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From: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: ian.campbell@citrix.com, tim@xen.org, julien.grall@linaro.org,
	ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com, stefano.stabellini@citrix.com,
	andres@lagarcavilla.org, jbeulich@suse.com,
	dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov, Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Subject: [PATCH v5 12/17] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events.
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 15:28:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1410355726-5599-13-git-send-email-tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1410355726-5599-1-git-send-email-tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>

This patch enables to store, set, check and deliver LPAE R/W mem_events.
As the LPAE PTE's lack enough available software programmable bits,
we store the permissions in a Radix tree, where the key is the pfn
of a 4k page. Only settings other than p2m_access_rwx are saved
in the Radix tree.

Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
---
v5: - Move p2m_set_entry's logic into apply_one_level via
      a new p2m_op, MEMACCESS.
v4: - Add p2m_mem_access_radix_set function to be called
      when inserting new PTE's and when updating existing entries.
    - Switch p2m_mem_access_check to return bool_t.
    - Use new struct npfec to pass violation info.
v3: - Add new function for updating the PTE entries, p2m_set_entry.
    - Use the new struct npfec to pass violation information.
    - Implement n2rwx, rx2rw and listener required routines.
v2: - Patch been split to ease the review process.
    - Add definitions of data abort data fetch status codes (enum dabt_dfsc)
      and only call p2m_mem_access_check for traps caused by permission violations.
    - Only call p2m_write_pte in p2m_lookup if the PTE permission actually changed.
    - Properly save settings in the Radix tree and pause the VCPU with
      mem_event_vcpu_pause.
---
 xen/arch/arm/p2m.c              | 412 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 xen/arch/arm/traps.c            |  31 ++-
 xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h       |  17 ++
 xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h |  30 +++
 4 files changed, 456 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index e6b4bb6..e089d52 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -152,6 +152,74 @@ static lpae_t *p2m_map_first(struct p2m_domain *p2m, paddr_t addr)
     return __map_domain_page(page);
 }
 
+static void p2m_set_permission(lpae_t *e, p2m_type_t t, p2m_access_t a)
+{
+    /* First apply type permissions */
+    switch ( t )
+    {
+    case p2m_ram_rw:
+        e->p2m.xn = 0;
+        e->p2m.write = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case p2m_ram_ro:
+        e->p2m.xn = 0;
+        e->p2m.write = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case p2m_iommu_map_rw:
+    case p2m_map_foreign:
+    case p2m_grant_map_rw:
+    case p2m_mmio_direct:
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        e->p2m.write = 1;
+        break;
+
+    case p2m_iommu_map_ro:
+    case p2m_grant_map_ro:
+    case p2m_invalid:
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        e->p2m.write = 0;
+        break;
+
+    case p2m_max_real_type:
+        BUG();
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* Then restrict with access permissions */
+    switch ( a )
+    {
+    case p2m_access_n:
+        e->p2m.read = e->p2m.write = 0;
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_r:
+        e->p2m.write = 0;
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_x:
+        e->p2m.write = 0;
+        e->p2m.read = 0;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_rx:
+        e->p2m.write = 0;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_w:
+        e->p2m.read = 0;
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_rw:
+        e->p2m.xn = 1;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_wx:
+        e->p2m.read = 0;
+        break;
+    case p2m_access_rwx:
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Lookup the MFN corresponding to a domain's PFN.
  *
@@ -262,37 +330,7 @@ static lpae_t mfn_to_p2m_entry(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int mattr,
         break;
     }
 
-    switch (t)
-    {
-    case p2m_ram_rw:
-        e.p2m.xn = 0;
-        e.p2m.write = 1;
-        break;
-
-    case p2m_ram_ro:
-        e.p2m.xn = 0;
-        e.p2m.write = 0;
-        break;
-
-    case p2m_iommu_map_rw:
-    case p2m_map_foreign:
-    case p2m_grant_map_rw:
-    case p2m_mmio_direct:
-        e.p2m.xn = 1;
-        e.p2m.write = 1;
-        break;
-
-    case p2m_iommu_map_ro:
-    case p2m_grant_map_ro:
-    case p2m_invalid:
-        e.p2m.xn = 1;
-        e.p2m.write = 0;
-        break;
-
-    case p2m_max_real_type:
-        BUG();
-        break;
-    }
+    p2m_set_permission(&e, t, a);
 
     ASSERT(!(pa & ~PAGE_MASK));
     ASSERT(!(pa & ~PADDR_MASK));
@@ -384,6 +422,7 @@ enum p2m_operation {
     REMOVE,
     RELINQUISH,
     CACHEFLUSH,
+    MEMACCESS,
 };
 
 /* Put any references on the single 4K page referenced by pte.  TODO:
@@ -444,6 +483,33 @@ static bool_t is_mapping_aligned(const paddr_t start_gpaddr,
     return true;
 }
 
+static long p2m_mem_access_radix_set(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long pfn,
+                                     p2m_access_t a)
+{
+    long rc;
+
+    if ( p2m_access_rwx == a )
+    {
+        radix_tree_delete(&p2m->mem_access_settings, pfn);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    rc = radix_tree_insert(&p2m->mem_access_settings, pfn,
+                           radix_tree_int_to_ptr(a));
+
+    if ( -EEXIST == rc )
+    {
+        /* If a setting existed already, change it to the new one */
+        radix_tree_replace_slot(
+            radix_tree_lookup_slot(
+                &p2m->mem_access_settings, pfn),
+            radix_tree_int_to_ptr(a));
+        rc = 0;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
 #define P2M_ONE_DESCEND        0
 #define P2M_ONE_PROGRESS_NOP   0x1
 #define P2M_ONE_PROGRESS       0x10
@@ -504,6 +570,10 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
             page = alloc_domheap_pages(d, level_shift - PAGE_SHIFT, 0);
             if ( page )
             {
+                rc = p2m_mem_access_radix_set(p2m, paddr_to_pfn(*addr), a);
+                if ( rc < 0 )
+                    return rc;
+
                 pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(page_to_mfn(page), mattr, t, a);
                 if ( level < 3 )
                     pte.p2m.table = 0;
@@ -538,6 +608,10 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
            /* We do not handle replacing an existing table with a superpage */
              (level == 3 || !p2m_table(orig_pte)) )
         {
+            rc = p2m_mem_access_radix_set(p2m, paddr_to_pfn(*addr), a);
+            if ( rc < 0 )
+                return rc;
+
             /* New mapping is superpage aligned, make it */
             pte = mfn_to_p2m_entry(*maddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, mattr, t, a);
             if ( level < 3 )
@@ -663,6 +737,7 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
 
         memset(&pte, 0x00, sizeof(pte));
         p2m_write_pte(entry, pte, flush_cache);
+        radix_tree_delete(&p2m->mem_access_settings, paddr_to_pfn(*addr));
 
         *addr += level_size;
         *maddr += level_size;
@@ -707,6 +782,53 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
             *addr += PAGE_SIZE;
             return P2M_ONE_PROGRESS_NOP;
         }
+
+    case MEMACCESS:
+        if ( level < 3 )
+        {
+            if ( !p2m_valid(orig_pte) )
+            {
+                (*addr)++;
+                return P2M_ONE_PROGRESS_NOP;
+            }
+
+            /* Shatter large pages as we descend */
+            if ( p2m_mapping(orig_pte) )
+            {
+                rc = p2m_create_table(d, entry,
+                                      level_shift - PAGE_SHIFT, flush_cache);
+                if ( rc < 0 )
+                    return rc;
+
+                p2m->stats.shattered[level]++;
+                p2m->stats.mappings[level]--;
+                p2m->stats.mappings[level+1] += LPAE_ENTRIES;
+            } /* else: an existing table mapping -> descend */
+
+            return P2M_ONE_DESCEND;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            pte = orig_pte;
+
+            if ( !p2m_table(pte) )
+                pte.bits = 0;
+
+            if ( p2m_valid(pte) )
+            {
+                ASSERT(pte.p2m.type != p2m_invalid);
+
+                rc = p2m_mem_access_radix_set(p2m, paddr_to_pfn(*addr), a);
+                if ( rc < 0 )
+                    return rc;
+
+                p2m_set_permission(&pte, pte.p2m.type, a);
+                p2m_write_pte(entry, pte, flush_cache);
+            }
+
+            (*addr)++;
+            return P2M_ONE_PROGRESS;
+        }
     }
 
