From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: jbeulich@suse.com, kevin.tian@intel.com, suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Cc: keir@xen.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, tim@xen.org,
dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
jun.nakajima@intel.com, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v8 16/19] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2014 10:37:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1404225480-2664-17-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1404225480-2664-1-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Add support for privileged PMU mode which allows privileged domain (dom0)
profile both itself (and the hypervisor) and the guests. While this mode is on
profiling in guests is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 4 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 11 ++++++
xen/include/public/pmu.h | 7 +++-
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index bb759dd..a810d1c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
if ( is_hvm_vcpu(prev) )
{
- if ( (prev != next) && (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ON) )
+ if ( (prev != next) && (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) )
vpmu_save(prev);
if ( !list_empty(&prev->arch.hvm_vcpu.tm_list) )
@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
!is_hardware_domain(next->domain));
}
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(next) && (prev != next) && (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ON) )
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(next) && (prev != next) && (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) )
/* Must be done with interrupts enabled */
vpmu_load(next);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
index dacfd81..87559fe 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void __init parse_vpmu_param(char *s)
}
/* fall through */
case 1:
- vpmu_mode = XENPMU_MODE_ON;
+ vpmu_mode = XENPMU_MODE_SELF;
break;
}
}
@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ int vpmu_do_msr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content, uint8_t rw)
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
- if ( !(vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ON) )
+ if ( (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF) ||
+ ((vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(current->domain)) )
return 0;
ASSERT((rw == VPMU_MSR_READ) || (rw == VPMU_MSR_WRITE));
@@ -154,8 +156,12 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
struct vcpu *curr_vcpu, *v = current;
struct vpmu_struct *vpmu;
- /* dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) */
- if ( v->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ /*
+ * dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) or,
+ * in XENPMU_MODE_ALL, for everyone.
+ */
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) ||
+ (v->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED) )
{
v = choose_hwdom_vcpu();
if ( !v )
@@ -167,7 +173,7 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
curr_vcpu = v;
vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
- if ( !is_hvm_domain(v->domain) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(v->domain) || (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) )
{
/* PV(H) guest or dom0 is doing system profiling */
const struct cpu_user_regs *gregs;
@@ -179,6 +185,7 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return 1;
if ( is_pvh_domain(curr_vcpu->domain) &&
+ !(vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
!vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->do_interrupt(regs) )
return 0;
@@ -187,34 +194,68 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->arch_vpmu_save(v);
vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
- /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(curr_vcpu->domain) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(current->domain) )
{
- /*
- * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
- * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-priviledged
- * PV 32-bit domain.
- */
- struct compat_cpu_user_regs *cmp;
-
- gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
-
- cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
- XLAT_cpu_user_regs(cmp, gregs);
+ /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(curr_vcpu->domain) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
+ * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-priviledged
+ * PV 32-bit domain.
+ */
+ struct compat_cpu_user_regs *cmp;
+
+ gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+
+ cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
+ XLAT_cpu_user_regs(cmp, gregs);
+
+ /* Adjust RPL for kernel mode */
+ if ( (cmp->cs & 3) == 1 )
+ cmp->cs &= ~3;
+ }
+ else if ( !is_hardware_domain(curr_vcpu->domain) &&
+ !is_idle_vcpu(curr_vcpu) )
+ {
+ /* 64-bit unprivileged PV(H) guest */
+ gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+ memcpy(&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs,
+ gregs, sizeof(struct cpu_user_regs));
+ }
+ else
+ memcpy(&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs,
+ regs, sizeof(struct cpu_user_regs));
+
+ if ( !is_pvh_domain(current->domain) )
+ {
+ if ( current->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode )
+ v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs &= ~3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ struct segment_register seg_cs;
+
+ hvm_get_segment_register(current, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
+ v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs = seg_cs.sel;
+ }
}
- else if ( !is_hardware_domain(curr_vcpu->domain) &&
- !is_idle_vcpu(curr_vcpu) )
+ else
{
- /* PV(H) guest */
+ /* HVM guest */
+ struct segment_register seg_cs;
+
gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
- memcpy(&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs,
+ memcpy(&v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs,
gregs, sizeof(struct cpu_user_regs));
+
+ hvm_get_segment_register(current, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
+ v->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs = seg_cs.sel;
}
- else
- memcpy(&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs,
- regs, sizeof(struct cpu_user_regs));
- vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = curr_vcpu->domain->domain_id;
+ vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = (curr_vcpu == v) ?
