From: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>,
tim@xen.org, linux@eikelenboom.it, jbeulich@suse.com,
keir@xen.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] x86/hvm: Always do SMAP check when updating runstate_guest(v)
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2014 07:18:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1404775098-6083-2-git-send-email-feng.wu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1404775098-6083-1-git-send-email-feng.wu@intel.com>
In the current implementation, we honor the guest's CPL and AC
to determain whether do the SMAP check or not for runstate_guest(v).
However, this doesn't work. The VMCS feild is invalid when we try
to get geust's SS by hvm_get_segment_register(), since the
right VMCS has not beed loaded for the current VCPU.
In this patch, we always do the SMAP check when updating
runstate_guest(v) for the guest when SMAP is enabled by it.
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index e896210..b0c8810 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -1349,22 +1349,31 @@ static void paravirt_ctxt_switch_to(struct vcpu *v)
}
/* Update per-VCPU guest runstate shared memory area (if registered). */
-bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *v)
+bool_t update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v)
{
+ bool_t rc;
+
if ( guest_handle_is_null(runstate_guest(v)) )
return 1;
+ v->arch.smap_check_policy = SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED;
+
if ( has_32bit_shinfo(v->domain) )
{
struct compat_vcpu_runstate_info info;
XLAT_vcpu_runstate_info(&info, &v->runstate);
__copy_to_guest(v->runstate_guest.compat, &info, 1);
- return 1;
+ rc = 1;
+ goto out;
}
- return __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1) !=
+ rc = __copy_to_guest(runstate_guest(v), &v->runstate, 1) !=
sizeof(v->runstate);
+
+out:
+ v->arch.smap_check_policy = SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC;
+ return rc;
}
static void _update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *v)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
index bb38fda..1afa7fd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
@@ -164,25 +164,40 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
struct segment_register seg;
const struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
- hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg);
-
/* SMEP: kernel-mode instruction fetches from user-mode mappings
* should fault. Unlike NX or invalid bits, we're looking for _all_
* entries in the walk to have _PAGE_USER set, so we need to do the
* whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. */
smep = hvm_smep_enabled(v) && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch);
- /*
- * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault
- * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
- * conditions come true:
- * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
- * - A user page is accessed
- * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
- * - Page fault in kernel mode
- */
- smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) &&
- ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) || !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC));
+ switch ( v->arch.smap_check_policy )
+ {
+ case SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC:
+ hvm_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &seg);
+
+ /*
+ * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings
+ * should fault.
+ * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
+ * conditions come true:
+ * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
+ * - A user page is accessed
+ * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
+ * - Page fault in kernel mode
+ */
+ smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v) &&
+ ((seg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) ||
+ !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC));
+ break;
+ case SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED:
+ smap = hvm_smap_enabled(v);
+ break;
+ case SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED:
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(XENLOG_INFO "Invalid SMAP check type!\n");
+ break;
+ }
}
if ( smep || smap )
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index abf55fb..d7cac4f 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -446,13 +446,26 @@ struct arch_vcpu
/* A secondary copy of the vcpu time info. */
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_time_info_t) time_info_guest;
+
+ /*
+ * The SMAP check policy when updating runstate_guest(v) and the
+ * secondary system time.
+ * SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC - honor the guest's CPL and AC
+ * SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED - enable the check
+ * SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED - disable the check
+ */
+ uint8_t smap_check_policy;
} __cacheline_aligned;
+#define SMAP_CHECK_HONOR_CPL_AC 0
+#define SMAP_CHECK_ENABLED 1
+#define SMAP_CHECK_DISABLED 2
+
/* Shorthands to improve code legibility. */
#define hvm_vmx hvm_vcpu.u.vmx
#define hvm_svm hvm_vcpu.u.svm
-bool_t update_runstate_area(const struct vcpu *);
+bool_t update_runstate_area(struct vcpu *);
bool_t update_secondary_system_time(const struct vcpu *,
struct vcpu_time_info *);
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-07 23:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-07 23:18 [PATCH 0/2] x86/HVM: Properly handle SMAP check in certain cases Feng Wu
2014-07-07 23:18 ` Feng Wu [this message]
2014-07-08 10:04 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/hvm: Always do SMAP check when updating runstate_guest(v) Andrew Cooper
2014-07-09 1:33 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-23 12:10 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-10 10:56 ` Tim Deegan
2014-07-23 12:11 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23 12:15 ` Tim Deegan
2014-07-07 23:18 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/hvm: honor guest's option when updating secondary system time for guest Feng Wu
2014-07-08 10:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-09 1:39 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-08 16:13 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-07-09 1:52 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-10 11:00 ` Tim Deegan
2014-07-23 12:16 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-23 12:19 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-25 4:30 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-25 7:25 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-25 7:33 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-25 7:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-25 8:03 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-25 8:31 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-25 8:35 ` Wu, Feng
2014-07-25 8:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-25 9:17 ` Jan Beulich
2014-07-08 9:56 ` [PATCH 0/2] x86/HVM: Properly handle SMAP check in certain cases Sander Eikelenboom
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