From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: jbeulich@suse.com, kevin.tian@intel.com,
suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com, eddie.dong@intel.com,
Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com
Cc: keir@xen.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, tim@xen.org,
xen-devel@lists.xen.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 17/20] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2014 23:41:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1409802080-6160-18-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1409802080-6160-1-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Add support for privileged PMU mode which allows privileged domain (dom0)
profile both itself (and the hypervisor) and the guests. While this mode is on
profiling in guests is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 12 +++++++
xen/include/public/pmu.h | 3 ++
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
index 35a08d2..93842cd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpmu.c
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ int vpmu_do_msr(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content,
struct arch_vpmu_ops *ops = vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops;
int ret = 0;
- if ( !(vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) )
+ if ( (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF) ||
+ ((vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(current->domain)) )
return 0;
switch ( rw )
@@ -160,8 +162,12 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
struct vcpu *sampled = current, *sampling;
struct vpmu_struct *vpmu;
- /* dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) */
- if ( sampled->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ /*
+ * dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) or,
+ * in XENPMU_MODE_ALL, for everyone.
+ */
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) ||
+ (sampled->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED) )
{
sampling = choose_hwdom_vcpu();
if ( !sampling )
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
sampling = sampled;
vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(sampling);
- if ( !is_hvm_domain(sampling->domain) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(sampling->domain) || (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) )
{
/* PV(H) guest or dom0 is doing system profiling */
const struct cpu_user_regs *gregs;
@@ -183,6 +189,7 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return 1;
if ( is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) &&
+ !(vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
!vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->do_interrupt(regs) )
return 0;
@@ -191,32 +198,65 @@ int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->arch_vpmu_save(sampling);
vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
- /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(sampling->domain) )
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(sampled->domain) )
{
- /*
- * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
- * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-privileged
- * PV 32-bit domain.
- */
- struct compat_cpu_user_regs *cmp;
-
- gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
-
- cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
- XLAT_cpu_user_regs(cmp, gregs);
+ /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(sampling->domain) )
+ {
+ /*
+ * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
+ * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-privileged
+ * PV 32-bit domain.
+ */
+ struct compat_cpu_user_regs *cmp;
+
+ gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+
+ cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
+ XLAT_cpu_user_regs(cmp, gregs);
+
+ /* Adjust RPL for kernel mode */
+ if ((cmp->cs & 3) == 1)
+ cmp->cs &= ~3;
+ }
+ else if ( !is_hardware_domain(sampled->domain) &&
+ !is_idle_vcpu(sampled) )
+ {
+ /* 64-bit PV(H) unprivileged guest */
+ gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+ vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs = *gregs;
+ }
+ else
+ vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs = *regs;
+
+ if ( !is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) )
+ {
+ if ( sampled->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode )
+ sampling->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs &= ~3;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ struct segment_register seg_cs;
+
+ hvm_get_segment_register(sampled, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
+ sampling->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs = seg_cs.sel;
+ }
}
- else if ( !is_hardware_domain(sampled->domain) &&
- !is_idle_vcpu(sampled) )
+ else
{
- /* PV(H) guest */
+ /* HVM guest */
+ struct segment_register seg_cs;
+
gregs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs = *gregs;
+
+ hvm_get_segment_register(sampled, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
+ sampling->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs.cs = seg_cs.sel;
}
- else
- vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs = *regs;
- vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = sampled->domain->domain_id;
+ vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = (sampled == sampling) ?
