From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Derek Murray Subject: Re: Re: Next steps with pv_ops for Xen Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2007 10:11:48 +0000 Message-ID: <47567964.2030402@cl.cam.ac.uk> References: <1195682725.6726.48.camel@sisko.scot.redhat.com> <4753FC6A.4020601@redhat.com> <4754024C.7020905@cl.cam.ac.uk> <47540FB8.8000106@redhat.com> <475417E7.9070006@cl.cam.ac.uk> <47546931.2090602@redhat.com> <475520A1.6080909@cl.cam.ac.uk> <475541A8.7030100@redhat.com> <1196771999.10809.18.camel@sisko.scot.redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1196771999.10809.18.camel@sisko.scot.redhat.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: "Stephen C. Tweedie" Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" , Eduardo Habkost , Juan Quintela , Jan Beulich , Glauber de Oliveira Costa , Chris Wright , "virtualization@lists.osdl.org" , Gerd Hoffmann List-Id: virtualization@lists.linuxfoundation.org Stephen C. Tweedie wrote: > So... the interface (a) cannot be used on the Linux VM without at least > one invasive VM modification, due to the requirement of ptes being > explicitly unmapped via hypercall; Also there is the use of VM_FOREIGN (http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg?file/b2768401db94/mm/memory.c lines 1040--1059), which has been used quite happily in blktap since 2005 (http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-changelog/2005-07/msg00053.html). While it may not be a priority to get gntdev into pv-ops Linux, I should imagine that blktap would be fairly critical. > I can't help wondering if this is a hint that now is the time to find a > better API, which doesn't have the requirement (a) that seems to be > causing such trouble? Are other PV guests --- *BSD, Solaris --- going > to have the same problems with their VM layers if they try to implement > this API? Upstream Linux pv_ops certainly will, and it would be good if > we could avoid tying unprivileged guests to ABIs which cannot hope to be > merged into pv_ops. I'm open to suggestions... but I think it always reduces to needing a hook that is called on process exit before the PTEs are zapped. > (Just what is the cost of not having this functionality in blktap, > anyway?) If tapdisk dies whilst holding a granted page, the page can never be ungranted, so we leak that page. Regards, Derek.