* [PATCH for-4.5 v12 1/3] xen/xsm: Wrap mem_access blocks into HAS_MEM_ACCESS ifdefs
2014-09-29 15:55 [PATCH for-4.5 v12 0/3] Refactoring for future mem_event and mem_access support on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2014-09-29 15:55 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:55 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v12 2/3] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2014-09-29 15:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: tim, dgdegra, stefano.stabellini, ian.campbell, Tamas K Lengyel
This patch wraps the XSM code corresponding to the mem_access and
mem_event code-paths into HAS_MEM_ACCESS ifdefs.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
---
v12: Split enabling mem_access on ARM from this patch into separate patch
so this can be merged independently.
v8: All MEM_* flags have been converted to HAS_* and moved into config/*.mk
v3: Wrap mem_event related functions in XSM into #ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
blocks.
Update XSM hooks in flask to properly wire it up on ARM.
v2: Add CONFIG_MEM_PAGING and CONFIG_MEM_SHARING definitions and
use them instead of CONFIG_X86.
Split domctl copy-back and p2m type definitions into separate
patches and move this patch to the end of the series.
---
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 7 +++++--
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index df55e70..f20e89c 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -513,6 +513,20 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param_nested(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
}
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_event_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+{
+ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_event_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int op)
+{
+ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_do_mca(XSM_DEFAULT_VOID)
{
@@ -556,18 +570,6 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_ioreq_server(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int
return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
}
-static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_event_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
-{
- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
- return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
-}
-
-static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_event_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, int op)
-{
- XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
- return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
-}
-
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_mem_sharing_op(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
{
XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_DM_PRIV);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 6c1c079..4ce089f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*hvm_param_nested) (struct domain *d);
int (*get_vnumainfo) (struct domain *d);
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+ int (*mem_event_control) (struct domain *d, int mode, int op);
+ int (*mem_event_op) (struct domain *d, int op);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
int (*do_mca) (void);
int (*shadow_control) (struct domain *d, uint32_t op);
@@ -149,8 +154,6 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*hvm_set_pci_link_route) (struct domain *d);
int (*hvm_inject_msi) (struct domain *d);
int (*hvm_ioreq_server) (struct domain *d, int op);
- int (*mem_event_control) (struct domain *d, int mode, int op);
- int (*mem_event_op) (struct domain *d, int op);
int (*mem_sharing_op) (struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op);
int (*apic) (struct domain *d, int cmd);
int (*memtype) (uint32_t access);
@@ -540,6 +543,18 @@ static inline int xsm_get_vnumainfo (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
return xsm_ops->get_vnumainfo(d);
}
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+static inline int xsm_mem_event_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+{
+ return xsm_ops->mem_event_control(d, mode, op);
+}
+
+static inline int xsm_mem_event_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int op)
+{
+ return xsm_ops->mem_event_op(d, op);
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
static inline int xsm_do_mca(xsm_default_t def)
{
@@ -576,16 +591,6 @@ static inline int xsm_hvm_ioreq_server (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int
return xsm_ops->hvm_ioreq_server(d, op);
}
-static inline int xsm_mem_event_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
-{
- return xsm_ops->mem_event_control(d, mode, op);
-}
-
-static inline int xsm_mem_event_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, int op)
-{
- return xsm_ops->mem_event_op(d, op);
-}
-
static inline int xsm_mem_sharing_op (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
{
return xsm_ops->mem_sharing_op(d, cd, op);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index 0826a8b..8eb3050 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -118,6 +118,11 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, remove_from_physmap);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, map_gmfn_foreign);
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_event_control);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_event_op);
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, do_mca);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shadow_control);
@@ -126,8 +131,6 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_set_pci_link_route);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_inject_msi);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_ioreq_server);
- set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_event_control);
- set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_event_op);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, mem_sharing_op);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, apic);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, platform_op);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index df05566..8de5e49 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -577,6 +577,9 @@ static int flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission:
case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_event_op:
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
/* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/x86/domctl.c) */
case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
@@ -584,7 +587,6 @@ static int flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
- case XEN_DOMCTL_mem_event_op:
/* These have individual XSM hooks (drivers/passthrough/iommu.c) */
case XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group:
case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
@@ -1189,6 +1191,18 @@ static int flask_deassign_device(struct domain *d, uint32_t machine_bdf)
}
#endif /* HAS_PASSTHROUGH && HAS_PCI */
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+static int flask_mem_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
+{
+ return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_EVENT);
+}
+
+static int flask_mem_event_op(struct domain *d, int op)
+{
+ return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_EVENT);
+}
+#endif /* HAS_MEM_ACCESS */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
static int flask_do_mca(void)
{
@@ -1299,16 +1313,6 @@ static int flask_hvm_ioreq_server(struct domain *d, int op)
return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__HVMCTL);
}
-static int flask_mem_event_control(struct domain *d, int mode, int op)
-{
- return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_EVENT);
-}
-
-static int flask_mem_event_op(struct domain *d, int op)
-{
- return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_EVENT);
-}
-
static int flask_mem_sharing_op(struct domain *d, struct domain *cd, int op)
{
int rc = current_has_perm(cd, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__MEM_SHARING);
@@ -1577,6 +1581,11 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.deassign_device = flask_deassign_device,
#endif
+#ifdef HAS_MEM_ACCESS
+ .mem_event_control = flask_mem_event_control,
+ .mem_event_op = flask_mem_event_op,
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
.do_mca = flask_do_mca,
.shadow_control = flask_shadow_control,
@@ -1585,8 +1594,6 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.hvm_set_pci_link_route = flask_hvm_set_pci_link_route,
.hvm_inject_msi = flask_hvm_inject_msi,
.hvm_ioreq_server = flask_hvm_ioreq_server,
- .mem_event_control = flask_mem_event_control,
- .mem_event_op = flask_mem_event_op,
.mem_sharing_op = flask_mem_sharing_op,
.apic = flask_apic,
.platform_op = flask_platform_op,
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH for-4.5 v12 3/3] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers.
