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From: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
To: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>,
	Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
	Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, JBeulich@suse.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/11] Xen PCI Passthrough security fixes
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 16:47:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1433260042.15036.332.camel@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.02.1506021608160.19838@kaball.uk.xensource.com>

On Tue, 2015-06-02 at 16:08 +0100, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> the following is a collection of QEMU security fixes for PCI Passthrough
> on Xen.

Part of this locks down the PCI cfg space emulation, which means we now
need a way for people to request the old "permissive" behaviour for
devices which need it. Per the xl docs:
        It is recommended to enable this option only for trusted VMs
        under administrator control.

The toolstack (libxl, xl etc) already support a permissive flag in the
domain cfg, and this series adds a new device property. All we need to
do is tie them together.

The simple version is below. I also have an incremental update which
uses the QMP device-list-properties command to probe for the presence of
this property (so things can automatically work with unpatches qemu). I
think it's not really necessary in this case.

Ian.

-----8>---------

>From c395657b03a1e2b7616d987e7078694874981979 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 11:32:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tools: libxl: allow permissive qemu-upstream pci
 passthrough.

EMBARGOED UNTIL 2015-06-02 12:00 (WITH XSA-131 ET AL)

Since XSA-131 qemu-xen now restricts access to PCI cfg by default. In
order to allow local configuration of the existing libxl_device_pci
"permissive" flag needs to be plumbed through via the new QMP property
added by the XSA-131 patches.

Versions of QEMU prior to XSA-131 did not support this permissive
property, so we only pass it if it is true. Older versions only
supported permissive mode.

qemu-xen-traditional already supports the permissive mode setting via
xenstore.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
---
v2: Only set argument if permissive==true.
---
 tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
index 9aa7e2e..6484f5e 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_qmp.c
@@ -849,6 +849,18 @@ int libxl__qmp_pci_add(libxl__gc *gc, int domid, libxl_device_pci *pcidev)
         QMP_PARAMETERS_SPRINTF(&args, "addr", "%x.%x",
                                PCI_SLOT(pcidev->vdevfn), PCI_FUNC(pcidev->vdevfn));
     }
+    /*
+     * Version of QEMU prior to the XSA-131 fix did not support this
+     * property and were effectively always in permissive mode. The
+     * fix for XSA-131 switched the default to be restricted by
+     * default and added the permissive property.
+     *
+     * Therefore in order to support both old and new QEMU we only set
+     * the permissive flag if it is true. Users of older QEMU have no
+     * reason to set the flag so this is ok.
+     */
+    if (pcidev->permissive)
+        qmp_parameters_add_bool(gc, &args, "permissive", true);
 
     rc = qmp_synchronous_send(qmp, "device_add", args,
                               NULL, NULL, qmp->timeout);
-- 
1.7.10.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-02 15:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-10-06  8:42 [PATCH] docs: xl.cfg: permissive option is not PV only Ian Campbell
2015-10-06  8:52 ` Wei Liu
2015-10-07 11:52   ` Ian Campbell
2015-06-02 15:08     ` [PATCH 0/11] Xen PCI Passthrough security fixes Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 01/11] xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 02/11] xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 03/11] xen/MSI-X: limit error messages Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 04/11] xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 05/11] xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 06/11] xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 07/11] xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space handling Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 08/11] xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 09/11] xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 10/11] xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:10       ` [PATCH 11/11] xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:32       ` [PATCH 0/11] Xen PCI Passthrough security fixes Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-02 15:51         ` Peter Maydell
2015-06-02 15:47       ` Ian Campbell [this message]
2015-06-17 12:38         ` [Xen-devel] " Ian Campbell
2015-06-17 13:52           ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-06-17 13:54             ` Ian Campbell
2015-07-03 14:49         ` [PATCH] tools: libxl: allow permissive qemu-upstream pci passthrough Ian Campbell
2015-07-06 12:20           ` George Dunlap
2015-07-06 12:59           ` Anthony PERARD
2015-07-07 13:40           ` Wei Liu
2015-07-07 15:41             ` Ian Campbell
2015-10-06  8:36           ` Ian Campbell
2015-10-06 13:07             ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-10-06 15:18               ` Ian Jackson
2015-10-20 17:09           ` [PATCH] tools: libxl: allow permissive qemu-upstream pci passthrough. [and 1 more messages] Ian Jackson

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