data_avail == 0) > -- This came out quite complex. Tell me, will the following do the trick? diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c index 0ce02d7e5048..e887a68cc151 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static void random_recv_done(struct virtqueue *vq) if (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->vq, &len)) return; + len = array_index_nospec(len, sizeof(vi->data)); + smp_store_release(&vi->data_avail, len); complete(&vi->have_data); } > 2.53.0