2014-09-29 15:55 [PATCH for-4.5 v12 0/3] Refactoring for future mem_event and mem_access support on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:55 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v12 1/3] xen/xsm: Wrap mem_access blocks into HAS_MEM_ACCESS ifdefs Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-29 15:55 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v12 2/3] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
@ 2014-09-29 15:55 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-10-01 10:59 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v12 0/3] Refactoring for future mem_event and mem_access support on ARM Ian Campbell
3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tamas K Lengyel @ 2014-09-29 15:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: tim, dgdegra, stefano.stabellini, ian.campbell, Tamas K Lengyel
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
---
v8: Determine level_shift in p2m_shatter_page instead of passing as argument.
---
xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 94 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index 70929fc..1a72ea7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
@@ -227,6 +227,76 @@ int p2m_pod_decrease_reservation(struct domain *d,
return -ENOSYS;
}
+static void p2m_set_permission(lpae_t *e, p2m_type_t t, p2m_access_t a)
+{
+ /* First apply type permissions */
+ switch ( t )
+ {
+ case p2m_ram_rw:
+ e->p2m.xn = 0;
+ e->p2m.write = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case p2m_ram_ro:
+ e->p2m.xn = 0;
+ e->p2m.write = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case p2m_iommu_map_rw:
+ case p2m_map_foreign:
+ case p2m_grant_map_rw:
+ case p2m_mmio_direct:
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ e->p2m.write = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case p2m_iommu_map_ro:
+ case p2m_grant_map_ro:
+ case p2m_invalid:
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ e->p2m.write = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case p2m_max_real_type:
+ BUG();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Then restrict with access permissions */
+ switch ( a )
+ {
+ case p2m_access_rwx:
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_wx:
+ e->p2m.read = 0;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_rw:
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_w:
+ e->p2m.read = 0;
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_rx:
+ case p2m_access_rx2rw:
+ e->p2m.write = 0;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_x:
+ e->p2m.write = 0;
+ e->p2m.read = 0;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_r:
+ e->p2m.write = 0;
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ break;
+ case p2m_access_n:
+ case p2m_access_n2rwx:
+ e->p2m.read = e->p2m.write = 0;
+ e->p2m.xn = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
static lpae_t mfn_to_p2m_entry(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int mattr,
p2m_type_t t)
{
@@ -258,37 +328,8 @@ static lpae_t mfn_to_p2m_entry(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int mattr,
break;
}
- switch (t)
- {
- case p2m_ram_rw:
- e.p2m.xn = 0;
- e.p2m.write = 1;
- break;
-
- case p2m_ram_ro:
- e.p2m.xn = 0;
- e.p2m.write = 0;
- break;
-
- case p2m_iommu_map_rw:
- case p2m_map_foreign:
- case p2m_grant_map_rw:
- case p2m_mmio_direct:
- e.p2m.xn = 1;
- e.p2m.write = 1;
- break;
-
- case p2m_iommu_map_ro:
- case p2m_grant_map_ro:
- case p2m_invalid:
- e.p2m.xn = 1;
- e.p2m.write = 0;
- break;
-
- case p2m_max_real_type:
- BUG();
- break;
- }
+ /* We pass p2m_access_rwx as a placeholder for now. */
+ p2m_set_permission(&e, t, p2m_access_rwx);
ASSERT(!(pa & ~PAGE_MASK));
ASSERT(!(pa & ~PADDR_MASK));
@@ -451,6 +492,26 @@ static const paddr_t level_masks[] =
static const paddr_t level_shifts[] =
{ ZEROETH_SHIFT, FIRST_SHIFT, SECOND_SHIFT, THIRD_SHIFT };
+static int p2m_shatter_page(struct domain *d,
+ lpae_t *entry,
+ unsigned int level,
+ bool_t flush_cache)
+{
+ const paddr_t level_shift = level_shifts[level];
+ int rc = p2m_create_table(d, entry,
+ level_shift - PAGE_SHIFT, flush_cache);
+
+ if ( !rc )
+ {
+ struct p2m_domain *p2m = &d->arch.p2m;
+ p2m->stats.shattered[level]++;
+ p2m->stats.mappings[level]--;
+ p2m->stats.mappings[level+1] += LPAE_ENTRIES;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* 0 == (P2M_ONE_DESCEND) continue to descend the tree
* +ve == (P2M_ONE_PROGRESS_*) handled at this level, continue, flush,
@@ -582,14 +643,9 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
if ( p2m_mapping(orig_pte) )
{
*flush = true;
- rc = p2m_create_table(d, entry,
- level_shift - PAGE_SHIFT, flush_cache);
+ rc = p2m_shatter_page(d, entry, level, flush_cache);
if ( rc < 0 )
return rc;
-
- p2m->stats.shattered[level]++;
- p2m->stats.mappings[level]--;
- p2m->stats.mappings[level+1] += LPAE_ENTRIES;
} /* else: an existing table mapping -> descend */
BUG_ON(!p2m_table(*entry));
@@ -624,15 +680,10 @@ static int apply_one_level(struct domain *d,
* and descend.
*/
*flush = true;
- rc = p2m_create_table(d, entry,
- level_shift - PAGE_SHIFT, flush_cache);
+ rc = p2m_shatter_page(d, entry, level, flush_cache);
if ( rc < 0 )
return rc;
- p2m->stats.shattered[level]++;
- p2m->stats.mappings[level]--;
- p2m->stats.mappings[level+1] += LPAE_ENTRIES;
-
return P2M_ONE_DESCEND;
}
}
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread