From: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
To: jbeulich@suse.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
jun.nakajima@intel.com, eddie.dong@intel.com,
kevin.tian@intel.com, george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com,
ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com, stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com,
ian.campbell@citrix.com, wei.liu2@citrix.com, keir@xen.org
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for do_page_fault
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 18:31:55 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1447669917-17939-9-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1447669917-17939-1-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com>
This patch adds pkeys support for do_page_fault.
the protection keys architecture define a new status bit in the PFEC. PFEC.PK
(bit 5) is set to 1 if an only if protection keys block the access.
Protection keys block an access and induce a page fault if and only if
1.Protection keys are enabled (CR4.PKE=1 and EFER.LMA=1), and
2.The page has a valid translation (page is present with no reserved bit
violations), and
3.The access is not an instruction fetch, and
4.The access is to a user page, and
5.At least one of the following restrictions apply:
--The access is a data read or data write and AD=1
--The access is a data write and WD=1 and either CR0.WP=1 or (CR0.WP=0 and
it is a user access)
Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 9f5a6c6..73abb3b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ enum pf_type {
spurious_fault
};
-static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
+static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(struct vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long addr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long mfn, cr3 = read_cr3();
@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
l3_pgentry_t l3e, *l3t;
l2_pgentry_t l2e, *l2t;
l1_pgentry_t l1e, *l1t;
- unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, page_user;
+ unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, page_user, pte_pkeys;
unsigned int error_code = regs->error_code;
/*
@@ -1340,6 +1340,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
if ( ((l3e_get_flags(l3e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & disallowed_flags) )
return real_fault;
+ pte_pkeys = l3e_get_pkeys(l3e);
page_user &= l3e_get_flags(l3e);
if ( l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PSE )
goto leaf;
@@ -1351,6 +1352,7 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
if ( ((l2e_get_flags(l2e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
(l2e_get_flags(l2e) & disallowed_flags) )
return real_fault;
+ pte_pkeys = l2e_get_pkeys(l2e);
page_user &= l2e_get_flags(l2e);
if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE )
goto leaf;
@@ -1362,12 +1364,22 @@ static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
if ( ((l1e_get_flags(l1e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
(l1e_get_flags(l1e) & disallowed_flags) )
return real_fault;
+ pte_pkeys = l1e_get_pkeys(l1e);
page_user &= l1e_get_flags(l1e);
leaf:
if ( page_user )
{
unsigned long cr4 = read_cr4();
+ unsigned int ff, wf, uf, rsvdf, pkuf;
+ unsigned int pkru_ad, pkru_wd;
+
+ uf = error_code & PFEC_user_mode;
+ wf = error_code & PFEC_write_access;
+ rsvdf = error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit;
+ ff = error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch;
+ pkuf = error_code & PFEC_protection_key;
+
/*
* Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP):
* Disallow supervisor execution from user-accessible mappings
@@ -1386,15 +1398,35 @@ leaf:
* - CPL=3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC is clear
* - Page fault in kernel mode
*/
- if ( (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP) && !(error_code & PFEC_user_mode) &&
+ if ( (cr4 & X86_CR4_SMAP) && !uf &&
(((regs->cs & 3) == 3) || !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)) )
return smap_fault;
+ /*
+ * PKU: additional mechanism by which the paging controls
+ * access to user-mode addresses based on the value in the
+ * PKRU register. A fault is considered as a PKU violation if all
+ * of the following conditions are ture:
+ * 1.CR4_PKE=1.
+ * 2.EFER_LMA=1.
+ * 3.page is present with no reserved bit violations.
+ * 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
+ * 5.the access is to a user page.
+ * 6.PKRU.AD=1
+ * or The access is a data write and PKRU.WD=1
+ * and either CR0.WP=1 or it is a user access.
+ */
+ pkru_ad = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
+ pkru_wd = READ_PKRU_AD(pte_pkeys);
+ if ( pkuf && (cr4 & X86_CR4_PKE) && hvm_long_mode_enabled(vcpu) &&
+ !rsvdf && !ff && (pkru_ad ||
+ (pkru_wd && wf && (hvm_wp_enabled(vcpu) || uf))))
+ return real_fault;
}
return spurious_fault;
}
-static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(
+static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(struct vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long addr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1405,7 +1437,7 @@ static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault(
* page tables from becoming invalid under our feet during the walk.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
- pf_type = __page_fault_type(addr, regs);
+ pf_type = __page_fault_type(vcpu, addr, regs);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return pf_type;
@@ -1479,6 +1511,7 @@ static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
* Bit 2: User mode (=1) ; Supervisor mode (=0)
* Bit 3: Reserved bit violation
* Bit 4: Instruction fetch
+ * Bit 5: Protection-key violations
*/
void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
@@ -1500,7 +1533,7 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
if ( unlikely(!guest_mode(regs)) )
{
- pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
+ pf_type = spurious_page_fault(current, addr, regs);
if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault) )
{
console_start_sync();
@@ -1533,7 +1566,7 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
if ( unlikely(current->domain->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults) )
{
- pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
+ pf_type = spurious_page_fault(current, addr, regs);
if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault))
{
printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pv fatal SM%cP violation\n",
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
index 427eb84..e8090fb 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
@@ -135,13 +135,14 @@
#define TF_kernel_mode (1<<_TF_kernel_mode)
/* #PF error code values. */
-#define PFEC_page_present (1U<<0)
-#define PFEC_write_access (1U<<1)
-#define PFEC_user_mode (1U<<2)
-#define PFEC_reserved_bit (1U<<3)
-#define PFEC_insn_fetch (1U<<4)
-#define PFEC_page_paged (1U<<5)
-#define PFEC_page_shared (1U<<6)
+#define PFEC_page_present (1U<<0)
+#define PFEC_write_access (1U<<1)
+#define PFEC_user_mode (1U<<2)
+#define PFEC_reserved_bit (1U<<3)
+#define PFEC_insn_fetch (1U<<4)
+#define PFEC_protection_key (1U<<5)
+#define PFEC_page_paged (1U<<6)
+#define PFEC_page_shared (1U<<7)
#define XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PAE)
--
2.4.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-16 10:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-16 10:31 [PATCH 00/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add memory protection-key support Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for cpuid handling Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 12:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-19 14:39 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-16 16:58 ` Wei Liu
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pku support for x86_capability Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 13:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add the flag to enable Memory Protection Keys Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 13:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support when setting CR4 Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-20 1:16 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-20 10:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, disable pkeys for guests in non-paging mode Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add functions to get pkeys value from PTE Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 14:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 14:42 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 07/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add functions to support PKRU access/write Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 15:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` Huaitong Han [this message]
2015-11-16 15:25 ` [PATCH 08/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for do_page_fault Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for guest_walk_tables Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 16:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 16:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 10:31 ` [PATCH 10/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add xstate support for pkeys Huaitong Han
2015-11-16 16:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-16 17:45 ` [PATCH 00/10] x86/hvm: pkeys, add memory protection-key support Andrew Cooper
2015-11-17 10:26 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-17 16:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-17 16:36 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-18 9:12 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-18 10:10 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-11-19 7:44 ` Wu, Feng
2015-11-19 8:44 ` Jan Beulich
2015-11-19 8:49 ` Wu, Feng
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