     BUG(); /* Should never get here */
@@ -1135,6 +1257,234 @@ err:
     return page;
 }
 
+bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, vaddr_t gla, struct npfec npfec)
+{
+    struct vcpu *v = current;
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(v->domain);
+    mem_event_request_t *req = NULL;
+    xenmem_access_t xma;
+    bool_t violation;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = p2m_get_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), &xma);
+    if ( rc )
+    {
+        /* No setting was found, reinject */
+        return 1;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        /* First, handle rx2rw and n2rwx conversion automatically. */
+        if ( npfec.write_access && xma == XENMEM_access_rx2rw )
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+                                    0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rw);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        else if ( xma == XENMEM_access_n2rwx )
+        {
+            rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+                                    0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rwx);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise, check if there is a memory event listener, and send the message along */
+    if ( !mem_event_check_ring( &v->domain->mem_event->access ) )
+    {
+        /* No listener */
+        if ( p2m->access_required )
+        {
+            gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Memory access permissions failure, "
+                                  "no mem_event listener VCPU %d, dom %d\n",
+                                  v->vcpu_id, v->domain->domain_id);
+            domain_crash(v->domain);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            /* n2rwx was already handled */
+            if ( xma != XENMEM_access_n2rwx)
+            {
+                /* A listener is not required, so clear the access
+                 * restrictions. */
+                rc = p2m_set_mem_access(v->domain, paddr_to_pfn(gpa), 1,
+                                        0, ~0, XENMEM_access_rwx);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* No need to reinject */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    switch ( xma )
+    {
+    default:
+    case XENMEM_access_n:
+        violation = npfec.read_access || npfec.write_access || npfec.insn_fetch;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_r:
+        violation = npfec.write_access || npfec.insn_fetch;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_w:
+        violation = npfec.read_access || npfec.insn_fetch;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_x:
+        violation = npfec.read_access || npfec.write_access;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_rx:
+        violation = npfec.write_access;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_wx:
+        violation = npfec.read_access;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_rw:
+        violation = npfec.insn_fetch;
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_rwx:
+        violation = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if ( !violation )
+        return 1;
+
+    req = xzalloc(mem_event_request_t);
+    if ( req )
+    {
+        req->reason = MEM_EVENT_REASON_VIOLATION;
+        if ( xma != XENMEM_access_n2rwx )
+            req->flags |= MEM_EVENT_FLAG_VCPU_PAUSED;
+        req->gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+        req->offset =  gpa & ((1 << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1);
+        req->gla = gla;