+ DOMID_SELF :
+ sampled->domain->domain_id;
vpmu->xenpmu_data->vcpu_id = sampled->vcpu_id;
vpmu->xenpmu_data->pcpu_id = smp_processor_id();
@@ -592,7 +632,9 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_pmu_params_t) arg)
if ( copy_from_guest(&pmu_params, arg, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( pmu_params.val & ~XENPMU_MODE_SELF )
+ if ( (pmu_params.val & ~(XENPMU_MODE_SELF | XENPMU_MODE_ALL)) ||
+ ((pmu_params.val & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) &&
+ (pmu_params.val & XENPMU_MODE_ALL)) )
return -EINVAL;
/*
@@ -606,7 +648,7 @@ long do_xenpmu_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_pmu_params_t) arg)
current_mode = vpmu_mode;
vpmu_mode = pmu_params.val;
- if ( vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF )
+ if ( (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_OFF) || (vpmu_mode == XENPMU_MODE_ALL) )
{
/*
* Make sure all (non-dom0) VCPUs have unloaded their VPMUs. This
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 106f522..aaf8530 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2578,6 +2578,10 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
{
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
+ break;
+
if ( vpmu_do_msr(regs->ecx, &msr_content,
0, VPMU_MSR_WRITE) )
goto fail;
@@ -2701,6 +2705,14 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
{
+ if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
+ !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
+ {
+ /* Don't leak PMU MSRs to unprivileged domains */
+ regs->eax = regs->edx = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
if ( vpmu_do_msr(regs->ecx, &msr_content,
0, VPMU_MSR_READ) )
goto fail;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/pmu.h b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
index 44bf43f..3023e52 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/pmu.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
@@ -50,9 +50,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pmu_params_t);
* - XENPMU_MODE_OFF: No PMU virtualization
* - XENPMU_MODE_SELF: Guests can profile themselves, dom0 profiles
* itself and Xen
+ * - XENPMU_MODE_ALL: Only dom0 has access to VPMU and it profiles
+ * everyone: itself, the hypervisor and the guests.
*/
#define XENPMU_MODE_OFF 0
#define XENPMU_MODE_SELF (1<<0)
+#define XENPMU_MODE_ALL (1<<1)
/*
* PMU features:
--
1.8.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-04 3:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-04 3:41 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] common/symbols: Export hypervisor symbols to privileged guest Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86/VPMU: Manage VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE flag in vpmu_save_force() Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86/VPMU: Set MSR bitmaps only for HVM/PVH guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu macros a bit more efficient Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] intel/VPMU: Clean up Intel VPMU code Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] vmx: Merge MSR management routines Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-08 16:07 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-08 17:28 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-09 9:11 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/VPMU: Handle APIC_LVTPC accesses Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] intel/VPMU: MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL should be initialized to zero Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86/VPMU: Add public xenpmu.h Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 14:45 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 17:23 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-11 6:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-11 13:54 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-11 14:55 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-11 15:26 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-11 15:59 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-11 16:51 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 6:50 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 14:21 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 14:38 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 15:18 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-15 11:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-15 13:06 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-16 1:00 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-16 0:49 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu not HVM-specific Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86/VPMU: Interface for setting PMU mode and flags Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 15:05 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 17:37 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-11 6:44 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-11 14:12 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-11 14:59 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-11 16:10 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 6:49 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 14:12 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 14:39 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 15:03 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 15:30 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 15:54 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-12 16:05 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-12 11:41 ` Dietmar Hahn
2014-09-12 14:25 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-15 13:35 ` Dietmar Hahn
2014-09-18 4:11 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-09-18 21:50 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-19 6:51 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-19 12:42 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-19 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-22 22:29 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-09-22 22:32 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-09-22 22:48 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/VPMU: When handling MSR accesses, leave fault injection to callers Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-18 5:01 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] x86/VPMU: Add support for PMU register handling on PV guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for " Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 15:30 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 16/20] x86/VPMU: Merge vpmu_rdmsr and vpmu_wrmsr Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 15:33 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-18 4:16 ` Tian, Kevin
2014-09-04 3:41 ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-09-10 15:39 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode Jan Beulich
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] x86/VPMU: Save VPMU state for PV guests during context switch Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 15:44 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86/VPMU: NMI-based VPMU support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-04 3:41 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/VPMU: Move VPMU files up from hvm/ directory Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-10 15:48 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 15:54 ` [PATCH v10 00/20] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Jan Beulich
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