+ DOMID_SELF :
+ curr_vcpu->domain->domain_id;
vpmu->xenpmu_data->vcpu_id = curr_vcpu->vcpu_id;
vpmu->xenpmu_data->pcpu_id = smp_processor_id();
@@ -562,7 +603,9 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_pmu_params_t) arg)
if ( copy_from_guest(&pmu_params, arg, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( pmu_params.val & ~XENPMU_MODE_ON )
+ if ( (pmu_params.val & ~(XENPMU_MODE_SELF | XENPMU_MODE_ALL)) ||
+ ((pmu_params.val & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) &&
+ (pmu_params.val & XENPMU_MODE_ALL)) )
return -EINVAL;
if ( !spin_trylock(&xenpmu_mode_lock) )
@@ -571,7 +614,7 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_pmu_params_t) arg)
current_mode = vpmu_mode;
vpmu_mode = pmu_params.val;
- if ( vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF )
+ if ( (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF) || (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_ALL) )
{
/*
* Make sure all (non-dom0) VCPUs have unloaded their VPMUs. This
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 5cd7102..33bdcf0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2573,6 +2573,10 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
{
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
+ break;
+
if ( vpmu_do_msr(regs->ecx, &msr_content, VPMU_MSR_WRITE) )
goto fail;
break;
@@ -2693,6 +2697,13 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
{
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
+ {
+ /* Don't leak PMU MSRs to unprivileged domains */
+ regs->eax = regs->edx = 0;
+ break;
+ }
if ( vpmu_do_msr(regs->ecx, &msr_content, VPMU_MSR_READ) )
goto fail;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/pmu.h b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
index ba0abbd..3023e52 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/pmu.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
@@ -48,11 +48,14 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pmu_params_t);
/* PMU modes:
* - XENPMU_MODE_OFF: No PMU virtualization
- * - XENPMU_MODE_ON: Guests can profile themselves, dom0 profiles
+ * - XENPMU_MODE_SELF: Guests can profile themselves, dom0 profiles
* itself and Xen
+ * - XENPMU_MODE_ALL: Only dom0 has access to VPMU and it profiles
+ * everyone: itself, the hypervisor and the guests.
*/
#define XENPMU_MODE_OFF 0
-#define XENPMU_MODE_ON (1<<0)
+#define XENPMU_MODE_SELF (1<<0)
+#define XENPMU_MODE_ALL (1<<1)
/*
* PMU features:
--
1.8.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-01 14:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-01 14:37 [PATCH v8 00/19] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 01/19] common/symbols: Export hypervisor symbols to privileged guest Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 15:06 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 02/19] x86/VPMU: Set MSR bitmaps only for HVM/PVH guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 13:48 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 03/19] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu macros a bit more efficient Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 04/19] intel/VPMU: Clean up Intel VPMU code Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 14:00 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-28 16:20 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 05/19] vmx: Merge MSR management routines Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 14:08 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 06/19] x86/VPMU: Handle APIC_LVTPC accesses Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 07/19] intel/VPMU: MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL should be initialized to zero Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 08/19] x86/VPMU: Add public xenpmu.h Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 14:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 09/19] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu not HVM-specific Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 10/19] x86/VPMU: Interface for setting PMU mode and flags Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 15:22 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-28 16:29 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 16:36 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-28 17:13 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 6:19 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-29 14:31 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 15:21 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 11/19] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 12/19] x86/VPMU: When handling MSR accesses, leave fault injection to callers Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 16:26 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 13/19] x86/VPMU: Add support for PMU register handling on PV guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-28 16:33 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 14/19] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for " Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 7:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 15/19] x86/VPMU: Merge vpmu_rdmsr and vpmu_wrmsr Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 7:46 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-29 14:35 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-07-29 7:55 ` [PATCH v8 16/19] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode Jan Beulich
2014-07-29 14:49 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 17/19] x86/VPMU: Save VPMU state for PV guests during context switch Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-01 14:37 ` [PATCH v8 18/19] x86/VPMU: NMI-based VPMU support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 8:03 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-01 14:38 ` [PATCH v8 19/19] x86/VPMU: Move VPMU files up from hvm/ directory Boris Ostrovsky
2014-07-29 8:07 ` [PATCH v8 00/19] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Jan Beulich
2014-07-29 15:00 ` Boris Ostrovsky
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