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From: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
To: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Cc: wei.liu2@citrix.com, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>,
	Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v11 0/9] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 16:07:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1412003230.3801.26.camel@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAErYnsgk7gBLW7NvWrKsA62omKTVRnO_dQzzjuc01PPhx6p5dA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 2014-09-29 at 16:21 +0200, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:

> The patch you reference in the previous round was newly added has been
> refactored in this round to avoid adding overhead. If it's your
> feeling that there might be some other similar cases and you want to
> delay so you have more time to look at it just be sure, that's
> perfectly understandable, but IMHO in this version there is no
> indication that we are adding any unreasonable overhead.

As I say I think we need to step back and take our time over this. I
think 4.6 is the right target for this stuff, otherwise we are rushing
and risking slipping in something which has an unexpected impact.


> I don't see how those benchmarks would be meaningful for this series.
> During normal operations, the only overhead for the domain would be in
> the trap handlers checking the boolean flag if mem_access is in use in
> case a permission fault happened in the second stage translation..
> which I have never observed happening during my tests. So those
> benchmarks don't really exercise any paths that mem_access touches.

It touches the p2m update code which is a hot path. Also it previously
touched the copy to/from guest paths which is super hot, if you aren't
doing that anymore then great, if you are then there is still a
potential for regressions.

But in any case the benchmarks will serve to highlight *unexpected*
regressions to serve as confirmation of what you expect.

For example I think they would would have pretty clearly shown poor
performance due to the copy to/from user changes in your previous
iteration.

Ian.

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-29 15:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-29 11:36 [PATCH for-4.5 v11 0/9] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 1/9] xen/arm: p2m changes for mem_access support Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 12:26   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 12:41     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 2/9] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 3/9] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 4/9] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 12:35   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 12:47     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 12:52       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 12:53         ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 5/9] xen/arm: Allow hypervisor access to mem_access protected pages Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 14:12   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 14:44     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 14:50       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 14:57         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:07           ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 6/9] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 14:13   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 7/9] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 8/9] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 11:36 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 9/9] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 14:16   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-29 12:17 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v11 0/9] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 13:37   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-29 14:21     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:07       ` Ian Campbell [this message]
2014-09-29 15:17         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:21           ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-29 15:29             ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-30 11:02       ` Stefano Stabellini

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