From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 19/31] tools/libxc: Sanitise guest featuresets
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 21:24:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1450301073-28191-20-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1450301073-28191-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
When generating a VM featureset, clearing individual features is problematic
if a feature has dependent features.
Instead of disabling individual features, collect all disabling together in
sanitise_featureset(), and perform deep dependency removal on the result, to
remove all impacted features.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
index 3f39306..6c8995f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -21,14 +21,15 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "xc_private.h"
-#include <xen/arch-x86/featureset.h>
+#include "cpuid-private.h"
#include <xen/hvm/params.h>
#include <xen/sysctl.h>
#define bitmaskof(idx) (1u << ((idx) & 31))
-#define clear_bit(idx, dst) ((dst) &= ~bitmaskof(idx))
-#define set_bit(idx, dst) ((dst) |= bitmaskof(idx))
+#define clear_feature(idx, dst) ((dst) &= ~bitmaskof(idx))
+#define set_feature(idx, dst) ((dst) |= bitmaskof(idx))
#define DEF_MAX_BASE 0x0000000du
#define DEF_MAX_INTELEXT 0x80000008u
@@ -212,20 +213,6 @@ static void amd_xc_cpuid_policy(xc_interface *xch,
regs[0] = DEF_MAX_AMDEXT;
break;
- case 0x80000001:
- if ( !info->pae )
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE, regs[3]);
-
- if ( !info->nestedhvm )
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SVM, regs[2]);
-
- if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_FMA4, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LWP, regs[2]);
- }
- break;
-
case 0x80000008:
/*
* ECX[15:12] is ApicIdCoreSize: ECX[7:0] is NumberOfCores (minus one).
@@ -272,11 +259,6 @@ static void intel_xc_cpuid_policy(xc_interface *xch,
{
switch ( input[0] )
{
- case 0x00000001:
- if ( !info->nestedhvm )
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VMXE, regs[2]);
- break;
-
case 0x00000004:
/*
* EAX[31:26] is Maximum Cores Per Package (minus one).
@@ -375,20 +357,6 @@ static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(xc_interface *xch,
regs[2] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_1c];
regs[3] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_1d];
-
- if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_AVX, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_F16C, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_FMA, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, regs[2]);
- }
-
- if ( !info->pae )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE36, regs[3]);
- }
break;
case 0x00000007: /* Intel-defined CPU features */
@@ -416,15 +384,6 @@ static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(xc_interface *xch,
case 0x80000001:
regs[2] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_e1c];
regs[3] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_e1d];
-
- if ( !info->pae )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE36, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB, regs[3]);
- }
break;
case 0x80000007:
@@ -473,23 +432,6 @@ static void xc_cpuid_pv_policy(xc_interface *xch,
case 0x00000001:
regs[2] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_1c];
regs[3] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_1d];
-
- if ( !info->pv64 )
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_CX16, regs[2]);
-
- if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_AVX, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_F16C, regs[2]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_FMA, regs[2]);
- }
-
- if ( !info->pvh )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE, regs[3]);
- }
break;
case 0x00000007:
@@ -513,19 +455,6 @@ static void xc_cpuid_pv_policy(xc_interface *xch,
case 0x80000001:
regs[2] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_e1c];
regs[3] = info->featureset[XEN_FEATURESET_e1d];
-
- if ( !info->pv64 )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM, regs[2]);
- }
-
- if ( !info->pvh )
- {
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE, regs[3]);
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB, regs[3]);
- }
break;
case 0x00000005: /* MONITOR/MWAIT */
@@ -605,6 +534,65 @@ void xc_cpuid_to_str(const unsigned int *regs, char **strs)
}
}
+static void sanitise_featureset(struct cpuid_domain_info *info)
+{
+ uint32_t disabled_features[XEN_NR_FEATURESET_ENTRIES];
+ unsigned int i, b;
+
+ if ( info->hvm )
+ {
+ /* HVM Guest */
+
+ if ( !info->pae )
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE, info->featureset);
+
+ if ( !info->nestedhvm )
+ {
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SVM, info->featureset);
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VMXE, info->featureset);
+ }
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* PV or PVH Guest */
+
+ if ( !info->pv64 )
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM, info->featureset);
+
+ if ( !info->pvh )
+ {
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE, info->featureset);
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE36, info->featureset);
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE, info->featureset);
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB, info->featureset);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 )
+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, info->featureset);
+
+ /* Disable deep dependencies of disabled features. */
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i )
+ disabled_features[i] = ~info->featureset[i] & deep_dep_features[i];
+
+ for ( b = 0; b < sizeof(disabled_features) * CHAR_BIT; ++b )
+ {
+ const struct tagged_featureset *dfs;
+
+ if ( !test_bit(b, disabled_features) ||
+ !(dfs = lookup_deep_deps(b)) )
+ continue;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i )
+ {
+ info->featureset[i] &= ~dfs->fs[i];
+ disabled_features[i] &= ~dfs->fs[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static int __xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
uint32_t *featureset,
unsigned int nr_features)
@@ -628,6 +616,8 @@ static int __xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
else
ext_max = (regs[0] <= DEF_MAX_INTELEXT) ? regs[0] : DEF_MAX_INTELEXT;
+ sanitise_featureset(&info);
+
input[0] = 0;
input[1] = XEN_CPUID_INPUT_UNUSED;
for ( ; ; )
@@ -811,9 +801,9 @@ int xc_cpuid_set(
val = polval;
if ( val )
- set_bit(31 - j, regs[i]);
+ set_feature(31 - j, regs[i]);
else
- clear_bit(31 - j, regs[i]);
+ clear_feature(31 - j, regs[i]);
config_transformed[i][j] = config[i][j];
if ( config[i][j] == 's' )
--
2.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-16 21:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-16 21:24 [PATCH RFC 00/31] x86: Improvements to cpuid handling for guests Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 01/31] xen/public: Export featureset information in the public API Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:28 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:59 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-23 10:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-23 10:24 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-23 11:26 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-06 7:43 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 02/31] tools/libxc: Use public/featureset.h for cpuid policy generation Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:29 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-05 14:13 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 14:18 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:02 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 15:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:09 ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 03/31] xen/x86: Store antifeatures inverted in a featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:32 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 14:19 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 14:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 04/31] xen/x86: Mask out unknown features from Xen's capabilities Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:42 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 05/31] xen/x86: Collect more CPUID feature words Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:46 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 06/31] xen/x86: Infrastructure to calculate guest featuresets Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:50 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 07/31] xen/x86: Export host featureset via SYSCTL Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 16:57 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 08/31] tools/stubs: Expose host featureset to userspace Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:36 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 15:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:09 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:38 ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 09/31] xen/x86: Calculate PV featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:07 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:13 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:18 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 10/31] xen/x86: Calculate HVM featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:11 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 11/31] xen/x86: Calculate Raw featureset Andrew Cooper
2015-12-22 17:14 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-22 17:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 12/31] tools: Utility for dealing with featuresets Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:17 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:34 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 17:13 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 17:37 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 18:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-06 10:38 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-06 10:40 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-06 10:42 ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 13/31] tools/libxc: Wire a featureset through to cpuid policy logic Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:42 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 14/31] tools/libxc: Use featureset rather than guesswork Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 15:54 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 15/31] x86: Generate deep dependencies of x86 features Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:03 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 16:54 ` Ian Campbell
2016-01-05 17:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-05 17:19 ` Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 16/31] x86: Automatically generate known_features Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 17/31] xen/x86: Clear dependent features when clearing a cpu cap Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 18/31] xen/x86: Improve disabling of features which have dependencies Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 16:48 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-01-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC 19/31] tools/libxc: Sanitise guest featuresets Ian Campbell
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 20/31] x86: Improvements to in-hypervisor cpuid sanity checks Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:02 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-21 17:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 18:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 7:47 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 7:45 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 21/31] x86/domctl: Break out logic to update domain state from cpuid information Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:05 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-21 17:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 22/31] x86/cpu: Move set_cpumask() calls into c_early_init() Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:08 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 23/31] xen/x86: Export cpuid levelling capabilities via SYSCTL Andrew Cooper
2016-01-21 17:23 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 24/31] tools/stubs: Expose host levelling capabilities to userspace Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 25/31] xen/x86: Common infrastructure for levelling context switching Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 8:56 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 10:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 26/31] xen/x86: Rework AMD masking MSR setup Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 9:27 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 11:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 11:13 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 13:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:12 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 17:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-25 11:25 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 27/31] xen/x86: Rework Intel masking/faulting setup Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:53 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 28/31] xen/x86: Context switch all levelling state in context_switch() Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 9:52 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:31 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 29/31] x86/pv: Provide custom cpumasks for PV domains Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 9:56 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:33 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 14:48 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-22 14:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 30/31] x86/domctl: Update PV domain cpumasks when setting cpuid policy Andrew Cooper
2016-01-22 10:02 ` Jan Beulich
2015-12-16 21:24 ` [PATCH RFC 31/31] tools/libxc: Calculate xstate cpuid leaf from guest information Andrew Cooper
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