+        req->gla_valid = npfec.gla_valid;
+        req->access_r = npfec.read_access;
+        req->access_w = npfec.write_access;
+        req->access_x = npfec.insn_fetch;
+        if ( npfec_kind_in_gpt == npfec.kind )
+            req->fault_in_gpt = 1;
+        if ( npfec_kind_with_gla == npfec.kind )
+            req->fault_with_gla = 1;
+        req->vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id;
+
+        mem_access_send_req(v->domain, req);
+        xfree(req);
+    }
+
+    /* Pause the current VCPU */
+    if ( xma != XENMEM_access_n2rwx )
+        mem_event_vcpu_pause(v);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Set access type for a region of pfns.
+ * If start_pfn == -1ul, sets the default access type */
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long pfn, uint32_t nr,
+                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    p2m_access_t a;
+    long rc = 0;
+    paddr_t paddr;
+
+    static const p2m_access_t memaccess[] = {
+#define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = p2m_access_##ac
+        ACCESS(n),
+        ACCESS(r),
+        ACCESS(w),
+        ACCESS(rw),
+        ACCESS(x),
+        ACCESS(rx),
+        ACCESS(wx),
+        ACCESS(rwx),
+#undef ACCESS
+    };
+
+    switch ( access )
+    {
+    case 0 ... ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) - 1:
+        a = memaccess[access];
+        break;
+    case XENMEM_access_default:
+        a = p2m->default_access;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
+    /* If request to set default access */
+    if ( pfn == ~0ul )
+    {
+        p2m->default_access = a;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    for ( pfn += start; nr > start; ++pfn )
+    {
+        paddr = pfn_to_paddr(pfn);
+        rc = apply_p2m_changes(d, MEMACCESS, paddr, paddr+1, 0, MATTR_MEM, 0, a);
+        if ( rc < 0 )
+            break;
+
+        /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
+        if ( nr > ++start && !(start & mask) && hypercall_preempt_check() )
+        {
+            rc = start;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Flush the TLB of the domain to ensure consistency */
+    flush_tlb_domain(d);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long gpfn,
+                       xenmem_access_t *access)
+{
+    struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
+    void *i;
+    unsigned int index;
+
+    static const xenmem_access_t memaccess[] = {
+#define ACCESS(ac) [XENMEM_access_##ac] = XENMEM_access_##ac
+            ACCESS(n),
+            ACCESS(r),
+            ACCESS(w),
+            ACCESS(rw),
+            ACCESS(x),
+            ACCESS(rx),
+            ACCESS(wx),
+            ACCESS(rwx),
+#undef ACCESS
+    };
+
+    /* If request to get default access */
+    if ( gpfn == ~0ull )
+    {
+        *access = memaccess[p2m->default_access];
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    spin_lock(&p2m->lock);
+
+    i = radix_tree_lookup(&p2m->mem_access_settings, gpfn);
+
+    spin_unlock(&p2m->lock);
+
+    if ( !i )
+        return -ESRCH;
+
+    index = radix_tree_ptr_to_int(i);
+
+    if ( index >= ARRAY_SIZE(memaccess) )
+        return -ERANGE;
+
+    *access =  memaccess[index];
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Local variables:
  * mode: C
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
index 019991f..9d93ed8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/traps.c
@@ -1852,11 +1852,36 @@ static void do_trap_data_abort_guest(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
     info.gva = READ_SYSREG64(FAR_EL2);
 #endif
 
