From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 11/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op hypercall
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2013 18:56:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1385665021-5392-12-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1385665021-5392-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
And some of the sub-subops. It is a little hacky given the legacy way of
having several methods of enabling/disbling LOG_DIRTY mode.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c b/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
index ea4a7c0..056f2b8 100644
--- a/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
+++ b/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
@@ -696,6 +696,49 @@ PRE(domctl)
__PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(getvcpuextstate, vcpuextstate, buffer);
break;
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+ PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, op);
+
+ switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.op)
+ {
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF:
+ /* No further inputs */
+ break;
+
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE:
+ PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, mode);
+ switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.mode)
+ {
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_LOG_DIRTY:
+ goto domctl_shadow_op_enable_logdirty;
+
+
+ default:
+ bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
+ "__HYPERVISOR_domctl shadowop mode",
+ domctl->u.shadow_op.mode);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_LOGDIRTY:
+ domctl_shadow_op_enable_logdirty:
+ /* No further inputs */
+ break;
+
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN:
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK:
+ PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, dirty_bitmap);
+ PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, pages);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
+ "__HYPERVISOR_domctl shadow(10)",
+ domctl->u.shadow_op.op);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
default:
bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
"__HYPERVISOR_domctl", domctl->cmd);
@@ -1212,6 +1255,27 @@ POST(domctl){
domctl->u.vcpuextstate.size);
break;
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
+ switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.op)
+ {
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF:
+ /* No outputs */
+ break;
+
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN:
+ case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK:
+ POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, pages);
+ POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, stats.fault_count);
+ POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, stats.dirty_count);
+ if(domctl->u.shadow_op.dirty_bitmap.p)
+ POST_MEM_WRITE((Addr)domctl->u.shadow_op.dirty_bitmap.p,
+ domctl->u.shadow_op.pages * sizeof(vki_uint8_t));
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
}
#undef POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE
#undef __POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE
diff --git a/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h b/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
index 67dc2ef..7cce4af 100644
--- a/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
+++ b/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
@@ -173,6 +173,40 @@ struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity {
struct vki_xenctl_bitmap cpumap; /* IN/OUT */
};
+struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op_stats {
+ vki_uint32_t fault_count;
+ vki_uint32_t dirty_count;
+};
+
+/* vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op.op is an utter mess for compatibily reasons. */
+
+struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op {
+ vki_uint32_t op; /* IN */
+
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF 0
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE 32
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN 11
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK 12
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_GET_ALLOCATION 30
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION 31
+
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_TEST 1
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_LOGDIRTY 2
+#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_TRANSLATE 3
+
+ vki_uint32_t mode;
+
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_REFCOUNT (1 << 1)
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_LOG_DIRTY (1 << 2)
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_TRANSLATE (1 << 3)
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_EXTERNAL (1 << 4)
+
+ vki_uint32_t mb;
+ VKI_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(vki_uint8) dirty_bitmap;
+ vki_xen_uint64_aligned_t pages;
+ struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op_stats stats;
+};
+
struct vki_xen_domctl_max_mem {
/* IN variables. */
vki_xen_uint64_aligned_t max_memkb;
@@ -285,7 +319,7 @@ struct vki_xen_domctl {
struct vki_xen_domctl_getpageframeinfo3 getpageframeinfo3;
struct vki_xen_domctl_nodeaffinity nodeaffinity;
struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity vcpuaffinity;
- //struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op shadow_op;
+ struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op shadow_op;
struct vki_xen_domctl_max_mem max_mem;
struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpucontext vcpucontext;
struct vki_xen_domctl_getvcpuinfo getvcpuinfo;
--
1.7.10.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-28 18:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-11-28 18:56 [PATCH 00/13] Valgrind patches for hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 01/13] xen: Fix XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist for version 0xa Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 02/13] xen: Infratructure for XEN_TMEM_* hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 03/13] xen: XENMEM_maximum_ram_page hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 04/13] xen: XENMEM_maximum_gpfn hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 05/13] xen: XENMEM_machphys_mfn_list hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 06/13] xen: XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:17 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 07/13] xen: XENMEM_remove_from_physmap hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 08/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 09/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3 hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 10/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_sethvmcontext hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:22 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-28 18:56 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2013-11-29 11:25 ` [PATCH 11/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op hypercall Ian Campbell
2013-11-29 11:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:57 ` [PATCH 12/13] xen: XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:57 ` [PATCH 13/13] xen: XEN_SYSCTL_debugkeys hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:45 ` [PATCH 00/13] Valgrind patches for hypercalls Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:37 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-12-02 10:49 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-12-02 11:16 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 14:25 ` Ian Campbell
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