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[68.48.65.54]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 6a1803df08f44-8b02ae5c44esm34256396d6.27.2026.04.18.08.06.31 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 18 Apr 2026 08:06:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Michael Bommarito To: Olivia Mackall , Herbert Xu , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Michael S . Tsirkin" , Jason Wang , virtualization@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 11:06:13 -0400 Message-ID: <20260418150613.3522589-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260418000020.1847122-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> References: <20260418000020.1847122-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: virtualization@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a guest booted under a QEMU 9.0 whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff8880089c2220 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880089c2000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff8880089c2000, ffff8880089c2220) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. Changes in v2 (per Michael S. Tsirkin review): - move the bound check from random_recv_done() into copy_data(), so the clamp sits immediately next to the memcpy it protects - clamp to sizeof(vi->data) rather than substituting len = 0, so a previously-working but buggy device that occasionally over-reports used.len does not start returning zero-length reads - add array_index_nospec() on vi->data_idx to defeat a speculative out-of-bounds read given the malicious-backend threat model - expand the commit message to describe the /dev/hwrng observation path and the hypervisor + guest-root cooperation scenario Fixes: f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 --- drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c index 0ce02d7e5048..5e83ffa105e4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -69,8 +70,26 @@ static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) static unsigned int copy_data(struct virtrng_info *vi, void *buf, unsigned int size) { - size = min_t(unsigned int, size, vi->data_avail); - memcpy(buf, vi->data + vi->data_idx, size); + unsigned int idx, avail; + + /* + * vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and + * vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A + * malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past + * sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index + * with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be + * steered into adjacent slab memory, including under + * speculation. + */ + avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); + if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { + vi->data_avail = 0; + request_entropy(vi); + return 0; + } + size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx = array_index_nospec(vi->data_idx, sizeof(vi->data)); + memcpy(buf, vi->data + idx, size); vi->data_idx += size; vi->data_avail -= size; if (vi->data_avail == 0) -- 2.53.0