-    if (dabt.s1ptw)
+    rc = gva_to_ipa(info.gva, &info.gpa);
+    if ( -EFAULT == rc )
         goto bad_data_abort;
 
-    rc = gva_to_ipa(info.gva, &info.gpa);
-    if ( rc == -EFAULT )
+    switch ( dabt.dfsc )
+    {
+    case DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_1:
+    case DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_2:
+    case DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_3:
+    {
+        struct npfec npfec = {
+            .read_access = 1,
+            .write_access = dabt.write,
+            .gla_valid = 1,
+            .kind = dabt.s1ptw ? npfec_kind_in_gpt : npfec_kind_with_gla
+        };
+
+        rc = p2m_mem_access_check(info.gpa, info.gva, npfec);
+
+        /* Trap was triggered by mem_access, work here is done */
+        if ( !rc )
+            return;
+    }
+    break;
+
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if ( dabt.s1ptw )
         goto bad_data_abort;
 
     /* XXX: Decode the instruction if ISS is not valid */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
index b4ca86d..85ce984 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
@@ -246,6 +246,23 @@ static inline bool_t p2m_mem_event_sanity_check(struct domain *d)
     return 1;
 }
 
+/* Send mem event based on the access (gla is -1ull if not available). Boolean
+ * return value indicates if trap needs to be injected into guest. */
+bool_t p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, vaddr_t gla, struct npfec npfec);
+
+/* Resumes the running of the VCPU, restarting the last instruction */
+void p2m_mem_access_resume(struct domain *d);
+
+/* Set access type for a region of pfns.
+ * If start_pfn == -1ul, sets the default access type */
+long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long start_pfn, uint32_t nr,
+                        uint32_t start, uint32_t mask, xenmem_access_t access);
+
+/* Get access type for a pfn
+ * If pfn == -1ul, gets the default access type */
+int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, unsigned long pfn,
+                       xenmem_access_t *access);
+
 #endif /* _XEN_P2M_H */
 
 /*
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
index 0cc5b6d..b844f1d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/processor.h
@@ -262,6 +262,36 @@ enum dabt_size {
     DABT_DOUBLE_WORD = 3,
 };
 
+/* Data abort data fetch status codes */
+enum dabt_dfsc {
+    DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_0       = 0b000000,
+    DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_1       = 0b000001,
+    DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_2       = 0b000010,
+    DABT_DFSC_ADDR_SIZE_3       = 0b000011,
+    DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_0     = 0b000100,
+    DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_1     = 0b000101,
+    DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_2     = 0b000110,
+    DABT_DFSC_TRANSLATION_3     = 0b000111,
+    DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_1          = 0b001001,
+    DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_2          = 0b001010,
+    DABT_DFSC_ACCESS_3          = 0b001011,
+    DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_1      = 0b001101,
+    DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_2      = 0b001110,
+    DABT_DFSC_PERMISSION_3      = 0b001111,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT          = 0b010000,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY       = 0b011000,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_0    = 0b010100,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_1    = 0b010101,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_2    = 0b010110,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_EXT_TTW_3    = 0b010111,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_0 = 0b011100,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_1 = 0b011101,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_2 = 0b011110,
+    DABT_DFSC_SYNC_PARITY_TTW_3 = 0b011111,
+    DABT_DFSC_ALIGNMENT         = 0b100001,
+    DABT_DFSC_TLB_CONFLICT      = 0b110000,
+};
+
 union hsr {
     uint32_t bits;
     struct {
-- 
2.1.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-10 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-10 13:28 [PATCH v5 00/17] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 01/17] xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 02/17] xen: Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to mem_access common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 20:16   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:56     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 03/17] xen: Relocate struct npfec definition into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 04/17] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:44   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 05/17] xen/mem_event: Clean out superfluous white-spaces Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 06/17] xen/mem_event: Relax error condition on debug builds Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 07/17] xen/mem_event: Abstract architecture specific sanity checks Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 08/17] xen/mem_access: Abstract architecture specific sanity check Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 09/17] xen/arm: p2m type definitions and changes Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 20:25   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:15     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-12 19:23       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12 20:25         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 20:49   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:31     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-12 19:41       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12 20:20         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 10/17] xen/arm: Add set access required domctl Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 20:26   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 11/17] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 20:28   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:58     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` Tamas K Lengyel [this message]
2014-09-11 21:19   ` [PATCH v5 12/17] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:46     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-12 20:35       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12 20:48         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-12 21:04           ` Julien Grall
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 13/17] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 21:23   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:34     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 14/17] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 15/17] xen: Extend getdomaininfo to return the domain's max_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:48   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 13:55     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 16/17] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:28 ` [PATCH v5 17/17] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-11 21:29   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-12  8:50     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-12  9:01     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 13:51 ` [PATCH v5 00/17] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Jan Beulich
2014-09-10 14:01   ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-15 22:26     ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-16  8:00       ` Jan Beulich

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